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ABSTRACT

It is generally considered that sumptuary law is an archaic form of governmental
intervention that targeted the personal lives of people living in the early modern
period in Europe, and has no modern significance. This thesis examines the post
Federation period, between 1901 and 1927, to reveal that the sumptuary impulse was
alive and well in modern Australia. This impulse was now transmuted by a new
patrician elite into a form of social and legal regulation in order to control the
clothing and entertainment choices of working Australians. The impulse was
sustained through taxation and fiscal legal mechanisms (ie: tariffs), wage cases, and
through the agency of wartime regulations. All of these measures recall the
sumptuary laws of early modern Europe.

This period saw the fabric of Australian society undergo enormous social and
political change. To a large extent, this change was prompted by the availability of
unprecedented economic opportunities and personal freedoms. An increase in the
attraction and availability of imported luxuries led the government to increase tariffs
as part of their settled policy of protectionism. This thesis argues that, during this
period of socio-economic development, protectionism shared many of the discursive
features of the sumptuary laws of the early modern period. This association became
even more evident during World War I, when government often relied on moral
regulation to constrict the consumption practices of the Australian people to address
wartime shortages and to provide for the military needs of the Empire.

This thesis accepts that protectionist policies did not aim to control the moral and
personal behaviour of the individual but rather sought to protect nascent or struggling
domestic industries. It was in the effect of these policies where the sumptuary
impulse was apparent. By the beginning of the 1920s, this policy of protectionism,
with frequent increases in tariffs on imported clothing, changed the language and
method of the sumptuary impulse into one of rationality. These types of measures
existed in a direct line back to the early sumptuary laws, one facet of which sought to
protect industries. However, by the mid-1920s, the association began to wane when
moralisation served a secondary role in protectionist discourse. By 1927, the
regulatory objective became pure rational protectionism rather than the moralisation
that was evident throughout the first two decades following Federation.

THESIS CERTIFICATION

CERTIFICATION
I, Caroline Irene Dick, declare that this thesis, submitted in fulfilment of the
requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy, in the Faculty of Law,
Humanities and the Arts, University of Wollongong, is wholly my own work unless
otherwise referenced or acknowledged. The document has not been submitted for
qualifications at any other academic institution.

Caroline Irene Dick
26 June 2015

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Firstly, I would like to acknowledge and thank my supervisors, Associate Professor
Marett Leiboff and Dr Cassandra Sharp. I especially thank Marett for her constant
guidance and support throughout this journey. In particular, her assiduous attention
to detail and referencing has been invaluable.

I would like to acknowledge my family for their patience and love. I would like to
thank my husband, Kevin, for his enduring love and support during this challenging
project. My children (Carly, Shane, Glen, Elena and Gilbert) to this day still do not
know what I have been up to in the last six years! I have been particularly buoyed by
the comments from my son, Shane, who lives in Canada, who frequently asks me:
‘aren’t you done with schooling yet?’

I wish to thank my good friend and colleague, Ryan Kernaghan, for his constant
friendship and support over the last few years. His referencing skills have proved to
be of immeasurable assistance, particularly in the last weeks leading up to the
completion of this thesis.

I thank my colleagues, Dean of Law, Professor Warwick Gullett, Professor Greg
Rose, Associate Professors Andrew Frazer and Jakkrit Kuanpoth, Dr Charles Chew,
Dr Trish Mundy, Dr Linda Steele, John Littrich, Dr Niamh Kinchin, Michael Devitt,
Sandy Noakes and Viv McIlroy. I acknowledge the encouragement of Professors
Brian Martin and Margaret McKerchar.

I thank Christine Jones, Kirsten Bissett, and all the wonderful people at ITS Staff
Support, for being pleasant and helpful in relation to any and all technology-related
questions throughout the last few years.

I also thank my brother, Raymond Kinch, and colleague Theresa Huxtable for their
insightful comments on the first draft of this thesis.

I thank my PhD colleagues, Yvonne Apolo, Pariz Lythgo-Marshall, Brett Heino,
Kate Tubridy and Sarah Wright for their kind words of encouragement.

I acknowledge the University of Wollongong Employment Equity and Diversity
Fellowship (awarded in 2014), which assisted in the completion of the thesis.

I thank all the team at the University of Wollongong Library, especially the
Document Delivery team for their considerable assistance in gaining access to
archival material. I also acknowledge the team at the National Archives of Australia,
the National Library of Australia.

I dedicate this thesis to my late darling mother Beryl Kinch (nee Aroney, born Alenie
Moustakas). My mother was born in 1919, during the period examined by my thesis.
As a result, the early post-Federation period holds a great significance for me. Mum
was a bright and intuitive lady who had little but gave a lot.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................ 1
THESIS CERTIFICATION...................................................................................... 3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS....................................................................................... 4
TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................................................................... 6
WORKS PUBLISHED IN THE COURSE OF THIS RESEARCH ................... 12
1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. 1
1.1

Purpose of the chapter .................................................................................. 1

1.2

Introduction to this thesis ............................................................................. 2

1.3

Originality and significance of this study .................................................... 6

1.4

Methodology and Scope of the study ........................................................... 8

1.5

Literature Review ....................................................................................... 13

1.6

Outlining the structure of this thesis .......................................................... 22

2 Sumptuary Pattern Making: using the English design...................................... 25
2.1

Purpose and structure of this chapter ......................................................... 25

2.2

Sumptuary Patterns and Themes 1336-1604.............................................. 28

2.3

Entertainments and popular pastimes......................................................... 51

2.4

The erosion of the sumptuary impulse: 1604-1758.................................... 53

2.5

Gone but not Forgotten: The Australian Sumptuary Experience ............... 56

2.6

Conclusion ................................................................................................. 59

3 Shaping the Australian Sumptuary Experience: Individuals and Institutions 61
3.1

Purpose and Structure of this chapter ........................................................ 61

3.2

Federation................................................................................................... 63

3.3

Ivy and Herbert Brookes - their political and social mission was to rid

society of ‘evils’ ..................................................................................................... 71
3.4

The Tariff Board ........................................................................................ 76

3.5

Women’s Associations ............................................................................... 82

3.6

The Commonwealth and State Arbitration Courts ..................................... 86

3.7

The Unions ................................................................................................. 90

3.8

The Press .................................................................................................... 93

3.9

Conclusion ................................................................................................. 95

4 Taxation in Australia up until 1914: The Warp and Weft of Protectionism... 97
4.1

Purpose and Structure of the chapter ......................................................... 97

4.2

Early Colonial taxes-a faint sumptuary pattern ........................................ 100

4.3

1819-1859- the formalisation of tax policy in the Australian Colonies ... 105

4.4

1860-1900-taxation and protectionism .................................................... 110

4.5

Federation –taxation, tariffs and morals................................................... 115

4.6

A sumptuary tariff .................................................................................... 120

4.7

New Protection, 1905-1908–protectionism and wages ............................ 123

4.8

Uniform Protectionism-sumptuary threads .............................................. 127

4.9

The establishment of the Inter-State Commission-the new scientific

approach towards Protectionism .......................................................................... 133
4.10

Conclusion ............................................................................................... 136

5 The Sumptuary Impulse in ‘living wage’ cases ................................................ 138
5.1

Purpose and Structure of this chapter ...................................................... 138

5.2

Living Wage Inquiries: the ‘normal needs’ of the worker ....................... 139

5.3

“The principle of the living wage has been applied to women, but with a

difference” ............................................................................................................ 141
5.4

Matrimony and Motherhood: the real life-work of the average woman .. 143

5.5

Keeping women in their place at home rather than them “having to go out

and seek employment in man’s realm” ................................................................ 145
5.6

Justice Higgins: The Cost of Dress is What Makes Women’s Needs

Different from those of men................................................................................. 149
5.7

Judicial Interrogation ............................................................................... 153

5.8

Judicial Probing........................................................................................ 161

5.9

What is a camisole?.................................................................................. 165

5.10

Independent Evidence .............................................................................. 167

5.11

Female Input............................................................................................. 170

5.12

The Press’s foray into working women’s wardrobes ............................... 172

5.13

Style and Taste: the exclusive domain of upper class women ................. 177

5.14

Conclusion ............................................................................................... 179

6 The Prohibition of Luxury – the plan to stitch-up Australians with a jingoistic
yarn .......................................................................................................................... 182
6.1

Purpose and structure of this chapter ....................................................... 182

6.2

Twisting sumptuary threads around the notion of Luxury ....................... 184

6.3

Fashionable acquisition trumps self-denial .............................................. 187

6.4

Ruling Australia from Downing Street: a sumptuary pattern drafted for the

Empire 188
6.5

The establishment of the Luxuries Board: an ensemble of the Prime

Minister’s making ................................................................................................ 201
6.6

The Board to decide what was a ‘luxury’: not an easy task ..................... 206

6.7

Women: the usual target........................................................................... 211

6.8

The Board’s determinations: the thread quickly runs out ........................ 218

6.9

Conclusion ............................................................................................... 229

7 Sumptuary Impulses Tied up with Film and Khaki ........................................ 231
7.1

Purpose and structure of the chapter ........................................................ 231

7.2

Anti-Shouting Laws ................................................................................. 233

7.3

Sumptuary law at the movies: Entertainments Tax Act 1916 (Cth) ......... 245

7.4

Conclusion ............................................................................................... 261

8 Women and Moralisation v Men and Rational Protectionism ....................... 262
8.1

Purpose and structure of this chapter ....................................................... 262

8.2

Women’s Fashion excites moral condemnation ...................................... 265

8.3

Men’s Underwear: a sumptuary impulse sparked by rational protectionism293

8.4

Conclusion ............................................................................................... 310

9 A Strong Shift To A Rational Form Of Protectionism ................................... 311
9.1

Purpose and structure of this chapter ....................................................... 311

9.2

Early Australian Hosiery Manufacturers: demand protection ................. 313

9.3

Cossetting Australian Corset-Makers ...................................................... 343

9.4

Conclusion ............................................................................................... 360

10 Conclusion.......................................................................................................... 362
10.1

The purpose of this chapter ...................................................................... 362

10.2

Structure of this chapter ........................................................................... 362

10.3

Drawing together the threads ................................................................... 363

10.4

Remnants of the Sumptuary Impulse in present day consumer culture ... 368

REFERENCES ....................................................................................................... 372

WORKS PUBLISHED IN THE COURSE OF THIS RESEARCH

Parts of this thesis are based on material that has been published in peer reviewed
journals during the course of this research. The details are as follows:
Chapter 4 – Caroline Dick, ‘Taxation in Australia up until 1914: The Warp and
Weft of Protectionism’ (2014) 12 eJournal of Tax Research 104
<https://www.business.unsw.edu.au/research/publications/atax-journal/past-issues>.

The following are non-peer reviewed conference papers/presentations delivered
during the course of this research:
Caroline Dick, ‘Dressing Up with Foucault’ (Paper presented at Work in Progress
Conference, University of Queensland, July 2010).
Caroline Dick, ‘Wearing the Burden: Tariff Regulation on Clothing and its Effects
on the Working-Man in Australia, 1921-1927’ (Paper presented at the Law and
History Conference, Melbourne, 13–15 December 2010).
Caroline Dick, ‘Clobber: The Paradox of Protectionist Tariffs on Clothing in
Australia, 1921–1927’ (Paper presented at the 22nd Annual Conference of the
Australasian Tax Teachers’ Association, Melbourne Law School, 19–21 January
2011).
Caroline Dick, ‘Not Just Another Australian Couple’ (Paper presented at the
Ceremonies of Law Conference, University of Wollongong, 7–9 December 2011).

Caroline Dick, ‘Not Just Revenue Raising: Taxation as a Way of Regulating Dress’
(Paper and Poster presented at the 23rd Annual Conference of the Australasian Tax
Teachers’ Association, University of Sydney, January 2012).
Caroline Dick, ‘Easy Money: The Australian Tariff from 1915–1930 (Paper
presented at the 24th Annual Conference of the Australasian Tax Teachers’
Association, University of Auckland Business School, 23–25 January 2013).
Caroline Dick, ‘Testing the Fabric: Prescribing Female Dress in Early “Living
Wage” Cases’ (Paper presented at the Annual Postgraduate History Conference,
University of Sydney, 27–28 November 2014).
Caroline Dick, ‘The Mother(land) Leads the Way: A Sumptuary Impulse Bound Up
with Slouch Hats and Khaki’ (Paper presented at the 33rd Annual Australia and New
Zealand Law and History Society Conference, Coffs Harbour, 10–13 December
2014).
Caroline Dick, ‘Sumptuary Law at the Movies: the Entertainments Act 1917 (Cth)’
(Paper presented at the 27th Annual Conference of the Australasian Tax Teachers’
Association, University of Adelaide, 19–21 January 2015.

1 INTRODUCTION

Sumptuary laws did not so much ‘die’ as undergo a process of transfiguration or
metamorphosis such as the original is barely recognizable in the resultant, just as the
butterfly can barely be imagined from the chrysalis.1

1.1

Purpose of the chapter

This chapter introduces this thesis, sets out the thesis argument and marks
out its place in the literature in the field of sumptuary law. 2 This literature serves as
the backdrop to the original research conducted as part of this thesis. It lays out the
thesis’ framework, and sets out its scope and limits. It also outlines its structure and
methodology. In doing so, it sets out how the sumptuary impulse, reminiscent of
the sumptuary laws of the early modern period in Europe, re-emerged in the early
years of post-Federation Australia in the transformed sense as identified by Alan
Hunt.
The period under examination, between 1901-1927, shows that the
sumptuary impulse was alive and well in modern Australia. This impulse was now
transmuted by a new patrician elite into a form of social and legal regulation in
order to control the clothing and entertainment choices of working Australians. The
impulse was sustained through taxation and fiscal legal mechanisms (ie: tariffs),
wage cases, and through the agency of wartime regulations. All of these measures
recall the sumptuary laws of early modern Europe. As will be seen, the timeframe is
not accidental. It begins with Federation and ends with the move of government to

1

Alan Hunt, Governance of the Consuming Passion: A History of Sumptuary Law (MacMillan Press,
1996) 361.
2
From the Latin sumptuariae lex.

1

from Melbourne to Canberra, and with the emergence of a more formal institutional
setting in which government took place. It also charts the impact of legal and extralegal actors who exerted influence on law and policy in the period, especially the
Melbourne-based elite that sought to control social movements, economic policy
and the law. This interconnected set of actors spoke to the sumptuary impulse
revealing that, whilst sumptuary law had been rescinded, its pull remained alive
within Australian society and law during the post-Federation period.

1.2

Introduction to this thesis

This thesis examines how ideas based within long-discarded sumptuary laws
re-emerged in Australia in the period 1901-1927. This thesis argues that during this
period, many of the laws, policies and interventions, successful and unsuccessful,
were aimed at regulating the private and public lives of the Australian people through
interventionist processes that were closely akin to the interventionist sumptuary laws
of the early modern period. These measures were often exercised through seemingly
rational policies that were under the guise of the war effort, wage management, and
economic policy, but were also practically designed to interfere in, and regulate, the
public and private social and economic lives of the population.
But there was something different about this population that frustrated some
of these interventions. Unlike the populations of early modern Europe, or indeed
some of their contemporaries in Europe in the first two decades of the 20th century,
Australians, including women, had suffrage. Attempts to regulate the conduct of a
population who could vote meant that the sumptuary impulse was not always
successful. For instance, it will be seen in chapter 6 how the Hughes government
established the ill-fated Luxuries Board as part of its policy to control the importation
of luxuries, especially women’s apparel. It also attempted to adjust social behaviour
through the imposition of taxation on amusements pursuant to the Entertainments

2

Tax Act 1916 (Cth), and when it sought to impose taxation on unmarried men; the socalled Bachelors’ Tax. 3 Flurries of letters to newspapers decried these interventions
as a return to the sumptuary era. Other interventions into female dress also revealed
that patrician women were prepared to control the desires of working class women to
emulate styles of fashionable dress in a clear return to the language of the sumptuary
laws of the early modern period. 4
Later, by the beginning of the 1920s, a policy of protectionism, with frequent
increases in tariffs on imported clothing, changed the language and method of the
sumptuary impulse into one of rationality. These types of measures existed in a direct
line back to the early sumptuary laws, one facet of which sought to protect industries,
such as the English wool industry of the 16th century. 5 This thesis argues that during
this period of socio-economic development, protectionism shared many of the
discursive features of the sumptuary laws of the early modern period. This
association became even more evident during World War I, when government often
relied on moral regulation to constrict the consumption practices of the Australian
people to address wartime shortages and to provide for military needs. It is accepted
that protectionist policies in Australia did not so much aim to control the moral and
personal behaviour of the individual but rather sought to protect nascent or struggling
local or domestic industries. However, by the mid-1920s, the association began to
wane when moralisation served a secondary role in protectionist discourse.
The 1921 Greene Tariff 6 and the establishment of the Tariff Board in 1922
were expected to alleviate concerns about national security and economic viability by
motivating industrial development and increasing Australia’s workforce. 7 However,
this was not always the case because of increased tensions between government and

3

Income Tax Assessment Acts 1915-1916 (Cth).
See below Chapters 3 and 8.
5
See below Chapter 2.
6
This Tariff was named after Sir Walter Massy-Greene (1874-1952), the Minister of Trade and
Customs in 1921.
7
Leon Glezer, Tariff Politics: Australian Policy-making 1960-1980 (Melbourne University Press,
1982) 8.
4

3

the Tariff Board regarding the efficacy of imposing prohibitive tariffs to support
inefficient industries at the expense of the consumer. The increased controversy over
protectionism culminated in 1927 with the appointment of the Brigden Committee8
to report to the Bruce Government on the effects of the tariff. 9
By 1930, the Federal Government had introduced a new taxing regime. 10 It
seems that by this time prohibitive tariffs were not only continuing to adversely
affect the consumer but were also occasioning a substantial a loss of revenue.
Government accepted that it was no longer able to depend on customs duties to raise
revenue and decided to look to other more formal and dependable sources of
revenue. 11 Faced with a budget shortfall and “a financial depression without parallel
in the 30 years’ life of the Commonwealth”, 12 the Scullin Government, in 1930,
introduced a sales tax of 2 ½ per cent on the sale prices of commodities sold in
Australia. 13 This manoeuvre, and the shift to rational language of formal regulatory
mechanisms seemingly buried sumptuary concepts, but as Hunt suggests, 14
sumptuary law will transform and metamorphose, and as will be briefly noted at the
end of this thesis, it has now returned in another new guise in the 21st century.

1.2.1 The Journey

When I commenced my doctoral studies, I had planned to investigate the
broad question of whether taxation on clothing had a sumptuary effect on certain
sections of the Australian population. Initially, I planned to focus on researching
archival material concerning the taxation of dress from Federation until 2000, when
the GST regime (with its implications for private forms of regulation vis-a-vis

8

Hunt, above n 1.
Glezer, above n 7, 11.
10
Sales Tax Assessment Act (No 2) 1930 (Cth).
11
Ibid.
12
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 9 July 1930, 3888 (Mr Scullin).
13
Sales Tax Assessment Act (No 2) 1930 (Cth).
14
Hunt, above n 1.
9

4

intellectual property laws) was introduced. As a taxation specialist, I had a deep
interest in ‘sumptuary law’. It seemed that there might be some potential for
exploring the question of whether the taxation of clothing in Australia (via tariffs on
imported clothing) could have a sumptuary effect. In other words, could taxation of
clothing regulate the type of clothing that certain people could afford to wear or limit
what was available for them to purchase?
It became apparent through archival and documentary research that the
language of sumptuary law was being used in Australia in the two decades following
Federation until about 1927 when its effect began to noticeably wane. My research
unearthed evidence of sumptuary-like forms of regulatory intervention sparked by
the exigencies of war and by the contestation over female dress in early female living
wage cases. 15 My thesis question expanded to include other manifestations of
sumptuary regulation as well as the taxation of dress during the period from
Federation until the move of the Commonwealth government to Canberra in1927.
The period from the end of First World War to 1927 saw great social and
economic developments surrounding the regulation of clothing: the establishment of
the Tariff Board, a dramatic increase of tariffs on imported clothing and in some
cases, the absolute prohibition into Australia of certain types of clothing during the
period leading up to the Great Depression. The archived records of the Tariff Board’s
Apparel Hearings, which took place in the mid-1920s, revealed the regulatory effect
of increases in tariff duties on clothing on the lower classes and in particular, on the
working man. It was through these documents that the influence of two people - one
a Tariff Board member and the other his wife - on the law and policy relating to the
clothing choices of working people became apparent. This couples’ influence was
both extra-legal and informal as well as formal and influential.
Herbert Brookes, an inaugural member of the Tariff Board who sat on the
Board from 1922 until 1927, was one of these members of the Board who
recommended that tariffs on imported goods such as machinery, clothing and luxury

15

See below Chapter 5.

5

items be increased. 16 He was well connected by his marriage to Alfred Deakin’s
daughter, Ivy and his political and social network was extensive and powerful. The
Melbourne-based Herbert and Ivy Brookes were involved in the political, economic
and social movements of their time. Ivy was a highly influential advocate for
patriotic causes and was involved with socio/political organisations such as the
Housewives Association. The story of this couple now sits as a thread through this
thesis, their influence cutting across the time period of the study as exemplary
exponents of the sumptuary impulse that shaped law and non-legal regulatory
mechanisms of this era.

1.3

Originality and significance of this study

This thesis shines a new light on the forms of law that took shape in the first
three decades of a federated Australia. It reveals how seemingly rational law returned
to ideas based on sumptuary concepts, now not exercised by an undemocratic ruler,
but through the actions of patrician and elite members of the community over other
less well-off individuals. In doing so, it brought class and economic distinctions
within the seeming egalitarian character of the Australian polity, by limiting and/or
discouraging access to luxury items.
The thesis reveals the attitudes underpinning the law of this period. It shows
the gendered effects of Federal protectionist taxing polices, the prescriptive
regulation of female dress in early wage cases, 17 and a number of war-time measures,
some successful and others not, were unequivocal sumptuary projects. 18 The thesis
reveals material that has been previously unexamined, such as Prime Minister

16

See below Chapters 3 and 8.
Gail Reekie, “Decently Dressed? Sexualised Consumerism and the Working Woman’s Wardrobe
1918-1923” (2006) 61 Labour History 42. Gail Reekie has examined the debates before the NSW
Board of Trade about what constituted appropriate attire for working women.
18
Including the establishment of the Luxuries Board in 1917 and the enactment of the Entertainments
Tax Act 1916 (Cth). The Anti-Shouting laws were proposed in the last years of the war but were never
enacted.
17

6

Hughes’ personal and confidential files concerning the establishment of the Luxuries
Board. 19 Furthermore, most of my research derives from previously unexplored
archival material and newspaper articles accessed through the online Trove database.
This material yielded new connections between government policy and the
sumptuary imperative.
As a result, the thesis adds to the present conventional account of Australian
tax history. It demonstrates that the protectionist objectives of early tariff policies
were often accompanied by sumptuary imperatives. It reveals that during the early
decades following Federation that the logic and practices behind the taxation of dress
were remarkably similar to sumptuary regulation: taxation not only underpinned
protectionism and generated revenue but it also regulated social behaviour. This
study shows that taxation acted as a powerful, intrusive and often inequitable tool to
effectively modify or discourage taxpayers’ behaviour to reflect both government
policy objectives, as well as to act as a device to preserve a hierarchy of social place
or status that is usually marked by wealth, power and class.
This thesis also goes some way to unpick the past rhetoric of masculinist
tariff policy and repopulates the previously narrow narrative of taxation history by
[re]placing women, albeit sometimes as victims, within its discourse. 20 Whilst
feminist scholars such as Judith Grbich, Clare Young and Miranda Stewart 21 have
done much to restore women’s presence in fiscal discourse, this thesis unearths a lost
account of the sumptuary effects of regulatory measures on women’s lives in the
early twentieth century. On the other side of the ledger, this thesis provides a fresh
body of knowledge about the role that Australian institutions, such as the Arbitration
Court and The Tariff Board, and individuals played in the regulation of women’s
dress in the early post-Federation period. At the same time, it shows that upper-class

19

See below Chapter 6.
See below Chapters 5 and 9.
21
Judith E Grbich, “Taxation Narratives of Economic Gain: Reading Bodies Transgressively” (1997)
V Feminist Legal Studies 131; Claire F L Young, “What’s Sex got to do with it? Tax and the ‘Family’
in Canada” (2006) 2 Journal of the Australasian Tax Teachers Association 16; Miranda Stewart,
”Are You Two Interdependent?’ Family, Property and Same-Sex Couples in Australia’s
Superannuation Regime” (2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 437.
20

7

women were actively engaged as moral regulators of working class women through
dress, and this thesis links the private and public connections between the Brookes’
through the institutional and personal interventions into law.

1.4

Methodology and Scope of the study

1.4.1 Introduction
The thesis is framed against Genovese’s concept of jurisography. 22 Genovese
argues that “we need more than the traditional records of law to tell an adequate
history of jurisprudence”.

23

She suggests that the duties that attach to the office of

jurisographer “involve examining how jurisprudence was written, thought and
practiced in time and place, and paying attention to how those traditions have been
inherited.” 24 As such, this thesis is a genealogical study that draws upon taxation
history, social history, cultural history, legal history, biography, as well as the
assumed form through which law takes place, the economic and political, in order to
uncover and reveal the forms through which law is created. The thesis builds upon
Hunt’s contention that legal regulation and government are situated within a larger
framework of moral, economic, social and political mechanisms.
Thus, whilst law “traditionally insisted on [its] own formal integrity”, 25 a
characteristic of most taxation law scholarship, 26 it must be recognised that to fully
understand the purpose and effect of the interventionist sumptuary impulse in
Australia after Federation, one must accept that law is a product of culture. Law is
inseparable from the interests, goals, machinations and motivations that meld and

22

Ann Genovese, “Critical decision, 1982: remembering Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen” (2014) 23
Griffith Law Review 1.
23
Ibid 4.
24
Ann Genovese and Shaun McVeigh, “Nineteen eight three: A jurisographic report on
Commonwealth v Tasmania” (2015) 24 Griffith Law Review 1, 2.
25
Naomi Mezey, “Law as Culture” (2001) 13 Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 38.
26
See below Chapter 4.
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influence social life. 27 To understand the law relating to the interventionist
sumptuary measures, one must appreciate that law and government policy, although
open to conventional legal analysis, may be more usefully interpreted and critiqued
in the context of the social and cultural world in which they arise, exist and resist.

1.4.2 Sources

The key objective of my study is to examine and assess the sumptuary effects
of government interventions in Australia in the early decades of the twentieth
century. Data for this study was collected from both primary and secondary sources.
However, whilst this study draws upon the earlier work of Alan Hunt, Frances
Baldwin, Shann and Margaret Maynard, 28 it relies primarily on data, including
published and unpublished letters, diaries and reports, collected from archival
depositories such as the National Archives and the National Library, Canberra.
Archived records used in this study provide some degree of contemporaneity and
authenticity. Further data was extracted from Parliamentary debates and media
reports that were sourced from online Hansard and Trove databases. A search of the
case law proved unfruitful though there is at least one case that makes an express
reference to sumptuary law. 29 The few cases that touch peripherally on the taxation
of clothing do not reference policy or provide commentary on this relationship. 30
This thesis draws upon a broad range of historical material. Much of it can be
categorised as the [un]picked threads of discourse (evidence) hidden within oft
forgotten archival boxes and overlooked texts, images, official records, repealed
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legislation and newspaper reports. These threads constitute “[t]he surviving residues
of past thoughts and things [that] represent a tiny fraction of previous generations’
contemporary fabric.” 31 These threads are then interpreted and rewoven into a
narrative tapestry that depicts and explains some of the manifestations of sumptuary
regulation that occurred in Australia between 1901 and 1927. Some of the threads of
this narrative are taken from official publications such as statistical records and
parliamentary speeches relating to the imposition of tariffs on clothing.

Other

contemporaneous material exists within academic journals such as The Economic
Record and within the social commentary found in popular newspapers and
magazines. In drawing upon these materials, Tosh’s caution has been heeded with
respect to certain of the materials as they were not only composed with a view to
their impact on contemporary opinion but they often only contain what governments
were prepared to reveal. 32
Throughout the thesis, I have given voice to the many people who feature
significantly within my account of sumptuary regulation. In many instances, their
opinions and actions were so important that they were recorded in Hansard and in
newspaper reports. However, time has often forgotten them and their contributions,
and the reports contained in these publications documents remain the only vestiges of
their public and private lives. I have extensively used newspaper reports because they
are documents rich in information and because often there is no other extant research
material available. These primary sources have proved to be inherently fruitful for
my research.
There are of course limitations with relying upon historical records, most of
which are more than one hundred years old. Neuman suggests 33 that a major issue
with archived materials is “that only a fraction of everything written or used in the
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past has survived into the present” 34 and often, more importantly, is that “what has
survived is a non-random sample of what once existed.” 35 No narrative can fully
recover the totality of any, or all, past events. However, whilst evidence used in this
study might be incomplete, elusive or somewhat non-representative of all sides of the
story, this form of historiography seeks to give some explanation and understanding
of the past and context in which early Federal governments used sumptuary
regulation to intervene in the lives of the Australian people.
Though certain material is easily available in digital form, in particular
Hansard and newspapers that are available through Trove, other material can only be
located in the original handwritten or typed form. There are limitations to this type of
research, including the practical limitation of time that restricted the amount of data
discovered and analysed. The search and location of primary documents was a timeconsuming task because relevant documents were sometimes stored under unrelated
subject names and often stored in an arbitrary or ad-hoc manner. A further problem
was found with the filing of duplicated documents in ancillary files of the Tariff
Board for the Apparel Hearings in 1925. In addition, many of the papers archived by
the National Archives, the National Library and other institutions may have been
culled, and some documents were faded 36 and fragile.
Other material drawn upon was the recollections, statements and files of
some of the stakeholders in the tariff regime. These writings took the shape of
memoirs, autobiographies and archived personal papers of Herbert and Ivy
Brookes. 37 Tosh suggests that it is in such materials that “men and women record
their decisions, discussions and sometimes their innermost thoughts, unmindful of
the eyes of future historians.” 38
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These documents (and biographies) could be said to have limited value, as
memory is imperfect and recollections are sometimes distorted, selective or selfserving. For instance, Rohan Rivett’s biography of his brother-in-law Herbert
Brookes painted the latter in a very sympathetic light. 39 Rivett’s account focused
more on Brookes’ largesse, his public service and his synergetic relationship with his
wife rather than his astute ability to influence leaders such as Hughes and Deakin to
embrace policies that furthered Brookes’ own political and business interests.
Despite these limitations, these sources have immeasurable worth because of
their contemporaneity and because it was possible to extract key elements from them
of personal and public past experience that contributes to an informed, albeit partial,
explanation of the economic, political and social reality that existed at the time.

1.4.3 Beyond the scope of the thesis

Originally the scope of my thesis was much broader than it is at present.
Early into my research it became obvious that it was necessary for me to limit the
scope of my research into the incidence of sumptuary regulation to the period
ranging from Federation in 1901 until 1927, as noted above, though the sumptuary
impulse has ‘erupted’ in Australia at other times. 40
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this study cuts across many disciplines.
It necessarily draws on scholarship based in Australian history, politics, economics
and social/cultural studies as source materials. Though there is a large body of
scholarship on dress, costume and fashion, the thesis again draws on this scholarship
rather than seeking to undertake a study of the field in areas such as psychology, 41
fashion theory, 42 class, 43 law 44 or costume studies. 45 Similarly, whilst much of the
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study examines the sumptuary effect of the imposition of tariff taxation on imported
clothing, this study will not explore the broad issue of taxation of ‘textiles’ in a
doctrinal sense as it relates to clothing, fashion, accessories and ornamentation.

1.5

Literature Review

For the purpose of this literature review I will discuss the existing literature under
separate ‘threads’.

Sumptuary Law
The current literature on sumptuary law, 46 is shaped largely by Alan Hunt’s
influential The Governance of Consumption: sumptuary laws and shifting forms of
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regulation. This foundational scholarly work, along with Frances Baldwin’s 1920s
study of English sumptuary law, 47 marks out the field. The key concepts that emerge
from this literature reveal that sumptuary law is both a political, social and economic
intervention, and one that is worthy of consideration as a form of law. The contrary
view is that sumptuary law was a form of governance that was both anomalous and
bizarre, 48 and has no significance in more modern times. 49 This view suggests that
the “dusty historical relics of pre-industrial societies” 50 are to be seen as
characteristic of the way early unenlightened governments controlled the private
lives of their citizens.
Indeed, during the latter phases of the timeframe of this study in 1926, the
American scholar Frances Baldwin argued that sumptuary regulations as
“ordinances” 51 were paternal, and “from a modern point of view…burdensome and
unnecessary.” 52 In 1996, Hunt suggested that such an imposition of such restrictions
on personal behaviour and expenditure “would strike…twentieth century citizens as
objectionable in principle and faintly ridiculous.” 53
Baldwin and Hunt justify their position in part by pointing to the demise of
sumptuary laws. Each explore reasons why sumptuary laws in their early forms seem
to be ineffective and prone to failure. 54 Hunt suggests that one of the main reasons
that these sumptuary laws regulating dress failed was that there was a lack of
consistent enforcement. 55 The records show very few prosecutions for breaching
these laws. 56 Hunt attributes much of the problem with ineffective enforcement of
these laws with the lack of public support and suggests that they often they provoked
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a converse effect; 57 the more some consumables were prohibited for certain classes,
the more they became attractive to them.

The limitations of this sumptuary account
However, it seems as if the demise of sumptuary concepts is overstated, as
Hunt himself acknowledges that sumptuary regulation continued to coexist with
readily distinguishable economic protectionism 58 and that “the sumptuary ethic
remained intact long after the waning of sumptuary legislation.” 59 Whilst he
considers that the connection between protectionist and sumptuary law continued to
play an important part in the later history of sumptuary regulation he treats
protectionism and sumptuary law as remaining located “within distinct discursive
traditions”. 60 He argues that whilst sumptuary law focuses on consumption,
protectionism is instead concerned with the control of consumption as a means “to
some politico-economic objective such as protecting domestic industry or starving
some enemy of import revenue.” 61 Hunt made no attempt to examine the sumptuary
effect of protectionism, nor did he explore taxation of dress as a sumptuary project.
He insisted that a study of protectionism was ‘”outside” 62 the concerns of his
research. However, these observations suggests that there is scope to consider the
relationship between sumptuary law and protectionism, and this thesis moves to
consider if there is a link.
This thesis reveals that the close link between protectionism and other forms
of state intervention mean that it is difficult to delineate between these forms of
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regulatory activity and sumptuary regulation. It is notable that preoccupations with
morality, luxury, extravagance and, in some instances, social hierarchy were central
discursive features of these interventionist policies in Australia in the period studied.
While protectionism may not overtly seek to regulate what individuals could wear or
how they chose to appear to others, the thesis suggests that protectionist measures
concerning the importation of imported clothing often had this same sumptuary
effect. Similarly, whilst the decisions of arbitration courts in early female living wage
cases were made ostensibly to set a ‘living wage’ for female workers in various
industries, these decisions also had a sumptuary effect. The process of setting a
female living wage was concomitant with judicial officers setting prescriptive
sumptuary standards for women’s dress.
Consequently, it is mostly in the effects of government policies and
legislation where those similarities or parallels with the assumptions and tenets of the
traditional sumptuary law paradigm can be observed. This is not to say that the
Australian government was not also actively engaged in overt sumptuary projects
during this period. For instance, the establishment of the Luxuries Board and laws
proposing to curtail the practice of standing treat for servicemen were both
unequivocal interventionist sumptuary measures that sought to curtail private
wartime spending and to modify consumption practices, particularly those of women
and the lower classes. 63
As will be seen in chapters 4, 6 and 7, Australian policy makers, legislators
and the judiciary were often not only concerned with economic, industrial or other
public projects, but also displayed a desire to, both consciously and less consciously,
protect public morals in the sense of seeking to determine forms of conduct.
Moralising threads were often seamlessly interwoven into legislative and other
interventionist projects.

For instance, in Chapter 7 we see that the Australian

Government ostensibly sought to use the Entertainments Tax Act 1916 (Cth) to raise
tax to support the war effort. However, the Act also had the effect of discouraging the
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lower classes from ‘wasting’ their resources on frivolous and ‘unworthy’
entertainment, particularly during the sombre war years. Indeed, this form in which
sumptuary regulation appears and reappears bears out Peter Goodrich’s observation,
suggesting that:
It is that law of manners, the moral and the symbolic capital of the good citizen, the
daily constraint of violence and desire, that the history of sumptuary law foretells and
in some measure subtends.

64

This research reveals that tariffs on imported clothing in an Australian
context proved to be much more effective than the sumptuary laws of the early
modern period in controlling the type of clothing that people wore. There was less
opportunity for those targeted by prohibitive tariffs to resist the machinations of the
administrative and legal machinery that implemented the imposition of tariffs on
third party clothing importers. Furthermore, the lower classes, unlike the wealthy
classes, had little or no opportunity to access cheaply-made apparel from overseas
sources via alternative means.

Taxation
As an object for research, taxation can be seen to represent an interdisciplinary problem. 65

The study of taxation law and its history appears to have remained mostly
one-dimensional. Prebble asserts that tax law is ectopic or anomalous in that “the
usual relationship between law and the activity it regulates is absent in the area of
taxation.” 66 Vosslamber suggests that taxation studies can be ectopic in another
sense because “they often fail to locate taxation within the human, social context
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within which it is legislated, assessed and paid.” 67 He further contends that taxation,
sometimes described as “a prime mover of history” 68 is ignored in the discussions of
history. In other words, the study of taxation is often dislocated from the world in
which it exists.
According to Vosslamber, “history and taxation rarely mix.” 69 History books
rarely only mention taxation except in passing or in terms of some archaic tax that
might amuse the reader. Taxation texts, on the other hand, concentrate mainly on the
analysis and application of fiscal legislation without reference to the social and
political context that prompted or fostered such legislation. Occasionally, a few
pages at the beginning of a taxation text are sacrificed to provide a thumbnail,
cursory and somewhat inadequate sketch of the history of taxation. More often than
not, the sketch is a bare “list or narration of facts, generally with little interpretation
or analysis.” 70 For instance, in Australian Taxation Law 71 the authors only devote
two pages to the complete history of taxation in Australia (1788-2015).
As suggested by Lamb, mono-disciplinary approaches to the study of taxation
are likely to appear linear and lacking perspective or context. 72 It is the contention of
tax academics such as Harris and Prebble, that to properly understand the aims and
effects of taxation, the researcher must focus not only on the context within which
taxation arises but also on those who enact such laws, as well as those affected by
them. Vosslamber argues that: “the focus moves from the ‘what’ of tax to such
questions as why a particular tax arose or changed when it did, and who was affected
by it and what they thought.” 73
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Little has been written specifically on taxation history in Australia. Harris
confirmed the dearth of material that specifically deals with Australian taxation
history. 74 He suggested that he found the ‘best book’ to be Stephen Mills’ Taxation
in Australia that was published in 1925. 75 This iconic text is surprisingly ‘modern’ in
its language and perspectives. It provides a contemporaneous account of the taxing
policies of the post Federation period and devotes a chapter about those who
shoulder ‘the burden of taxation’. The lack of scholarship in this field means that this
study will open up new perspectives in taxation law and it provides an expanded
account of taxation law literature in this period.

Dress
Strip us totally nude and you would see us as equal; reclothe us in your dress and you in
ours, and we would, without a doubt, seem noble and you base; because only poverty or
riches makes us unequal. 76

Whilst there have been many recent studies concerning the history and
cultural function of dress by dress historians such as Margaret Maynard and Lou
Taylor, there have been no comprehensive studies that specifically address the
effects of the taxation on dress. Lou Taylor has observed that up until recent years,
dress and fashion were not considered “in the once largely male academic world of
‘real history’ to be subjects worthy of study. 77 Taylor contends that “dress/textile
history…was seen to be inward looking, amateur, non-professional and basically a
non-academic field.” 78 Because clothes were customarily considered “to be a
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frivolous and ephemeral characteristic of society”, 79 it was thought that to study them
would “therefore be to trivialise history itself” 80 and that the subject was therefore
not one for serious academic research. Taylor, however, suggests that this blinkered
attitude to the history of dress is now changing. 81
Negley Harte points to the lack of research concerning the economic
motivation behind legislation controlling fashions and dress. Most often, dress is
only referred to as an aside in historical and economic texts. Harte demands that
social historians look at clothing, because in his opinion, “[t]he production,
distribution and consumption of textiles cannot…be ignored by any serious
economic and social historian…” 82 Harte argues that clothing should be studied in a
more scholarly manner because it is related to “wide matters of concern to the
historian of social change and movements in the standard of living and patterns of
expenditure and consumption.” 83 Harte’s insights about the state control of dress
provide a broad sketch of the economic and social issues of dress legislation;
including its aims, origins, enforcement and effects.
Maynard, in Fashioned from Penury: Dress as Cultural Practice in Colonial
Australia, provides a solid historical and cultural basis of dress scholarship

in

Australia. Whilst she does not deal with taxation of dress in any depth, she does
however highlight, in an Australian context, the relationship in colonial times
between taxation of dress and sumptuary law. She examines the variety of clothing
worn by colonists, and also investigates the meanings encoded in dress in respect of
social status of the inhabitants of colonial Australia as well as examining how
clothing was central to ways in which class and status were negotiated. She suggests
that “[d]ifferences existed which can be partly attributed to the somewhat limited
kinds of clothing available” 84 and that “[p]rotectionist duties and freight costs
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discouraged the purchase of high quality imported goods and acted…like a kind of
sumptuary tax.” 85
Maynard also details the various ways in which the lower and/or poorer
classes strove to emulate the higher classes and change their position in “the
hierarchy of acceptability.” 86 To avoid onerous customs duties, fashionable and
expensive clothing was copied by local manufacturers and home dressmakers and
there was a significant trade in second hand clothing. 87 I have drawn on Maynard’s
work on colonial dress to investigate the sumptuary effects of taxation of dress in the
early decades following Federation.

Feminist historiography
Whilst feminist historians, including Marilyn Lake, 88 Patricia Grimshaw89
and Susan Magery, 90 have made significant contributions in the last few decades to
the historiography on gender relations and the link between gender and nationbuilding, there is little scholarship about the regulation of dress in the early decades
following Federation.
However, Gail Reekie has undertaken a comprehensive account of sexualised
consumerism in the early years following the First World War when women were
experiencing a “new and increasingly visible freedom” 91 in their personal, social and
political lives. As part of this account she examines the prescriptive approach of the
NSW Board of Trade (1918-1923) towards female dress. 92 Her comprehensive study
suggests that during the early years after World War I men sought to objectify
85
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women as sexually attractive objects of desire. 93 She contends that this
characterisation helped to diffuse male anxieties about what appeared to be women’s
growing sexual and economic independence. 94 Whilst Reekie does not consider the
sumptuary effect of the Board of Trade’s approach to female dress, this work reveals
a similar set of assumptions and practices to those found in the decisions of
arbitration court judges in female living wage cases when they arbitrarily assessed
what constituted appropriate attire for working women. 95
Mark Hearn’s examination 96 of the narratives of gender and nation in the
Arbitration Court decisions seeks to interrogate Higgins J’s views on women’s dress
and his masculinist treatment of female witnesses in Fruitpickers and Archer. 97

1.6

Outlining the structure of this thesis

This thesis is divided into 10 chapters. Chapter 1 charts the direction of this
thesis and frames its scope in order to demonstrate how legislation, executive
directives, judicial opinion and moralising discourse were used in post-Federation
Australia as sumptuary tools to modify the behaviour of some sections of the
Australian population. Chapter 2 provides a brief account of the key facets of English
sumptuary laws of the early modern period. An understanding of the patterns and
objectives of these earlier laws is important, as later chapters will examine how these
foundational features of sumptuary law re-emerged in Australia in the post-
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Federation period. Chapter 3 reveals that some individuals, associations and
institutions, sought to control the behaviour of certain sections of society by using
sumptuary practices to exert confluent pressure on them and it provides an
introduction to their significant role in later chapters.
Chapter 4 offers an account of the taxing policies in Australia from the first
white settlement in 1788 up until the beginning of World War I. The chapter details
the strong symbiotic relationship that developed between taxation and protectionism.
It demonstrates that the Federal government’s policy of imposing protectionist tariffs
on imported clothing was decidedly ‘a project’ of sumptuary regulation.
Chapter 5 explores the contestation over female dress in female wage cases in
the first two decades following Federation. It illustrates the linkages between the
foundational tenets of early sumptuary law and the prescriptive and normative
practices of these early arbitration courts.
Chapter 6 focuses on the establishment of the Luxuries Board and its role,
albeit brief, in serving the government’s moralised wartime measures of thrift and
sober sacrifice. It argues that the Board was an interventionist project that was
implemented to quell traditional sumptuary anxieties concerning waste, extravagance
and mimesis.
Although most of the thesis focuses on the sumptuary regulation of women’s
dress, Chapter 7 explores two other manifestations of sumptuary regulation that
occurred in the context of wartime conditions in Australia: proposals for AntiShouting legislation and the Entertainments Tax Act 1916 (Cth). This digression into
other aspects of Australian life aims to highlight the persuasiveness of those
sumptuary threads that acted at the time as a hierarchical net to safeguard and
regulate all aspects of social life.
During this time, authorities and the press were particularly anxious about the
enormous increase of women’s fashion apparel that was being imported into
Australia. Chapter 8 reveals a contrast between the regulation of imported women’s
and men’s clothing in the years following Federation. The chapter demonstrates that
imported female fashion apparel, often characterised by authorities and the press as
luxury goods, persistently sparked moral condemnation and motivated the regulatory
reflex. On the other hand, the sumptuary regulation of imported men’s clothing by
23

the imposition of prohibitive protectionist measures was prompted not by moral
anxieties but rather by pure ‘unashamedly’ protectionist motives.
Chapter 9 examines two individual clothing industries that were faithfully
protected by governments committed to protecting nascent industries at the expense
of consumers. The chapter illustrates the noticeable discursive shift towards rational
economic motives that underpinned the regulatory reflex within the discourses
concerning these industries. What is seen here is an increased focus on economic
regulation rather than on moral regulation and a critique of luxury. The chapter
reveals that prohibitive tariffs on imported hosiery and corsetry during the war period
and the early 1920s evolved into a form of sumptuary intervention that was mainly
stimulated by a concern with the creation of internal markets rather than with a
concern with moral standards. Chapter 10 draws together the conclusions of this
thesis and reflects on current manifestations of the sumptuary impulse.
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2 SUMPTUARY PATTERN MAKING: USING THE ENGLISH DESIGN

We must always recollect that humanity has a habit of throwing back to its old practices.
Since a couple of hundred years ago we have been tolerably free from sumptuary laws. But
there is, in many quarters, a great disposition to take to these laws again, and we may,
before many years have passed be overwhelmed with them…” 1 Edmund Barton

2.1

Purpose and structure of this chapter

In order to understand the pattern of 20th century regulatory interventions
recalling the sumptuary impulse of the early modern period that is to be considered
in this thesis, this chapter will set out an account of the key facets of English
sumptuary laws that returned to prominence in post-Federation Australia. It will
mark the contours and patterns of that impulse as it emerged in a decidedly modern,
regulatory guise. This new sumptuary impulse was found in legislation and executive
directives and it was advanced through the interaction between a set of key
individuals who shaped both public discourse and formal legal interventions. To
understand how interventions, ranging from the regulation of apparel to the
prohibition of imported luxury items, bore the mark of the sumptuary impulse, it is
necessary to understand what those impulses were, and their original shape and
texture.
That these patterns resurfaced in Australia in the post-Federation period
seems remarkable, but sumptuary impulses were, in this period, alive and well
throughout the English-speaking world. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries there was a world-wide revival of interest in the old sumptuary laws,
particularly during the First World War years, when governments began to ‘cast
back’ to sumptuary law as a potential means to compulsorily curtail luxury and
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extravagance. 2 English sumptuary laws of the early modern period became a popular
topic of discussion in the community:
Like old inventories and wills, they have helped to make past history live again by furnishing
interesting details concerning the social life and the differences obtaining between different
ranks of society, in the centuries that lie behind us. 3

The topic stimulated close examination by scholars in the second and third
decades of the 20th century. Baldwin, Hooper and Miller all wrote iconic histories
and commentaries on English sumptuary law. 4 Hooper’s paper entitled The Tudor
Sumptuary Laws was, often without acknowledgement, disseminated internationally
in the press in a piecemeal manner. 5 Press editors, church officials and politicians
frequently made reference to sumptuary law when discussing the efficacy of modern
laws such as those designed to increase tariffs on imported clothing, the taxation of
amusements, rules relating to drinking practices and female living wage cases. 6
These were thoroughly modern regulatory responses that bore the memory and echo
of a very different world: early modern England. In returning to older sumptuary
laws, early 20th century Australia was itself repeating earlier repetitions of these
laws.
Western sumptuary laws have existed since ancient Greece and Rome. 7 The
Roman State in particular, created a sumptuary template, regulating everything from
food to clothing and other forms of conspicuous consumption. 8 It was pre-occupied
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with the preservation of ‘external symbols of class hierarchy’, 9 and moral and
familial features of Roman life. 10 Authorities targeted the consumption practices of
women, 11 who were forbidden from wearing jewellery, cosmetics, perfume, or dyed
clothing. 12 These interventions, which sought to restrain extravagance and various
manifestations of excess, particularly in relation to the consumption of luxury
goods, 13 next manifested themselves in Europe and Asia in the early modern period.
This chapter considers two periods relating to English sumptuary law. The
first period from 1336-1604 marks the apotheosis of sumptuary law in England.
During this period, the discursive features of sumptuary interventions in England
were established and their remnants manifested in socio-cultural imagery that would
eventually make its way, centuries later, into social and legal attitudes in Australia.
Sumptuary regulation waned from 1604, although efforts were made to reintroduce it
up until 1758. The second period reflects the shift from moralisation and hierarchical
concerns to rational protectionism that was increasingly noticeable in the Elizabethan
period.
The chapter begins by providing a brief account of the major English
sumptuary period that ranged from 1336 until 1604. It then chronicles the patterns of
sumptuary regulation during this period: the social impulses, the language and the
themes that delineated a unique form of interventionist regulation. The chapter then
considers the demise of sumptuary law. Finally, the chapter explores the worldwide
revival of interest in sumptuary regulation in the early twentieth century, including
within Australia in the post-Federation period.
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2.2

Sumptuary Patterns and Themes 1336-1604

In reading over the numerous laws of this sort which were passed in England, one is struck
by the fact that at least three different kinds of motives seem to have led to their enactment:
(1) the desire to preserve class distinctions; … 2) the desire to check practices which were
regarded as deleterious in their effects, due to the feeling that luxury and extravagance were
in themselves wicked and harmful to the morals of the people; (3) economic motives… Sheer
conservatism and dislike of new fashions or customs might be mentioned as a fourth factor
which led to the passage of the English sumptuary laws. 14

Although ancient regimes had used sumptuary laws to address the problem of
conspicuous displays of wealth and luxury, sumptuary legislation was uncommon in
early modern Europe prior to the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. 15 The earliest
English sumptuary laws were enacted during the reign of Edward III (1327-1377) in
an attempt to curb the rapidly increasing luxury and extravagance of the period. 16
Baldwin suggests that these forms of laws were not unusual in the context of the
period, for the habit of regulation was “deep-rooted in England” 17 and the population
was accustomed to the public regulation of “many matters pertaining to everyday
life.” 18 It was an epoch marked by ‘regulatory lawmaking’ 19 relating to wages,
prices, clothing, religious observations and commercial relationships: 20 “[i]n general
the desirability of sumptuary regulation was part of the taken-for-granted conception
of the proper role of government.” 21
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2.2.1 The Ordering of Appearance and Social Hierarchy

The Acts of Apparel gave tangible expression to an hierarchical ideal…it was assumed that
there was a ‘great chain of being’, an hierarchical order, in which individuals like
everything else had a determined place. 22

Clothing has been traditionally a distinctive and pervasive social marker that
could signal discernible information about the social class and economic standing of
the person wearing it. 23 Class and status sits behind the key sumptuary interventions
that took shape during Edward III’s reign. During the early modern period, there was
a clear demarcation and hierarchy in status. The lowest class of society included
carters, ploughmen, ox-herds (sic), cow-herds (sic), shepherds, dairymen, grooms
and those involved with husbandry, the equivalent of the modern day ‘working
class’. 24 This class was followed in hierarchical rank by esquires, gentlemen,
merchants, citizens and burgesses below the rank of knight. 25 There were different
categories of knights: those that possessed and income of less than 200 marks, those
with income over 200 marks but less than 400 marks and knights with incomes from
400 to 1000 marks per year. 26 On the next social level were, at various times, earls,
dukes, marquis, viscounts, barons and finally at the apex of the social scale was the
royal family. 27
Even before the early modern period, English fashions had been heavily
influenced by new French fashions emanating from the French Court. 28 However,
most of the new French hairstyles, millinery, footwear and dress were available only
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to the higher ranks. 29 The English aristocracy continually looked to purchase the
costly fashion clothing that was regularly imported from the continent. 30 At the same
time that ‘aristocratic luxury’ was being introduced into England, there was also a
parallel general growth in material prosperity in England that was typified by the
growth of manufactures and the progress of goldsmithing and jewellery-making. 31
Baldwin suggests that during the fourteenth century, this growth in prosperity and the
resultant increase in luxury and extravagance was “largely, if not primarily, due to
England’s success in foreign wars”. 32
This flood of costly articles into England, according to contemporary
chroniclers and satirists, moved both women and men to become “haughty and vain
in their attire”, 33 so much so that all levels of society endeavoured “to outstrip each
other in the brilliance of their appearance.” 34 In particular, the lower classes,
although transgressing fundamental social order and customs of medieval society,
sought to emulate the nobility both in the manner of living and in their dress. 35 It was
suggested that it was difficult to distinguish “the poor from the rich, the servant from
the master, or a priest from another man.” 36
Those, whose station and rank was based on bloodline, insisted that such
affectation was a sign of spiritual corruption and the corrosion in their society’s
consumption-based system of social distinction. 37 It was believed that each man’s
place was appointed to him as part of natural law and that he must be content to live
in “that state of life unto which it had please God to call him at his birth.”38 To allow
the lower classes complete sartorial freedom would cause the elite to forego their
exclusive symbol of status in society. By tradition, dress enabled them to display
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their wealth and social rank to the world. 39 To permit all manner and rank of people
to dress above their station by assuming the appearance of the superior classes 40
would cause blurring and erosion of those class distinctions that sometimes could
only be discerned when observing what an individual wore.
Moreover, the upper classes considered that fashion and ostentation, as actual and
symbolic demonstrations of wealth and rank, were deigned by God and the State to
be the exclusive right of the noblesse oblige and the royal class. 41 As social custom
dictated each man’s place in life, such transgressions were considered by those in
authority as unacceptable and requiring restraint. Unable to solve these pervasive
violations of moral and social values, upper-status individuals sought to maintain the
traditional social status quo by demanding the assistance from the monarch, the
government and the Church. 42 There was a move to rein in pernicious luxury and the
extravagance of dress by the passage of sumptuary legislation: 43
It was heresy for him to attempt to rise above his class either in his manner of living or in his
dress. It was therefore, inevitable that those in authority should consider it necessary to take
some steps to curb the extravagance which prevailed in the reign of Edward III. 44

The 1336 statute was to be the first sumptuary response from English
authorities and dealt only with food. 45 It cautioned people about the evil of imitation,
which the act claimed had caused “many mischiefs” affecting the people of the
Realm.

46

It warned that “lesser people”, 47 who attempted to imitate “the great

ones” 48 in matters of costly meats consumption practices, could be expected to be
greatly impoverished in both body and soul. 49
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The first, shortest and least complicated of the nine major ‘Acts of Apparel’ –
a sumptuary law dealing with dress and fashion - was enacted in 1337. 50 It was a
comprehensive and detailed sumptuary statute, entitled A Statute Concerning Diet
and Apparel 1363, 51 which targeted extravagance in dress and condemned the evil of
‘luxury’. 52 However, its objectives were plainly protectionist in that it prohibited all
men and women of all ranks, with some exceptions, from wearing fur and imported
cloth. 53 This act was the first sumptuary act that focused on the regulation of those
in the ranks of the nobility and it sought to divide them into three broad categories:
the Royal Family, Dukes and Earls. 54
The 1363 act aimed to correct “the outrageous and excessive apparel of
divers people against their estate and degree”. 55 It sought to preserve eight clear class
distinctions via the dress of various classes. 56 It not only directly attacked ‘excess of
apparel’ but it strongly chastised those who dressed beyond their status. 57 Its
preamble claimed, through the invocation of a common ‘dearth’ trope, that such
extravagance had led to “the great destruction and impoverishment of all the land.”58
It proclaimed

that

those belonging to the lowest class in society, including

ploughmen, ox-herds (sic), cow-herds (sic), swine-herds (sic), shepherds and
dairymen and those who possessed goods valued at less than 40s, could not wear
anything but blanket cloth and russet costing no more than twelve pence per item. 59
The penalty for failure to conform to the ordinance was forfeiture to the King of all
prohibited apparel.

60

The 1363 act earnestly complained of the extreme danger in

the use of outrageous and excess apparel, and provided more detail linking class
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distinctions and the control of dress. 61 However, the Act was repealed in 1364. 62 It,
along with many of the later sumptuary acts, had for various political reasons,
relatively short lives. 63
The purpose of these early sumptuary laws was to ensure that clothing
continued to be treated as an indicator of social class and occupation, and that social
hierarchy would continue to be faithfully echoed in hierarchies of appearance. For
instance, grooms and servants were not to wear “for their vesture or hosing” 64 items
that cost more than two marks or garb themselves in anything made of gold or silver,
or embroidered, enamelled or made of silk. 65 Esquires and gentlemen below the rank
of knights, not possessing land or rents to the value of a hundred pounds a year, were
ordered not to wear cloth costing more than four and a half marks. 66 However, those
who possessed lands or rents to the value of two hundred marks per year were
permitted to wear cloth worth five marks, as well as silk, cloth of silver. Similarly,
their female relatives were allowed to use limited types of fur and apparel, except for
headdresses trimmed with precious stones. 67 Knights who possessed an income of
less than 200 marks a year were allowed to wear cloth worth not more than 6 marks,
but could not wear cloth of gold, apparel furred with miniver, 68 ermine nor apparel
embroidered with precious stones. 69 Lords with lands worth 100 marks could wear
anything they pleased. 70
Luxury and extravagance of dress was prevalent amongst the nobles and rich
during the reign of Richard II (1377-1399). At the same time, members of all but the
poorer strata of society had become obsessed with fashion, novelty and ostentation in
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dress. 71 The hierarchy of appearance was threatened when the lower classes put aside
their old plain dress and began to adopt fashionable, albeit cheaper, versions 72 of the
same type of apparel, ornamentation and accoutrements that were usually only worn
by the patrician elite. 73 Servants emulated their masters and wore “absurd, long toed
shoes, called cracows and pokys” 74 and favoured enormous sleeves. 75 Even serving
women of “low estate” 76 imitated upper class women by wearing fur around their
collars and hems. 77
A century after Edward III’s first sumptuary act, Edward IV (1442-1483)
reintroduced a similar elaborate scheme of dress control 78 in response to a petition
from the House of Commons requesting the enforcement and renewal of legislation
against ‘inordinate array’. 79 The preamble of the 1463 act highlighted concerns of
public morality and the need for economic protectionism 80 and complained that
excessive and extravagant dress was being worn without distinction. It declared that
this extravagance was both displeasing to God and likely to impoverish the realm. 81
By employing hierarchy of dress, the act aimed to allay the fears of those who
considered that extravagant dress affronted God and that the waste of financial
resources on dress was impoverishing England whilst

“enriching other strange

Realms and Countries”. 82 Whilst it’s paramount objective was to force people to
dress “according to their degrees,” 83 its hierarchic dress restrictions and detailed
provisions remained, in the most part, similar to the 1363 act. 84 However, it did
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contain provisions that only the wealthy and those of noble birth were entitled to
enjoy new fashions. 85 For instance, knights below the rank of lords were prohibited
from wearing any gown, jacket or coat that was so short that it did not extend below
the hips. 86 To ensure compliance with the regulation, tailors were forbidden to make
any gown or jacket shorter than the proscribed length or to stuff any doublet contrary
to the statute. 87
The act also sought to reinforce the practice of using of colour, particularly
purple, to reflect the hierarchy of appearance. 88 It barred all English subjects, except
the royal family to wear any cloth of gold or purple silk, “upon pain of having to pay
a fine of £20 for every offence.” 89 Similarly, the act acknowledged a corresponding
hierarchy in the value of fabric and the complexity of woven textures that contributed
to the identification of the social status. 90 Expensive fabrics and weaves were to be
reserved for the upper ranks. 91 For instance, no one below the rank of a lord could
wear plain cloth of gold. 92 Those below the rank of esquire and gentlemen were
forbidden to wear velvet in their doublets or any velvet, damask or satin in their
gowns. 93 If anyone offended this provision, a fine of forty shillings was payable to
the authorities. 94 However, Baldwin suggested that this act proved to be ineffective
as it did little to check extravagance in dress. 95
Dress, as a visible marker of class distinction, would remain under statutory
control continuously from the 1463 act until 1604. 96 During Henry VIII’s reign
(1509-1547), for instance, four further sumptuary apparel statutes were enacted and
they all sought, in various ways, to implement a hierarchical dress regime for the
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whole population. 97 The first three statutes of Henry VIII’s reign focused on the
prohibition of particular ostentatious clothing fashions that customarily marked a
man of rank and wealth. 98 In 1510, an Act against Costly Apparel 99 repealed all
previous sumptuary laws and proceeded to prohibit “any garded or pleated shirt or
pleated ruff” 100 worn by those under the rank of a knight. 101 Its preamble moralised
about the ‘evil consequences’ produced by the “great and costly array and apparel
used within this Realm” 102 which were at the time contrary to earlier sumptuary
laws. 103
This was a lengthy and complex sumptuary act that aimed at supporting the
domestic textile industry and was clearly modelled on the acts of apparel of 1463 and
1483. 104 It closely resembled them in the grading of ranks and classes as well as the
various prohibitions that were attributable to each rank and class. 105 Just as with
earlier acts, the 1510 act prohibited or restricted the colour, quality, quantity, price
and style of dress materials on a graduated basis according to the rank and class of
the wearer. 106 Hooper suggests that the Act also contained “three novel features”. 107
It not only, ‘in most cases’, prescribed forfeiture of the “obnoxious apparel” 108 and
fines, but it provided for the opportunity for an individual to sue for the recovery of
the forfeited apparel and fines. 109 In addition, the act empowered the King to grant
licences of exemption. 110 It was also remarkable because, unlike the 1483 Act, it
excluded all women from its operation. 111
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The 1514 apparel act was, with slight modifications, very similar to the 1510
act. 112 It forbade the wearing of sable fur by all persons below the rank of an earl and
specifically stated that servants were permitted to wear garments trimmed or lined
with lamb’s fur. 113 Anyone below the rank of knight was not permitted to wear any
chain “or other thing of gold about his neck or bracelets of the same. 114 Presumably
those who drafted the act were optimistic and expected that the hierarchic rules
would completely and finally resolve the issues of excessive dress; it was not to be a
temporary regulatory regime but rather was, in the words of the statute to “last for
ever”. 115
Despite this optimism, the Act was repealed in 1515. It was replaced in that
same year by another apparel act that again was very similar to the 1510 and 1514
acts except that the list of classes of persons permitted to wear certain fabrics were
augmented and fines were lower than those previously imposed for breaches of
sumptuary laws. 116 The act also allowed an exemption to the fellows of the Inns of
Court to wear satin, damask and camlet. 117 The act of 1515 again made provision for
the recovery of forfeited apparel and fines. 118 Despite it having what Hunt describes
as a “more realistic approach to enforcement”, 119 it was more restrictive in that
“sable furs were reserved exclusively for the royal family, lynx and black genet furs
for dukes, earls and barons.” 120 The King was also permitted to issue licences
authorizing the wearing of prohibited apparel. 121 However, only a gentleman or
above was permitted to wear imported fur of a variety not produced in England. 122
Another noteworthy feature of this sumptuary legislation was that its bill had been
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initiated and drafted by the King and his advisors rather than it emanating from the
House of Commons. 123
The final apparel act of Henry VIII’s reign was enacted in 1533 and was
entitled An Act for Reformacyon of Excesse in Apparayle. 124 Its preamble reflected
the sovereign’s determination to ensure that the “good and politic order” 125 by
demanding that all classes in their dress should ‘keep their place’. 126 Furthermore,
the act decreed a revised hierarchy of appearance and sought to protect those
“inexpert and light persons” 127 who faced “utter impoverishment” 128 because of their
inclination to “pride, the mother of all vices.” 129 The act specifically denigrated the
use of “great and costly array and apparel” that was alleged to have provoked
“diverse of the King Subjects… to rob and do extortion and other unlawful deed to
maintain thereby their costly array”. 130
The 1533 act also abolished the restrictions on shirts and stomachers. Its
sumptuary motives were clearly mixed with protectionist concerns. However, it
made concessions to permit any Englishman to wear any foreign linen cloth and for
“any person being of the degree of a gentleman” 131 to wear a shirt embroidered in
thread or silk, so long as the garment was “wrought” 132 within the realm. 133 There
were also some concessions provided to the nobility in relation to the wearing of
“cloth of gold of tissue” 134 and the wearing of bonnets made of foreign cloth.135
Whilst the Lord Chancellor, Lord Treasurer, and those of similar social distinction
were permitted to wear velvet, satin and silk, they were, nonetheless, prohibited from
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wearing purple or black genet fur. 136 The clergy were not permitted to wear any kind
of fur, except black and grey coney, grey biche, fox, lamb, otter or beaver. 137 The act
contained a notable variation to earlier acts. The King’s privilege of licensing the
wearing of forbidden apparel, which has been provided for in the previous three
statutes, was divested from him, except with regard to those who served the royal
family. 138 However, Hoover suggests that the act remained a “dead letter” as it was
neglected and generally condemned. 139
Although only four apparel statues were enacted during Henry VIII’s reign,
dress was also regulated through the use of executive sumptuary regulations and
royal proclamations. 140 The latter were also utilised to extend the scope of the
statutes and to remind people of the existence of sumptuary regulation. 141 At times,
they targeted specific sections of society. For instance, in 1536, prescriptive
regulations were issued prohibiting inhabitants of Galway in Ireland from shaving
their moustaches and ordering them to grow their hair to cover their ears. 142
Furthermore, Galway people were forbidden from wearing mantles in the streets,
and, instead, were commanded to wear cloaks, gowns, doublets and hose “made in
the English fashion”. 143 Furthermore, the use of the Irish style of dress was also
prohibited 144 and people were banned from wearing garments dyed with saffron or
made with more than “five standard ells of cloth”. 145 During the first half of the
sixteenth century sumptuary regulation targeted other areas of social behaviour
besides dress. For instance, in 1517 there was a proclamation seeking to control
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excessive fare at feast. 146 It decreed that the number of courses served at a feast
should be regulated according to the rank of the highest person present at the feast. 147
In 1554, a further act of apparel was passed in the reign of Philip and Mary
(1553-58). Hooper suggests that this act, together with the 1533 act, was to remain
“the basis of sumptuary policy for the next half-century”. 148 The 1554 Act was much
shorter and less detailed than any of the four passed during Henry VIII’s reign. 149 It
primarily affected the lower poorer classes and was mainly concerned with
amendments to the existing law. 150 Even though it abstained from laying down “an
exhaustive code for all classes”, 151 it also substantially increased the penalties for
non-observance and forbade all natives of England and its dominions, below the rank
of knight or those with an annual income of £20 pounds, from wearing silk upon
their hats, bonnets, nightcaps, girdles, hose, shoes, scabbards or spur leathers. 152
What is notable in this act is that Mary, like her predecessor Edward IV (1461-70,
1471-83), attempted to regulate the absurd styles of footwear that ‘fashionable’ men
wore: 153 she sought, by proclamation, to limit the “prodigious breath of square toed
shoes”. 154
Although only two short sumptuary acts (both aimed to foster the local cap
industry) were passed during Elizabeth I’s reign (1558-1603) she issued twenty
proclamations on matters of apparel over a period of forty years. 155 Baldwin suggests
that the reason why this form of executive power was used to regulate extravagance
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had much to do with the “absolutism of the Tudor sovereigns who dispensed with
Parliament whenever it suited their purposes to do so.” 156

2.2.2 The Moralisation of Luxury and Extravagance

Luxury came to be viewed through the metaphor of moral contagion, involving the idea that
there is a sequential linkage between vices and sins which accumulatively cause social
harms or bring down the wrath of God. 157

During the early modern period, authorities sought to invoke moral regulation
by through the moralisation of luxury goods. Hunt argues that luxury had come to be
“conceived as both the cause and symptom of an evil that was both personal and
social”. 158 Throughout this epoch, ‘luxury’, ‘extravagance’ and the follies of fashion
continued to be persistent concerns with the King and with Parliament. 159 Most
sumptuary Acts’ preambles and Royal proclamations described luxury as being
linked to the sin of pride, which at the time was regarded as the “mother of all
vices”. 160 Authorities considered that it was their moral and lawful duty to protect
their people from ‘wasting’ their own resources and as well as the national wealth 161
through the ‘dissipation of capital’. 162 They also sought to ‘guard’ their subjects
against improper behaviour and the worldly sins of carnal imitation, social
competition and licentiousness. 163

There was a widespread apprehension that

inappropriate or boastful displays of clothing would lead to spiritual corruption
because such displays breached the religious ideals of modesty, thrift and virtuous
156
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behaviour. 164 In an attempt to counter such evils, the Statutum de Cibariis Utendis
of 1336 was enacted, with its primary intention being to check idle extravagance and
to promote thrift. 165
Baldwin argued that by the end of Edward III’s reign, England had become
“an intensely national state” 166 and was a realm where new fashions and clothing
styles were being rapidly being promoted amongst the nobles and other persons of
high degree. 167 Baldwin described the level of luxury in dress as sumptuous:
The tunics of the aristocracy were made of the most gorgeous materials: cloth of gold or silver,
velvet, silk, satin, etc., the use of some of which were forbidden in certain instances by the
sumptuary laws. Gold, embroidery, pearls and other jewels were used in ornamenting them. 168

During the Lancastrian period (1399-1485), little was done to curb the excess
and extravagance in apparel. This was despite the numerous petitions that were
presented to Henry IV, Henry V and Henry VI seeking ordinances demanding
regulation of the extravagant apparel worn by various classes. 169 By the reign of
Henry VI (1422-1461, 1470-1471), absurd, fantastic and extravagant styles were at
their peak.

170

It was a time that witnessed “lavish display, surpassed in quaintness,

color (sic) and variety only by the time of Henry VIII”. 171 Contemporary satirists and
moralists attacked those who wore extraordinary fashions including stuffed sleeves,
mandarin hats, streamers, shoes with enormously long toes and bizarre
headdresses. 172 Even Chaucer used strong religious overtones when he sermonized
against contemporary dress in the Parson’s Tale:
As to the first sin, that is in superfluity of clothing, which that makes it so dangerous, to the
harm of the people; not only the cost of embroidering, the elaborate indenting or barring,
ornamenting with waved lines, paling, winding or bending and semblables waste of cloth in
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vanity, but there is also the furring in their gowns, so much punching with chisels to make
holes, so much dragging of shears. 173

Religious leaders were particularly scathing of horned headdresses which
they condemned as fashionable foibles. 174 On occasion, their wearers were even
described as being ‘satanic’. 175
The ‘better classes’ favoured “fantastic hats” 176 of felt and fur as well as cloth
of gold, coloured hose (or ‘chausses’) and long-toed shoes that buttoned up the front
or buckled over the insteps. 177 These shoes, made from “rich materials,” 178 had
become increasingly ornate. Furthermore, the length of the toes eventually became so
extenuated and extravagant that church officials considered that it was necessary to
regulate them by law. 179 Despite the enactment of a number of what Hunt refers to as
“quasi-statutory” 180 statutes and proclamations, it was not until 1463 that a detailed
sumptuary dress code was decreed to check excess in dress. 181 It was only when
Edward IV came to the throne and through the duration of the Wars of the Roses
(1455-87) that a more strenuous effort was made to curb extravagance and luxury. 182
Throughout Edward IV’s reign three new sumptuary laws relating to apparel were
enacted.
This 1463 act was significant because it was one of the ‘rare’ English
sumptuary laws that prescribed the clothing to be worn by various classes rather than
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being prohibitive in its decree. 183 This act was reinforced in 1477. 184A third
sumptuary statute was passed in 1483 in response to a fresh petition from the
members of the House of Commons who claimed to be anxious about “the excessive
apparel of the people of [the] realm.” 185 They maintained that poverty and misery
stemmed from the lack of compliance with previous sumptuary laws. 186 Obviously,
those who drafted the 1483 act were also keen to uphold a certain standard of
decency in male dress. The act prohibited a man from wearing “any Gown or mantle
unless it be of such Length, that, he being upright, it shall cover his privy members
and Buttocks”. 187 Baldwin contends that the “diatribes of ecclesiastics and
contemporary satirists” 188 were especially directed against garments “of the dagged
or slashed variety” 189 and those with patterned and scalloped hems. 190
Elizabethan proclamations include protestations about the disorder, confusion
and subversion of all good order within society, particularly in cases when people
were judged as dressing outside their rank or class. 191 This was an immoderate
period when dress, both male and female, was “variegated and extravagant” 192 and
changed with much rapidity. 193 For example, women wore towers of hair
underpropped with forks and wires “like grim stern monsters, rather than chaste
Christian matrons.” 194 Perukes, false and dyed hair were popular along with French
hoods, hats, caps and kerchiefs of velvet, taffeta and wool. 195 Some women were
criticised for being so ‘wanton and lewd’ as to appear in doublets and jerkins.196
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These proclamations employed moralistic language and condemned new fashions
and extravagance in dress. 197
Ruffs of all different styles, size and forms were popular with both men and
women. 198 Later in Elizabeth’s reign, ruffs

would become even more

disproportionate in size when it was discovered that starch could be used as a means
to stiffen their folds, and the use of wire frameworks to afford additional support. 199
Fashionable men and women were prone to wearing all forms of exaggerated
dress. 200 For instance, the farthingale was particularly popular. It was a hoop-like
arrangement, intended to be worn inside women’s wide skirts and was accompanied
by a long stiff and pointed stomacher. 201 Men, on the other hand, favoured
exorbitantly expensive hats that had pointed crowns like steeples that often rose more
than a quarter of a yard above their heads. 202 Some men preferred to wear shirts
made from the finest embroidered material costing as much as £10. 203
Although Elizabeth I was acknowledged as a fashion trendsetter, she was
nevertheless determined that her sumptuary proclamations were to be strictly
observed. To this end, she included provisions within them for a widespread system
of surveillance and enforcement. 204 For instance, gate watchmen were to be
employed to keep a “diligent eye” out for offenders, who would then be hauled
before magistrates for punishment. 205 Successive Elizabethan proclamations focused
on the curtailment of new sumptuary abuses as well as the appointment of distinct
officials who were to be responsible for the enforcement of the Queen’s detailed
sumptuary regulations. 206 For example, the 1562 proclamation denounced the “the
monstrous and outrageous greatness of hosen… [that had] crept a late into the
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Realm.” 207 It foretold of users of extravagant hose who might become so
impoverished that they would have to resort to “unlawful ways.” 208 It was suggested
that this form of criminality would then lead them to ruinous “destruction”. 209 Hunt
suggests that this attack on male hose exhibited a “classical sumptuary motif” 210 in
that it criticised the quantity of material employed in the construction of item of
apparel. 211
Queen Elizabeth’s proposal to curtail excessive dress was also well supported
by a proliferation of censorious material attacking the fashions of the period. 212 For
instance, in 1583 Philip Stubbs’s Anatomie of Abuses decried the “execrable sin of
pride and excess in apparel” 213 and sought to reinforce the customary view that class
distinctions should be preserved by clear difference in costume. 214 Stubbs used the
dialogue between Philoponus and Spudeus to attack extravagance in dress on moral
grounds as offensive to God and leading men to sin:
Spudeus: How is pride of apparel committed?
Philoponus: By wearing of apparel more gorgeous, sumptuous and precious than our state,
calling or condition of life, required, whereby we are puffed up into pride, and forced to think
of ourselves more than we ought… This sin of excess in apparel remains as an example of evil
before our eyes and is a provocative to sin… 215

Critics regularly censured and lamented over Elizabethan consumption
practices and the waste. 216 One commentator, described the Elizabethans to be the
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“laughing stock to all the world for their pride, and very caterpillars to themselves in
wasting and consuming their goods and treasures upon vanities and trifles.” 217

2.2.3 Protecting Domestic Industries

Sumptuary law emerged in a period in which there was already an established tradition of
economic intervention: the regulation of the quality of protection and the associated basic
terms of trade such as weights and measures already existed. 218

Sumptuary laws frequently aimed to closely regulate the English economy by
protecting local industries, particularly the wool, cap and stocking industries, against
aggressive overseas competition. 219 Protectionism was mainly noticeable in
Elizabethan legislation and proclamations which sought to encourage the growth of
local industries by prohibiting the importation of luxury apparel from ‘alien’
countries such as France. 220 This type of protectionist legislation foreshadowed
similar protectionist measures in Australia in the first decades after Federation.
Protectionism was endorsed by government of both eras in an attempt to alleviate
anxiety about national security and to promote economic independence by relying on
a xenophobic and parochial discourse. 221
Hunt argues that the 1336 act, a “brief alimentary [sumptuary] statute,”222
was introduced as a result of rising trade, economic prosperity and increasing conflict
with France. 223 Hunt characterises its discourse as “typically alarmist”. 224 Its
preamble condemned the use of “outrageous and too many kinds” 225 of costly food
which it claimed were disrupting social order and creating mischief in the
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kingdom. 226 It suggested that the ‘landed class’ were ‘much inconvenienced’ and
could potentially be impoverished by such extravagance. 227
The 1337 act, as the first English sumptuary law regulating dress, had two
main objectives. 228 First, as mentioned above, it sought to restrain extravagance in
dress 229 and secondly, it aimed to promote the consumption of English manufactures
by forbidding the wearing of foreign cloth. 230 Furs were particularly targeted as a
form of sartorial extravagance because they were, according to Baldwin, the most
important single article of luxury at the time. 231 The act sought to protect the English
wool industry from imported furs, prohibited anyone under the rank of a knight or of
a lady from wearing any fur on their clothing. 232 Baldwin contended that this type of
economic protectionism or ‘national project’ 233 not only contributed to a strong
growth of national spirit but also incidentally created a national costume. 234
By the beginning of Henry VIII’s reign there was, throughout Europe, a
renewed interest in sumptuary regulation as a method of economic protectionism: 235
Sumptuary legislation was … frequently inspired by commercial protectionist policies, as
when in England, for example, the use of silk was forbidden in order to protect the domestic
woollen industry. 236

Even though Harte suggests that economic motives behind the Acts of
Apparel were only secondary, he notes that the 1510 act had very obvious
protectionist objects. 237 For instance, it forbade any man under the ‘degree of a lord’
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to wear any woollen cloth made outside England, Wales, Ireland, or Calais. 238
Hooper argues that the whole act was underpinned with protectionist ideology:
Indeed, the whole of it is indirectly conceived in the interests of native industry, for all the
richer fabrics mentioned came from abroad, and the trading classes would hardly have
submitted to the passing of these vexatious restrictions unless they had anticipated some
substantial benefit in return for the limitation on their own style of apparel. 239

In 1511, Henry VIII issued a proclamation that was understood to be a war
measure. 240 It ordered against excess in apparel and also had a protective object. 241 It
forbade all Englishmen, except lords and knights to wear silk, and directed that
doublets should only be made from camlet, a woven fabric probably made from
wool. 242 In 1533, a further proclamation sought to secure “good peax” 243 and was
aimed at regulating, amongst other things, unlawful games and excess in apparel. 244
In 1566, Elizabeth issued a fresh attack on the use of hosiery, which in part
sought to protect local hose industry but it also acted as a traditional hierarchic
edict. 245 Her royal proclamation decreed that the lining of hose was to be made from
English cloth and it restricted the use of velvet and satin to the sons of barons or
above. 246 In 1567, Parliament passed the first Elizabethan act on apparel. 247 It was a
purely protectionist measure concerning the supply of foreign wares on credit. 248
Hunt argues that it was specifically directed against tailors and those in related
trades. 249 In 1571, the eponymous ‘Cap Act’ was passed in an attempt to revive the
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English cap-making industry and protect it for foreign competition. 250 It was a
prescriptive and an “unashamedly” 251 protectionist piece of legislation that required:
that every person above the age of six, residing in any of the cities, towns, villages or hamlets
in England were to wear on Sundays and holidays a “a cap of wool knit, fulled and dressed in
England made within this realm, and only dressed and finished by some of the trade of cappers,
upon pain to forfeit for every day of not wearing 3 s. 4d.” 252

It is notable that many Elizabethan apparel proclamations had mixed motives.
They contained strong moralising tones that spoke of the evil of excessive dress as
well as pointing to the need for protectionist measures to shelter local industries. 253
Elizabeth’s apparel proclamations, in the latter part of her reign, showed an
increasing trend to invoke protectionist policy against ‘unnecessary foreign wares’,
particularly those made outside the Queen’s dominion. 254 Hunt explains that
proclamations during this period were “set against a background of sharpening
internal conflict alongside rising fear of external invasion.”
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Hooper suggests that

the rapid growth of trade and commerce during this period, and the prosperity
associated with agriculture brought “an increase of domestic and personal comfort
and luxury that made the attempt to keep dress within artificial barriers more and
more hopeless”. 256
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2.3

Entertainments and popular pastimes

We see in [the] medieval regulation of games and pastimes the birth of one of the most
persistent fields of moral regulation, one that is as alive and controversial today as it was in
the late Middles Ages, namely the overlapping association with idleness, popular recreation,
drinking and gambling. 257

Although the preservation of hierarchy of appearance appeared to be the main
target of sumptuary regulation during the early modern period, it was not its only
target. Sumptuary regulation also targeted amusement and popular social activities.
In 1363, Edward III issued a royal order against those who eschewed archery on
public holidays in favour of other sports such as football, quoits, club ball, handball,
hurling of stones and cockfighting. 258 The playing of such sports, particularly those
that involved gambling, was considered by the church and others as promoting
idleness, theft and debauchery amongst the lower classes, and the “sudden ruin,
desolation and suicide amongst the upper classes.” 259
Baldwin argues that the most important law dealing with unlawful games was
enacted in 1541-42. 260 She suggests that not only was the act concerned with the
encouragement of archery, but it also sought to restrict how an individual used their
leisure time and the manner in which they disposed of their income. 261 During this
period, there had been a shift from an interest in ball games towards those that had
provided the occasion for gambling. 262 The act aimed to veto games that impinged
on a citizen’s duty to maintain his skill with the long bow. Furthermore, it directed
people to avoid those activities that might distract them and cause them to waste
money on gambling. 263
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Hunt suggests that the act may have been enacted as the result of commercial
pressure from bow-makers for it specified that bows were not be made from yew but
rather to be made of mostly costly materials such as elm, witch hazel or ash. 264 The
act also tried to reinvigorate the practice of archery. It extended the age of those
required to keep and practice using a long bow to include every able-bodied person
who were under sixty years of age (except the clergy). 265 Hunt claims that this push
for compulsory archery began to lose its impetus in the mid-sixteenth century. 266
There was only one archery related proclamation in Elizabeth’s reign (1572), and the
final proclamation on unlawful games was decreed in 1608. 267 Hunt suggests that
attempts to compel people to practice archery and to prohibit popular games
eventually “ran out of steam”. 268 The focus of regulatory activity changed: for
instance, legislation relating to alcohol and gambling moved away from targeting the
individual and began to focus on the regulation the licensing of drinking and
gambling establishments. 269
Many Elizabethan statutes and proclamations sought to restrict or eradicate
many popular pastimes, particularly those involving ‘unruly’ games such as football
and those that provided opportunities for gambling and the consumption of
alcohol. 270 Baldwin suggests that it was not just the Parliament and the monarch who
were determined to curtail gambling. 271 The clergy were also very vocal in their
condemnation of those who participated in “the playing at cards, dice, tables, or any
other damned or unlawful games”. 272 It appears that neither the civil authorities nor
the clergy were successful in banning games they considered were so closely linked
with the ‘evils’ of idleness, disorder and vagrancy. 273
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2.4

The erosion of the sumptuary impulse: 1604-1758

Henry VIII could blow hot and Elizabeth I could blow cold, but neither could weaken the
force of social emulation… The process of social emulation was taken further in England
than in any contemporary society. It was facilitated by growing wealth, increasing
urbanisation, and especially by the growth of London and the increasingly dominant role
that the metropolis came to play in English society. 274

Hooper argues that “[p]erhaps the strangest episode in the history of the acts
of apparel” 275 was their sudden and final disappearance in 1604 when all extant
English sumptuary acts were repealed, “a century or more before such laws
disappeared in other countries”. 276 However, he denies that this sudden repeal
sumptuary law had anything to do with the perception that they such laws were futile
or that it was attributable to any hostility towards sumptuary regulation. 277 Rather, he
argues that their disappearance was attributable solely to the opposition “excited on
constitutional grounds,” 278 and in particular to the resentment of the House of
Commons at the King’s claims to legislate by proclamation. 279 Nevertheless, Hooper
contends that the sumptuary “feeling” 280 or impulse continued to survive and
permeate social opinion for generations to come. 281
After 1604, little attempt was made by either the English Parliament or the
monarchy to regulate the population’s dress, even though “the stream of sumptuary
legislation continued to flow fast and strong” 282 on the continent. 283 Between 1610
and 1628 a series of bills were put before the Commons that were attempts to
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reinforce some form of state control of dress. 284 However, they were mainly
concerned with the balance of trade and the protection of local industries. 285 In 1640,
1643, 1650 and 1656 three bills and one proclamation were introduced, without
success, seeking to prohibit the wearing of gold and silver lace, fine linen and ‘other
excess in apparel”. 286 By the 1690s, the security of the woollen trade “was eroding in
the face of a seemingly unquenchable demand for light floral novelties in dress.”287
Lemire argues that between 1719 and 1720 the campaign against imported calico
reached a peak and consequently calls was made for a return to sumptuary laws. 288
Between 1721 and 1758, further unsuccessful attempts were made to protect English
industries by forbidding the importation of such items as French cambrics and
lawns. 289 However, these calls, Lemire says, “fell on deaf ears”. 290
It seemed as if this would be the end of sumptuary law. It was to remain a
relic and remnant of the early modern period that seemed to have no place in a
democratic, liberal social and legal environment. Reed Berhamou suggests that the
sumptuary goals became more difficult to attain as the “stability of the Middle Ages
gave way to the volatility of the early Renaissance.” 291 Moreover, even when
accompanied with threats of punishment, they were ‘doomed to failure’. 292 Records
reveal very few prosecutions for breaching these laws. 293 A range of reasons have
been suggested for the demise of the sumptuary impulse. These include the rise of a
new form of bourgeoisie, which brought conspicuous consumption within a wider
reach and “rendered attempts at restraint even more difficult to secure”, 294 and the
effect of economic realism and national interest that undermined “the grip of
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paternalism that lay at the core of the sumptuary ethic.” 295 Ponte suggests that a lack
of consistent enforcement and a failure substantial public support for these laws were
to blame for their failure. 296 Harte argues that sumptuary laws could not weaken “the
social force of emulation”, 297 and that they might have even had a counter-productive
effect as the prohibition of an article “could give it a special appeal:” 298
Hunt maintains that whilst early sumptuary laws were concerned with
disciplinary power “acting on the detailed choices made by individuals about their
appearance or consumption”, 299 laws in the later phase, were less concerned about
personal regulation than with economic strategies affecting the protection of public
welfare: 300 moralising tones abated to some extent and the sumptuary discourse
shifted from a purely didactic impulse to be viewed in more explicitly ‘economic
terms’. 301
What this means for the regulatory pattern that came after will be considered
later in this thesis – as a set of economic imperatives that reflected the temper of the
modern era. But despite this, the ‘moralising tone’ did not disappear. Hunt argues
that the sumptuary impulse has never been entirely extinguished “despite the
disappearance of overt projects directed towards dress.” 302 Furthermore, he suggests
that sumptuary laws “have lived on in the ubiquitous quest for moral regulation”303
that has continued to find expression in the modern era. 304
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2.5

Gone but not Forgotten: The Australian Sumptuary Experience

And so we are warned that as a result of national extravagance in luxury the Government is
now considering the revival of sumptuary laws to restrict out intake and limit our
expenditure. 305

Although the apogee of sumptuary regulation had long passed, the sumptuary
ethic, which was so strong in England during the early modern period, continued to
survive in the collective memory of colonial and post-Federation Australians. This
memory was particularly ‘alive’ in the first three decades after Federation and was
constantly being refreshed by the press, politicians and church officials. Politicians
often harked backed to the protectionist objectives of the sumptuary laws enacted
during the reign of Elizabeth. 306 Congregations were ‘spoken to’ about the need for
women to be more modest and to lengthen their skirts and heighten their bodices. 307
Newspapers regularly featured didactic commentary and chatter that
reminded and amused Australian readers about the history, the objectives, the
language and curiousness of English sumptuary regulation. 308 Some commentators
characterised sumptuary laws as necessary regulations imposed by paternal
governments who “were so considerate and so anxious for the welfare of their
subjects.” 309 Others reflected that such laws were dictatorial and acted as compulsory
fiats that impinged upon “the personal liberty of the subject.” 310 Furthermore, they
considered that it was unfathomable as to why ‘modern’ Australians should be forced
to endure laws that had proved ineffective in the past. 311
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In the post-Federation period, much of the commentary concerning fashion
and luxury took the form of moralising venomous diatribe and drew on early
sumptuary edicts when inveighing against increased displays of luxury and
extravagance. 312 Women’s apparel, gambling and drinking habits were especial
targets. 313 Just as in the early modern period, women in the early twentieth century
were also admonished for wearing “gigantic millinery” 314 and for using gold lace.315
In the comparatively ‘modern’ sumptuary act of 1711, Queen Anne had absolutely
forbidden the importation for this same type of opulent lace, the demand for which at
the time was said to have become “exceedingly extravagant.” 316 Women were also
reminded that luxurious forms of boots, shoes, stockings, gloves and veils were was
reprehensible and inappropriate. 317 By the early decades following Federation, it was
obvious that the sumptuary impulse had permeated social opinion and was to
influence social commentators, legislators and the general public. Even the new
arbitration system initiated by Higgins J in 1907, that was based on ‘a fair and
reasonable wage’, was defined as a form of ‘sumptuary legislation’. 318
The privations of First World War caused Australians to become even more
focused on past sumptuary laws. One female commentator suggested during the war
that Australian women were still being subjected to the imperatives of these laws and
that they remained inherently imprinted within contemporary dress customs and
practices:
The recent cable stating that British Government is likely to fix dress allowances is simply a
revival of the Sumptuary Laws which were passed over a period of three hundred years, one
piling on another or varying it, and it is through the ‘mentality’ left against dressing above our
position and against others who, while we are decorous, transgress. 319
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Another woman mused, “in the midst of war time restrictions and
Government control of food and clothing supplies,”

320

that it was fascinating to

“look back into past times when lands and enactments governed many of the details
of daily life”. 321 Others laconically insisted that the exigencies of war and “the
extravagant tendencies of the times”

322

would require the Federal government to

follow the lead of England, the United States, France and Germany by resurrecting
sumptuary laws in the form of the imposition of a heavy tax on amusements and
luxuries.323 In Farey v Burvett, Griffith CJ even declared that that sumptuary laws
“have always been common war measures.” 324
During wartime hostilities, dress again became one of the main targets for the
revived sumptuary intervention: there were calls for uniformity of dress for men and
women as well as a demand for the imposition of fixed prices for fabric, clothing and
for tailoring. 325 The plea to revive sumptuary regulation was heeded. As we see in
Chapter 6, the Hughes government established the short-lived Luxuries Board to
repress extravagance and forestall ‘national ruin’ by curtailing the importation of
luxury goods. Furthermore, the War Precautions Act 1914-18 (Cth), which the
Hughes government used to implement wartime efficiency measures, was defined by
the High Court as “in substance a sumptuary law.” 326
In the 1920s, there was growing concern that Australian women were
becoming too enamoured with wearing the latest fashions and luxury fabrics such as
‘georgette’. It was feared this behaviour not only challenged the traditional
hierarchies of appearance, but it also risked personal and national impoverishment.327
It was suggested by one commentator that the community would benefit if women
were “obliged to gown themselves according to their station in life only, and were
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thereby inculcated with a desire to save some of their hardly-earned wages to enable
them to look forward to a future of partial independence.” 328

2.6

Conclusion

The critique of luxury exhibited remarkable resilience and lasted well into modernity; it is
arguable that the condemnation of luxury did not lose both its conventional and its moral
force until the late modernity of the twentieth century.329

This chapter accounted for the imperatives and themes that characterised the
English sumptuary laws during the period from 1337 until 1604. Authorities sought
to regulate social stability and order, and to maintain ‘the common weal’ by the
imposition of hierarchic dress codes reflecting what Hooper calls the “pyramid view
of society.” 330 It was expected that sumptuary laws would chart a hierarchical order
of appearance that would combat the excessive and wasteful consumption of the
lower classes that was thought to threaten both private and public economies. Most
English sumptuary laws of the early modern period were meticulous regulations.
They normally detailed the colours and types of fabrics that various ranks and
occupations could wear and regulated the type of clothing or textiles that could be
imported into Great Britain. 331 Thus, colour, style and fabric of apparel all became
part of a codification of appearance and they acted as social markers to distinguish
social and economic status. 332 The dress rules and class distinctions were exactingly
described in the legislation. For instance, luxury goods such as silk, lace, precious
gems, gold and silver fabric and exotic furs could only to be worn by royalty or
highly ranked families. 333
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Whilst sumptuary laws were concerned with the regulation of expenditure on
entertainment, food and ceremonies, their primary focus throughout this period was
on with the regulation of dress. The sumptuary impulse was particularly evident in
the moralisation of luxury and in economic regulation and in attempts to preserve
hierarchy of appearance by the creation of specific dress codes. These same
sumptuary imperatives were robustly discernible in countries such as Australia in the
early twentieth century. There was also a palpable movement, particularly during the
First World War, to resurrect these ‘antique’ laws to curtail luxury and extravagance,
and to protect local industries from aggressive overseas competition. Later chapters
will examine how these foundational tenets of sumptuary laws re-emerged in altered
manifestations in Australia during the early post-Federation period. We will now
move on to Chapter 3, which will examine some of the significant Australian
personalities, ideologies and institutions that were responsible for the revival of and
inextricably linked to the evolution of these fresh manifestations of sumptuary
regulation.
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3 SHAPING THE AUSTRALIAN SUMPTUARY EXPERIENCE:
INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS

The Parliament shall sit at Melbourne until it meets at the seat of Government
Australian Constitution s 125

3.1

Purpose and Structure of this chapter

The idea that a sumptuary impulse could return in a new guise during the first
years of the 20th century in Australia seems remarkable. A set of laws imposed by
absolute monarchs would seem to be out of step with the new modernity of the 20th
century, especially in a nation that prided itself on its (near) universal suffrage of
both women and men. In these circumstances, any sumptuary impulse would have to
manifest itself in a very different fashion, in particular through formal fiscal
measures – tariffs, taxes, and national wage determinations. But to account for these
interventions only through formal legal means only goes one small part of the way to
understand the role that the sumptuary impulse played in these formal legal
interventions – some successful, others not.
To understand the sumptuary impulse means to draw on the threads already
illustrated in Chapter Two – its moral component, implicit nationalism, formal
protectionism, and the formal acts of war – and pull them across time and space to a
set of influential individuals who continued to draw on

warp and weft in an

attempt to shape law in this new society – and to shape society directly. In the first
formative decades of the post-Federation Australian polity, the sumptuary impulse
originally shaped law in ways that belie expected conventions of formal law-making
through the interventions and manoeuvres of a tightly knit group of individuals and
associations that coalesced around the Melbourne elite of the first two decades after
Federation.
To understand how this happened in the Australia in this era is to rethink the
assumed geographic and physical setting of law and government with which later
generations of Australians have become familiar. At Federation, the Parliament and
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institutions of law and government were located in Melbourne. Canberra, later to be
the nation’s capital and seat of these institutions, was selected in 1908, and planning
and construction began in 1913, before the seat of government moved there in 1927.
Melbourne’s influence, during the period with which this thesis is concerned, looms
large, and the role of the individuals and organisations who actively participated in
the formation of the newly formed polity were from Melbourne. But, as will become
clear as this thesis unfolds, it is possible to locate a shift from a set of fairly informal
means by which patrician individuals created the conditions through which law was
formed or advocated, to the more formal conditions under which law was created by
the end of the period under examination. This shift matched the move away from the
local and informal location of Melbourne to the centralised and more bureaucratic
city of Canberra, which was to serve as the formal national capital. 1
Because of their influence and their recurring appearance throughout this
period, this chapter will be devoted to sketching the individuals and their connections
and allies. They feature prominently in the following chapters, as fragments of a
uniquely Australian account of the revival of sumptuary regulation during the early
decades following Federation. As discrete fragments, they stand only to explain a
portion of the story of a fledgling nation in a period characterised by sweeping social
change and wartime disturbance. Stitched together with threads of gender, class, race
and hegemony, these fragments intertwine to form a patchwork narrative showcasing
the same patterns and themes that were evident in early modern sumptuary laws.
Whilst these accounts will be teased out in greater depth in each of the later
chapters of this thesis, this chapter seeks to understand the role that influential
individuals and institutions played in the return of the sumptuary impulse in the early
20th century in Australia. The chapter begins by providing a brief overview and
account of the circumstances surrounding post-Federation Australia. It describes how
Melbourne was the locus of social and political activity during this time. The chapter
then considers the role and influence of the ‘power couple’ of the day, Herbert and
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Ivy Brookes, and the role they played in shaping the fledgling nation across the
board, but in particular as advocates of protectionism which was the pre-eminent
economic policy for the newly federated nation. While the Brookes’ were influential
in various social and political milieus throughout this period, Herbert Brookes also
had a role in the institutional life of the nation.
The chapter moves on to consider the role of one of these bodies, the Tariff
Board, of which Herbert Brookes was a member. The Board was the institutionalised
voice of Protectionism in Australia and was created to implement and justify the
government’s ‘settled economic policy’. His wife, Ivy, on the other hand, as a
feminine agent of protectionism, worked tirelessly through the institutions she helped
establish and run. The chapter also briefly accounts for the role that women’s
organisations played in advocating gender reform and promulgating moral
regulation. That form of moral regulation found its way into a surprising forum – the
formal wages mechanisms created in the first few years of Australia.
The chapter considers the role that Henry Bournes Higgins J, one of
Australia’s first High Court Justices, and his fellow Arbitration Court judges, played
in regulating and ‘normalising’ Australian workers, including acceptable forms of
spending permitted on dress, that were the subject of concern of patrician moral
campaigners like Ivy Brookes. It also details how the affiliation between the unions,
the arbitration courts and manufactures detrimentally affected consumers – those
who wished to express themselves as they chose through their style of dress and
choice of clothing.
Finally, the chapter reveals that

the press, largely based in Melbourne,

played a significant role in influencing government policy and in reinforcing sexual
stereotypes and masculinist hegemony.

3.2

Federation

In 1901, the former British colonies on the Australian continent were
federated as a new nation, Australia. Upon Federation, the imperial connection
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remained strong and most of the population continued to be fiercely loyal to the
British throne and to the Empire. Even native-born politicians such as Alfred Deakin
were convinced that trust in the newly formed nation was compatible with it
remaining a vital part of the British Empire and that Federation would provide
Australians with a more effective voice in the Empire’s activities. Prior to
Federation, Australia was a set of fractious alliances designed to deliver trade
between the former colonies. After Federation, there was distribution of powers
between the Commonwealth and the newly formed six States. 2 The Constitution
reflected responsible democratic parliamentary government based on the British
model. 3 It was envisaged that there would be a central government, with Parliament,
Executive and High Court. Although British Parliamentary practice was adopted,
early Federal Parliaments had to formulate their own procedure. 4
Parliament was also challenged with other major foundational tasks,
including the selection and creation of the site for the Federal capital, the
establishment of both the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration
Court and the High Court. Section 125 of the Constitution empowered the
Commonwealth Parliament to determine the location of seat of government in New
South Wales. This proved to be a difficult task. The choice of the site was the subject
of many resolutions, visits, inspections and a Royal Commission. Although the
Federal capital was chosen in 1908, it was not until 1927 that Parliament sat in
Canberra, the new nation’s Federal capital. In the meantime, Federal Parliament sat
in Melbourne.
The Second Federal Parliament (1903-1906) passed the Conciliation and
Arbitration Act 1904 (Cth), which established a system of compulsory judicial
arbitration of industrial disputes. It has been suggested this was to have profound
effects on Australia’s social and economic structures. 5 It not only encouraged trade

2

Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law: 1901-1921 (Melbourne University Press, 2nd
ed, 1972) 1.
3
Ibid 9.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid 40.

64

union development on a national scale, but it also had consequences for wages and
hours fixation.6 The Court’s principal registry was located in Melbourne. Section 71
of the Constitution empowered the Commonwealth Parliament to create a High Court
consisting of a Chief Justice and at least two other justices. The Court was to be
“keystone of the federal arch” 7 and was to decide the orbit and boundary of every
Federal power and to protect the Constitution. 8 There was much debate about
whether it was an unnecessary luxury and whether that “under Australian conditions
the task of constitutional interpretation could safely be left to the State Courts and the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London”. 9 The Court’s primary registry
was located in Melbourne. 10 It was only when the High Court building was finished
in 1980 that the Court’s administration was transferred to Canberra.
Federation proved to be a momentous political experiment and required
expertise, leadership and vison from those involved in its execution. There continued
to be concerns about the practicalities of Federal governance, such as the
establishment of a bureaucracy to serve and administer government, and the limits of
executive power. Furthermore, there were some ongoing anxieties regarding
concurrent laws such as income tax, which continued to operate in parallel with
States laws. For instance, all States had previously adopted State income taxes and it
was not until 1915 that the first Commonwealth Income Tax was adopted. 11 The
parallel State and Commonwealth income tax laws remained in effect until 1942
when the Commonwealth achieved exclusive power through formal measures. 12
The new Federal powers accorded to the Commonwealth upon Federation
meant that elected officials became responsible for shaping a unique framework of
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legislation and for initiating key features of Australian national policy. 13 The first
Commonwealth Parliaments were given the task of implementing a program of
responsible government in the face of continuing resistance from the States and
fractious disputes between protectionists and Free Traders. States such as New South
Wales and Victoria continued to squabble about the brand of economic policy that
should be adopted by a new federal government. Before Federation, Victoria had for
several decades adopted an economic policy of protection while New South Wales
remained steadfastly loyal to free trade. Finally, after many heated debates,
protectionism became the ‘settled policy’ of all governments. It was argued that it
offered the best “weapon of defence against that dangerous world outside which
struggled for profit”. 14
Parliament was charged with shaping the structure of the federal government
and attending to making a profusion of laws relating to a host of new Federal powers.
The Commonwealth had been given the power with respect of naval and military
defence 15 as well as external powers. 16 It had power to control immigration,
naturalisation and aliens, 17 as well as the power to provide for the settlement by
conciliation and arbitration of industrial disputes extending beyond one State.18
Besides enacting legislation covering these and other powers, Parliament had to deal
with fiscal issues of appropriation, supply and taxation, with social service issues
such as the implementation of a national system of old-age and invalid pensions,19
as well as with all aspects of trade and commerce between States and with foreign
countries. 20 Government departments had to be established and administrative
regimes needed to be implemented to assuage the social, economic and political

13

Sawer, above n 2, 20.
W K Hancock, Australia (Earnest Benn Limited, 1930) 83.
15
Australian Constitution s 51(vi).
16
Ibid s 51(xxix).
17
Ibid s 51(xxvii), (xix). See Leiboff, above n 1, 233.
18
Australian Constitution s 51(xxxv).
19
Ibid s 51(xxiii).
20
Ibid ss 51(i), 98.
14

66

aspirations and interests of the States and those prominent individuals and
institutions that had played a part in the struggle for Federation.
In many cases, the ‘Federal experiment’ proved to be difficult for those
inexperienced in national governance. The executive often lacked expertise in
particular areas of administration and were forced to seek ‘expert’ assistance in their
administration of government. 21 It became common practice for the executive branch
of government to delegate ad-hoc regulatory power to quasi-legal Boards such as the
Commonwealth Board of Trade, the Luxuries Board, the Repatriation Board and the
Tariff Board. As Australia was without a class “on whom birth conferred legal and
political privileges” 22 it became common for government to appoint prominent
middle class lawyers, business men and scholars to constitute such Boards. This type
of appointment hinted at cronyism. So small was the pool of Australian experts in
matters of finance, business and law it was not unusual for eminent men such as A B
Piddington, N C Lockyer and Herbert Brookes to be appointed, at various times, to
these Boards, and in some instances to more than one Board. Some members, such as
Brookes were appointed because of their expertise and their political standing, whilst
it seems others, such as Piddington 23 and N C Lockyer 24 may have received their
appointments, as amends for failed career opportunities. It would take many years
before Australia would adopt a more formalised and unbiased approach to the
administration of government.
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3.2.1 A new society
Leading up to Federation, there appeared a noticeable shift in attitudes
towards imperial notions of class distinction and aristocratic privileges based on birth
and rank. 25 Australia had become increasingly immune to British hierarchical
imperatives. Australians had developed their own social hierarchy based upon
material wealth and social position associated with commercial enterprise, primary
industry and public service. 26 By Federation, Australia’s unique form of democracy
was continuing to be further shaped amidst a general climate of racial, moral and
economic insecurity. The first Commonwealth Parliament had passed the
Commonwealth Franchise Act 1902 (Cth)
suffrage.

27

which had granted universal adult

Whilst Australian governments were anxious about the necessity to

increase population, public discourse idealised the ‘true’ Australian as male,
productive, moral and white.
There was a general move to create a unified society that was to be
dominated by ‘white’ Australians. This ‘ideal’ was to be achieved by prohibiting
‘coloured’ migration and by discouraging interracial marriage. 28 Deakin suggested
that a united Australia was one that was characterised by a people possessing the
same general cast of character, tone of thought and the same constitutional training
and traditions. 29 Australian primary producers were nervous about the continuing
viability of overseas markets for Australia’s two chief exports of wool and wheat,
even though Australia’s trade position in the early twentieth century had been greatly
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bolstered with increased sales. 30 Australia’s economic prosperity depended largely
on what prices she could receive for these staples in uncertain world’s markets. 31
Federation proved to be a boon for feminists who had been actively seeking
franchise for some time. The Australian Constitution extended women’s freedom to
participate more fully in the government of this new nation. South Australian and
Western Australian women had already had the vote and the right to stand for
parliament and this proved to be a powerful inducement to members of Federal
Parliament to accept female franchise for the whole of the Commonwealth and they
thus ensured that women were accorded the same rights under the Commonwealth
Franchise Act 1902 (Cth). 32

3.2.2 Melbourne
The centralisation within Melbourne of these significant federal foundational
institutions contributed to making it the locus of Australian political power in the
post-Federation period. Discriminatory tariffs led to Melbourne having the highest
concentration of manufacturing amongst the capital cities. 33 In 1901, Melbourne had
a population of 501 580 compared to 496 990 in Sydney. 34 Melbourne was already
home to many leading politicians and members of Australia’s wealthy elite. After
Federation, it also became the temporary abode of a large number of politicians and
bureaucrats who were involved significantly with constructing Australia’s domestic
and international identity. From the latter part of the nineteenth century, the city had
become renowned as a centre of wealth, culture, fashion, education and Liberal
politics. Wealth from the goldfields had made it a hub of finance and industry. R E N
Twopeny had observed that Melbourne in the 1880s boasted more culture and sport
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than Sydney. 35 Manning Clark claimed that its intellectual life had developed
“during the golden age of the bourgeoisie” in Australia (1861-1883). 36
Melbourne had also become the hotbed of protectionism and home to fervent
protectionists including Alfred Deakin (1856-1919) and David Syme (1860-1908),
the newspaper magnate and ‘father of protectionism’. Its philanthropic and liberal
culture spawned numerous middle class women’s associations; their members
busied themselves with social issues such as the cost of living and poverty. These
quasi-political organisations included the Australian Women’s National League and
the Housewives Association. Their members mixed in the same social circles and
were linked “through a network of philanthropic causes.” 37 Many had husbands or
close male relatives who were firmly entrenched in politics, farming and business. 38
It was not unexpected that a large section of Australia’s governing class
would be located in Melbourne and that national policy and Federal legislation
would be influenced by its privileged elite. Herbert and Ivy Brookes typified the type
of middle class, affluent, white, Protestant and Anglo-centric Melbournians who
played a crucial role in shaping Australia’s domestic and foreign policies. Manning
Clark located the couple in the heart of ‘Yarraside’- a term he used for the home of
ruling class in Melbourne. 39 Even though their contributions were often directly
interrelated with their own vested interests, their personal motives were frequently
mixed with altruistic ones. The Brookes’ for instance considered that, as members of
Australia’s wealthy and prominent elite, it was incumbent upon them to wield their
paternal and evangelical influence to help shape the political, social and moral order
of the fledgling nation. Members of this tightknit privileged network were linked
privately and publically in multifarious ways: socially, politically and through
religion, education and ‘good works’.
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Men and women of social distinction and position, such as the Brookes,
Alfred Deakin, David Syme and Higgins J were frequently involved together in a
plethora of civic and ‘patriotic’ causes. As part of the ‘establishment’, they were
especially concerned with economic initiatives, civic virtue and social compliance in
the face of rapid social and political changes, particularly in the shadow and, then in
the reality, of world conflict. The old hierarchical social regime, that had previously
been securely stitched into place by traditional ‘rules’ of appearance, consumerism
and privilege, was becoming frayed. During the war, these ‘rules’ became even more
blurred. The governing class saw it as a perilous time when moral values and
traditions were being constantly challenged by the exigencies of war, political
division and industrial strife. It was perceived to be a period of national emergency
that warranted interventionist measures, such as the War Precautions Act 1914 (Cth),
to bring people under political, legal and moral control.

3.3

Ivy and Herbert Brookes - their political and social mission was to
rid society of ‘evils’

The common thread throughout [his biography] is Brookes’ belief in the Empire, his sense of
duty to God and his conviction of the necessity for an informed, pious elite to lead the way. 40

The first decades after Federation saw the rise of a distinctive breed of social
leaders and political patricians who sought to fashion a new Australian identity. This
new identity would be garnered from a fresh spirit of independence and selfsufficiency that accompanied Federation and Australia’s significant participation in
the Great War. Some public figures such as Herbert Brookes (1867-1963) and David
Syme became the forerunners of new political parties, the leaders of industry and had
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created powerful social and political networks. They were often closely associated
with business, political and landed dynasties. They exerted enormous power during
the period when Australia was emerging from a fledgling nation to a leader in world
trade. They counselled Ministers and manipulated Prime Ministers; they directed
public policy and were closely involved with promoting their idealised notion of
Australia’s future identity. 41 Ivy and Herbert Brookes were two such powerful public
figures.
The Ivy and Herbert narrative provides a rare insight into a powerful familial
alliance that exerted enormous influence in shaping Australian social fabric and
economic policy in the first part of the 20th century. Married in Melbourne in 1905,42
the Brookes’ not only attempted to shape economic policy but they were also
energetically involved in regulating the private lives of ordinary Australians. Herbert
used his enormous wealth to secure a network “tied into powerful social and
economic circuits in the British Empire.” 43 He held executive roles in the newly
formed Liberal Party and served as the President of the Chamber of Manufactures. 44
Brookes was a clever power-broker and a confidant of Prime Ministers. He had much
in common with Prime Minister William Hughes (1862-1952) - he was a militant
Protestant and Anglophile and a fervent ‘conscriptionist’. 45 Herbert’s influence over
Hughes was so great that Manning Clark labelled Herbert “the king-maker of 191617. 46
Brookes had a glowing career in business and served in a number of wartime
committees and in government-appointed positions after 1918. He was one of the
first appointees to the Tariff Board and later, from 1929 until 1930, he served as the
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first Commissioner-General for Australia in the United States. 47 In 1922, he was
appointed to the Tariff Board that was established in 1921 to implement the
government’s ‘settled policy of Protection”. 48 As a hard-line Protectionist, he played
a central role as an agent of Federal institutional power in creating and administering
tariffs to protect Australian manufacturers and he paid scant heed to the needs and
choices of the working classes. Brookes was a hard-nosed right wing conservative.
He had directly influenced Hughes in the banning of the Sinn Fein flag and the red
flag during 1918. 49 In the same year, he was actively involved in the formation and
leadership of the right wing Protective League that sought to quell ‘disloyal protest’
in Queensland. 50 The League was established by “the watchdogs of loyalty” 51 to
counter the impact of ‘insidious, subversive propaganda’ in Australia. 52 It was the
face of vigilante activism and its xenophobic policies sought to “crush the growing
element of disloyalists (sic), traitors and scum of Australia.” 53
Ivy Brookes (1883-1970) was the eldest daughter of Alfred Deakin and her
political lineage gave her formidable social and political cachet. She had been
exposed from an early age to her father’s powerful reformist rhetoric and was well
versed in his views on topics such as the White Australia policy, eugenics and
nationalism.

54

Ivy was a confident public speaker, a successful fund raiser, an

energetic lobbyist and a committed women’s advocate. 55 She was actively engaged
on the executive in a plethora of women’s political and social organisations including
the Women’s Liberal League, the Housewives Association and the Imperial Defence
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League. 56 Ivy mostly remained outside the mainstream of official politics and
institutional power. She did venture into the public sphere when campaigning to
women on behalf of her father during elections, when she promoted her husband’s
political projects, and later when she became an iconic female voice of
protectionism. 57 She attended manufacturing conferences and political rallies with
Herbert. She was a dedicated and energetic member of prominent women’s civic
organizations such as the Housewives’ Association and the National Council of
Women. 58 It was within these roles that she played a crucial, influential and highly
visible and yet informal role in the creation of social policy. Her extra-parliamentary
political activism centred on moral regulation and social reforms pertaining to
women, children and the domestic sphere. 59 However, whilst she presented to some a
respectable, articulate and maternal image; Manning Clark depicts her as a narrowminded ‘wowser’ who possessed lofty religious and hierarchical ideals and promoted
austerity and simplicity in dress:
She took comfort from Christ’s rider, that with God all things were possible. She
believed God had a plan, and that the British were the instruments of Divine
Providence. Australia mirrored God’s plan. There was no need for any change in
society: the industrious, the talented and the frugal could rise to the top in Australia…
She thought some modern women went too far with their jewels, their powder and
their painted pomp. 60

Whilst Ivy became an influential voice for female consumers 61

she

nevertheless remained a passionate supporter and iconic advocate 62 for those
protectionist ‘buy-Australian’ policies so keenly espoused by her husband and father,
and which proved so problematical for these female consumers and their families. 63
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Although Ivy worked from a more marginalised and domestic locus than her
husband, she nevertheless became, during the decades following Federation, an
important influential participant in so many activities and associations that sought to
influence and intervene in the private lives of consumers.
In 1918, she was appointed as President of the Empire Trade Defence
Council and as a member of the Women’s Executive of Australian Industries
Protection League. 64 Towards the end of the war she became the official female
voice of protectionism and led a campaign of propaganda in support of protection for
local industries. 65 This campaign pressured female consumers to publicly
demonstrate their patriotism by giving their preference to Australian goods and by
boycotting “enemy goods”. 66 Ivy skilfully applied her immeasurable political skills
and her popularity with the press to harness ‘patriotic’ Australians to participate in
interventionist economic and social projects that sought to create a ‘loyal’ and
closely regulated population. Ivy cleverly linked protectionism with nationalism.
Her rhetoric often demonised Germans, Japanese and other aliens, and she frequently
sought to ostracize Australians who were so unpatriotic as to purchase goods from
them. 67
The Brookes’ made a formidable political couple and presented “an
extraordinary unity”. 68 They were both staunch supporters of the Empire and
believed in a life dedicated to God, ‘plain’ living’ and ‘high thinking’. 69 They
fervently believed that they had a paternal and pastoral duty “to be stewards to their
community, their culture and to the less fortunate.” 70 They saw themselves, and were
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seen, as deeply committed social crusaders who sought through their ‘evangelical
efforts’ to promote the common good and to save Australians from social ‘evils’:
The missionary spirit is strong in all the Deakins. The Prime Minister himself a man of
creed and enthusiasm: Mrs Deakin, is a social worker, whose benevolent work is
greater than many people know; and Mr Herbert Brookes, their son-in-law ….is
similarly inspired by altruistic emotion.71

Herbert and Ivy used their individual and joint talents and opportunities to
influence and regulate private consumption and to shape a society that nurtured
‘home grown industry’. Both zealously promoted economic protectionism as a form
of regulatory sumptuary intervention that targeted the governance of consumption
via the application of tariff imposts on the importation of consumables such as
clothing. 72

3.4

The Tariff Board

Protection…is now received as the settled fiscal policy accepted by all political parties.73

Shortly after Federation, Australia firmly adopted a protectionist stance
towards it manufacturing sector. 74 By 1904, it was proposed that a ‘non-political’
advisory body be appointed to assist Parliament and the government in making the
Tariff. 75 In August 1913, an Inter-State Commission had been appointed to
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investigate the tariff, amongst other things. 76 However, as the Commission’s
recommendations were based on pre-1914 ‘normal’ circumstances, they proved to be
“quite irrelevant” 77 in coping with a greatly altered post-war situation. 78 Even though
the Commission followed a “general protectionist line”, 79 its findings proved later to
have little influence on the 1921 Greene tariff debates that were concerned with the
danger of isolation, defence and the inability of Australian manufacturers to receive
industrial supplies should there be another war. 80
After the First World War, the ‘cry’ for an independent Tariff Board became
more incessant. 81 In Australia, a “more developed sense of nationhood” 82 had
evolved during the war along with increased feelings of isolation and vulnerability.
This produced a heightened demand for tariff revision to protect nascent industries,
particularly those born in the war years, from persistent post-war overseas
competition. 83 It was argued that the tariff should not be left to “amateur” 84 members
of Parliament with no qualifications in the framing of tariffs and that tariffs should
no longer be the partisan “tools of parties”. 85 Instead, it was argued that tariff
adjustments should be “suggested” 86 by disinterested experts who would have proper
regard for the interests of all concerned. 87 It was also argued that a permanent board
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would be an advantage when different goods became available, especially when new
industries were commenced. 88
Whilst Hughes sought a mandate vis referendum in 1919 for increased
legislative power to provide for remedies to protect the consumer against those
manufacturers who might use the tariff to exact unduly high prices, 89 his request was
refused by the public. 90 By 1921, Prime Minister Hughes’ Nationalist Party had
resolved to experiment 91 with the establishment of the Tariff Board as an
independent statutory authority that would hold, at the request of government, public
inquiries into tariff issues and that was “to act as a buffer between it and the various
interested groups.” 92
The Tariff Board Act 1921 93 had a stormy passage through Parliament as it
was opposed from both the right and the left. 94 Nevertheless, general support for
protection continued and all tariff debates in Parliament continued during the 1920s
to reflect the predominantly protectionist attitude of all parties. 95 The Government
promised that it would institute a Board to act as a check on the validity of claims for
increased protection. 96 In addition, the Board was to serve as a precaution against
monopoly practices, the exploitation of consumers and the ‘sweating’ of workers by
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industries that were provided with protection. 97 The Government hoped that this new
authority would make the tariff both “scientific” and “elastic”. 98 RC Mills suggested
in 1927 that the government, by empowering the Tariff Board to administer its policy
of protection, was “definitely and deliberately [handing] over to the executive
considerable power and discretion in tariff matters.”

99

Many complaints were made

inside and outside of Parliament to the effect that the Board was effectively usurping
the functions of Parliament and had become an independent tariff-making
authority. 100
The Hughes’ government promised that the new Tariff Board was to be
staffed by a group of “disinterested experts”. 101 The Board’s early appointees were
businessmen, like Herbert Brookes, and government employees. 102 All were key
stakeholders in the promotion of Australian protectionist policy. 103 They were neither
disinterested and, in the main, had little expertise in Tariff revision. The Board, this
“creature of Parliament,” 104 was seen and saw itself from its inception as “the
institutionalised voice of protectionism” 105 and the Board exercised its powers to
deliberately protect Australian manufacturers. 106 In its early days, the Board believed
it was “bound to recommend protective duties whenever possible.” 107 It has always
looked upon its functions as being to carry out, not to question, the settled policy of
protectionism. 108
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Hall declared in 1923, that the remarks of the Board “leave little doubt as to
the uncritical outlook on the question of protection.” 109 In a letter written in 1926,
Herbert Brookes, described the paternal and elitist approach of the Board members as
a form of religious dogma that was intertwined with protectionist ideals:
Although we are a fact-finding and non-partisan body, our facts are sought with the
object of improving the protectionist system our Country has adopted and not with the
idea of improving it out of existence. We are non-partisan because we have been
selected by a Government of a country, 95% of whose representatives are
protectionists. We are four protectionists-God helping us, and you will add, God
helping our Country. 110

During the Board’s early years, its members when overseeing tariff revisions,
strictly adhered to the cannons of the ‘settled policy of protectionism and endorsed
massive tariff hikes on imported clothing and ‘luxuries’. 111 Others saw the Board as
being at the “very centre of Australia’s Protectionist system”. 112
This was a period that saw the Board’s systematic extension of the umbrella
of protection resulting in a rapid rise and widening of tariff. 113 However, little was
heard during this period about the protection of the consumer. 114 Working class
consumers were especially disadvantaged by the very large increases in tariff rates
on apparel in 1925-26. 115 By 1928, there were 259 items with duties greater than 40
per cent. 116 Senator Kingsmill suggested that the high tariffs on imported clothing
might be described as “inverted sumptuary laws.” 117 He pointed out that whilst under
the ‘old sumptuary laws’ people of a certain status were not allowed to wear
expensive garments, the high duties imposed in 1926 prohibited “the wearing of
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inexpensive garments.” 118 No protection was accorded to consumers against
artificially raised domestic prices on essential goods, and instead, they suffered
declining access to growers and producers. 119 Most importantly, they were denied the
option of purchasing cheaper imported goods. 120
Despite exhibiting zealous loyalty protectionist ideals, the Tariff Board
sustained heavy criticism from all quarters. Whilst one critic referred to it, as “that
egregious excrescence on our constitutional and political system,” 121 others argued
that it failed dismally to provide sufficient protection for Australian industries.122
Some, “inside and outside Parliament”, 123 argued that the Board had usurped the
functions of Parliament and had become an independent tariff-making authority.124
One of the most persistent complaints levelled against it during the early years after
its establishment was that its decision-making processes lacked transparency and
impartiality. 125 In particular, the Board was rebuked for its practice of holding its
hearings in private. 126
Its recommended Tariff Schedule was considered unfair, and the manner in
which the Board formulated the Tariff was thought to be “seriously open to
question”. 127 One journalist, incensed about the Board members’ blatant bias towards
manufacturers, insisted that once the members of Parliament and their voters were
apprised of the level of the Board’s partiality, it would be inconceivable that the
public could expected to be “taxed so heavily for the benefit of a small section of the
community”. 128 Similarly, Mr Mann MP questioned whether the Board, in taxing the
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public in order that “private industries be bolstered up” 129 had “functioned in a right
and proper manner.” 130
The complaints against the Board intensified after its hearings were opened to
the public. Many were especially shocked by the “cupidity of applicants,” 131 whose
admissions, relating to their inability to meet ordinary completion, in fact, amounted
to confessions of inefficiency. 132 Others were concerned that whilst the government
nurtured Australian industries “under hot-house conditions,” 133 the working class
was being called upon to carry the economic burden of an increased cost of living134
and were “helpless against Melbourne and Sydney protectionist vampires.”135
Furthermore, it became manifestly obvious that the Board was not comprised of a
group of “disinterested experts” 136 who were expected to determine Australia’s
tariffs “on a scientific basis” 137 in place of the “usual empiricism.” 138 The Board was
expected to only have a temporary life. However, the Board’s term was extended for
an extra year in 1923 and the Tariff Board Act 1924 (Cth) had the effect of making
the Board a permanent body.

3.5

Women’s Associations

The housewife… represents the small purse, and artificially inflated prices for daily rations
that are not luxuries waken her indignation into active protest.139

During early twentieth century, the Australian women’s movement actively
challenged patriarchal and maculininst ideologies and institutions. 140 Their feminine
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brand of political activism, although centred on genteel and tasteful ‘at home’
functions and edifying forums, nevertheless prompted the politicization and
mobilisation of previously dependent and home-bound women. 141 The movement
saw the proliferation of progressive women’s organisations, such as the Housewives
Association and National Council of Women. Whilst the membership of these
organisations grew rapidly to became a “vital force,” 142 they were mainly comprised
of middle class and politically conservative women 143 who were not deeply
concerned with mainstream politics but were rather involved with gendered
interventionist philanthropic activities “in an increasingly urban society:” 144 “[t]he
Woman Movement was a broad and multifaceted expression of local and specific
concerns

with

non-Aboriginal

women’s

legal,

industrial

and

sexual

disadvantages.” 145
The National Council of Women addressed such gendered issues as women’s
work in the industrial world, 146 women’s work in charity and philanthropy, women’s
work in rural industries and educated motherhood. 147 During the war years, the
topics extended to ‘patriotic’ causes such as war savings and thrift campaigns.148
Male experts such as Herbert Brookes, the then President of the Chamber of
Commerce, were often invited to enlighten ‘uninformed’ female members on
mainstream political issues and debates. 149 Members of women’s organisations were
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also publically engaged in discussions about the “causes of the ills and evils that
confronted the poor.” 150 They promulgated a shared or collective belief in the value
of positive social intervention 151 to eradicate those ‘social evils’ that ‘threatened’ the
lives of ‘decent’ and respectable citizens. 152
The Housewives Association, led by Ivy Brookes, was established in mid1915 in Victoria in response to “wartime freezes, the failure of price-control
measures, and widespread unemployment and distress.” 153 The Association fervently
supported the government’s protectionist policies as being in the national economic
interest. 154 Nevertheless, the Housewives Association, along with other organisations
such as the National Council of Women, 155 sought to alleviate the problems faced by
female consumers with the rise in the cost of living by encouraging co-operative
buying and the marketing of produce directly from the producer to the consumer.156
However, this consumer project proved unsuccessful. Smart argues that its main
activity was then “reduced to preaching patriotism and thrift between 1917 and
1919.” 157
In July 1917, the National Council of Women demanded that women
sacrifice more when supporting the war effort. 158 It proposed a campaign to “to
foster among womenfolk such a strong patriotic spirit that any women buying
luxuries whose manufacture deprived the country of money that should be released
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for national purposes, must be regarded as lacking in patriotism”. 159 Whilst ‘luxury’
excited moral condemnation and stimulated the regulatory impulse, ‘thrift’ was
extolled as an idealized and commendable feminine virtue. Denying oneself luxuries
was considered to be a trivial female sacrifice compared to the part Australian men
had played at the front; for they have played their part “nobly, generously, and
marvellously unselfishly.” 160 The Council argued that “[s]urely it is only ‘up to us’
women to play our part equally as well, and by doing without luxuries is one way in
which we can help.” 161
Women of influence often used their powerful positions in these
organisations and acted as agents of the dominant male hegemony. For instance, Ivy
Brookes cleverly sought to convince other women to forego imported luxuries by
appealing to them via their traditional roles as mothers and wives. 162 It was
suggested that women were ideally suited to make personal sacrifices on behalf of
the nation because they had a superior and natural capacity for selflessness and
personal restraint. On one occasion, Ivy persuasively suggested to women that this
capacity for self-sacrifice was what defined their extrinsic female characteristic:
“[w]omen in general are more ready to make sacrifices, since they are so often called
upon to make them in their every-day life.” 163 On another occasion, she insisted that
women had a duty to their country to make a palpable sacrifice to shore-up
Australia’s economy. 164 In a further speech, Ivy posits: “[w]hat woman is there who
is loyal to her country, who would not give up buying luxuries to help Australia? So
this is one way in which we women can help.” 165
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3.6

The Commonwealth and State Arbitration Courts

I am safe in saying that this interesting Australian experiment is so far a success, and that
there is not the slightest indication of any movement to revert to the old anarchic state.
Henry Bournes Higgins 166

The constitutional framers of the new Constitution were determined that the new
nation should “reach out into a new province and replace barbarous [industrial
relations] practices” 167 with orderly practices through the machinery of conciliation
and arbitration: a uniquely “Australasian social experiment”. 168 This innovative form
of state intervention in industrial relations was led by Henry Bournes Higgins J
(1851-1929), 169 who has been described as “the founder and principal architect of the
system of conciliation and arbitration.” 170 Yet, Higgins J had no experience in
industrial matters when he was first appointed to the Conciliation and Arbitration
Court. 171
Higgins J had been born in Ireland on 30 June 1851. His father was a
Methodist minister and the family emigrated to Australia in 1870. He was educated
at Wesley College Ireland and Melbourne University where he graduated in law. He
had a lengthy career at the Melbourne Bar and in politics before his appointment to
the High Court. Higgins J had been one of the ten chosen from Victoria to meet in
Adelaide for the convention for framing the Federation Bill. Whilst he studying law,
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he tutored students including the sons of David Syme (the Victorian Newspaper
magnate who heavily influenced the promotion of Protectionism). 172 Alfred Deakin
was one of Higgins’ closest friends. 173
Higgins served as the federal member for North Melbourne, a working-class
seat. In 1904, he served as Attorney-General in the first and short-lived Watson
Labor government, but he was not a member of the Australian Labor Party. In 1906,
he was appointed as a Puisne Justice of the High Court of Australia, and in
September 1907, he was appointed as second President of the Court of Conciliation
and Arbitration, whilst simultaneously maintaining his position on the High Court.174
During the decades following Federation, government had sought to more formally
regulate and ‘normalise’ the population through new forms of institutional power.
The creation of the Federal arbitration court system was one of the most notable
examples of the government’s regulatory impulse. The arbitration courts’ ‘living
wage’ hearings not only diffused industrial conflict but were real attempts to control,
“in the whirling confusion of the times,” 175 what Hunt calls the “visible
manifestations of rising social groups either challenging or undermining the
incumbents of advantaged social positions.” 176
The Harvester case 177 was Higgins J’s first case and he had to decide
whether the manufacturer Hugh McKay was paying a ‘fair and reasonable’ wage to
his employees as required by the ‘New Protection’ legislation. In this case, after
Higgins had calculated a family budget for a household of ‘about five persons’, he
settled on seven shillings a day as the minimum wage for an unskilled labourer.
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Higgins J believed his task 178 was to set prescribed nationwide standards 179 for the
working classes whilst at the same time providing for the “normal needs of the
average [male] employee, regarded as a human being living in a civilised
community.” 180 Marriage was always to be the cornerstone of this ‘living wage’
paradigm. 181 Higgins argued that it was not his duty to fix a high wage “but a fair
and reasonable wage: not a wage that is merely enough to keep body and soul
together, but something between these two extremes.” 182 This ‘living wage’, as the
basis of his “pioneering nation-building work”, 183 was to cover the basic
requirements of shelter, food, clothing and some measure of ‘frugal comfort’ for a
man, his wife and three notional children. 184 This ‘normality test’ was to become
Higgins J’s “primary test” 185 in ascertaining the minimum wage in the case of male
‘unskilled labourers’. 186 This form of normalisation became binding as a code that
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was subsequently adopted and validated as “just and proper” 187 by other arbitration
judges and Boards of Trade. 188
The Harvester minimum wage was considerably higher than that allowed by
most State tribunals. Trade unions sought to bring their disputes within the
jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court whilst employer organisations vilified the
court and its president. Yet, Higgins J’s decision in this case won “him world-wide
renown as an innovator in the field of social justice” 189 and he was to become an
important influence on the state arbitration judges, including Justice William Jethro
Brown, who closely followed Higgins J’s lead. 190 The Court of Conciliation and
Arbitration offered Higgins J a unique opportunity to make his visionary stamp by
using a pioneering form of dispute resolution that involved a civilised 191 and
scientific 192 approach towards dispute resolution. On a broader level, he intended to
use the Court to play a role in the building of the new nation 193 and “to uphold
managerial prerogative while acknowledging a selective range of rights for a
predominately white male workforce.” 194 He provided working-class men and
women with an unprecedented opportunity to express their “demands for justice”195
and to give to the public an account of their personal trials and tribulations as
members of the workforce. 196 Nevertheless, Higgins’s ‘normalising’ objectives were
motivated to a large extent by his paternalistic desire for national industrial
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uniformity and to set prescribed nationwide standards 197 on consumables including
his vision of ‘civilized’ social conformity. 198

3.7

The Unions

The protection of manufacturers and of labour marches in one indissoluble unity, and in this
matter, at least, the two lions of employer and employed lie down at the same feast, with the
same “lamb”, consuming the consumer. 199

In 1914, about one Australian in every nine was a trade unionist, whilst in
1927 it was approximately one Australian in seven. 200 Conditions were immensely
favourable for the growth of trade unionism during the first decades after Federation.
This was mostly because its members were made up to a large extent from “the great
mass of [British] immigrants” 201 who were of a class that had been accustomed to
‘craft organisations’ or guilds. 202 Whilst unionism underpinned the creation of the
Labour Party, it was, according Hancock, also to a considerable degree, a product of
industrial arbitration. 203 Not only did the state protect unionism, the judicial
regulation of industry practically compelled the creation of trade union organisations,
as the “only organised bodies [that could] approach the courts.” 204
K J Hancock suggests that the expansion of federal coverage into areas of
employment appeared to have been instigated by the unions, particularly during the
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period between 1912 until the 1920s. 205 He suggests that Higgins J was “probably
the strongest exponent of the notion of pursuing industrial peace by enforcing a code
of wages and salaries that was founded upon clear principles of industrial policy.” 206
In the early years after Federation, the trade union-backed Labour Party, which had
at first held the balance between Free Traders and Protectionists, began playing what
W K Hancock calls the profitable bargaining game of “support in return for
concessions.” 207 The party started to drift towards the Protectionist side which
pandered to their fears about “the competitive strength of frugal Orientals” 208 that
might result in lower wages and conditions for Australian workers. 209 The Labour
Party reached a highpoint of political power in 1915, when it held Federal control
and governed five of the six states.210 Despite this affiliation between unionists and
protectionists, there was a period of acute industrial unrest during the latter part of
World War I. 211 However, notwithstanding some divisions, trade unionists generally
continued to support the existence of arbitration.

212

On the other hand, the relationship between government and the arbitration
system had become, at times, highly volatile. 213A crisis occurred in the 1918-21
period when “open conflict emerged” 214 between Higgins J and Hughes about
Higgins J’s apparent sympathy with union claims for a 44-hour week. 215 Hughes was
frustrated by the failure of Higgins J and Powers J “to secure quick settlements of
damaging strikes” 216 and proposed to replace Higgins J’s arbitration system with a
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number of specialised tribunals. 217 Higgins J immediately resigned, claiming that
such a proposal was a reckless concession that would only multiply future industrial
troubles. 218
During 1921-22, when the Tariff Board was being established, there was brief
economic recession, when unemployment rose to 11.2 per cent. 219 Even though there
was no union represented on the Tariff Board, union representatives, without concern
for the consumer, nevertheless continued to seek the rewards of protection to allay
what were seen as worsening standards of living for their workers:
Their strategy was to support the manufacturer’s claims for higher tariffs before the Tariff
Board, and after the increase had been granted, to apply to the Arbitration Court for higher
wages. 220

In its 1926 Annual Report, Tariff Board members expressed their alarm about
the actions of the unions in applying to the Arbitration Court for increases in wages
whenever the tariff was increased. 221 It seems that unionists supported protectionism
because they considered that it helped protect wages in sheltered industries and that it
could even guarantee them high wages. 222 Whilst the Board conceded that it was
natural for workers to want to share in the benefits of protection, the Board suggested
that the unions’ claims were in fact defeating the effect of any increase in duties. 223 It
suggested that this passing back and forth between the Federal Arbitration Court and
the Tariff Board for increments in wages and duties would have the effect of
continuously raising the cost of living and bringing about ‘industrial paralysis’. 224
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3.8

The Press

The public of Australia are more dependent on the daily press for information than the
public of any other country in the world… 225 Henry Bournes Higgins

Even before Federation, newspapers such as the Bulletin, The Age, The
Sydney Morning Herald and The Argus were popular and influential mouthpieces of
Australian “literary, economic, and political nationalism”. 226 There was fierce
competition between newspaper proprietors. During the peak year of 1923, Australia
had 26 metropolitan dailies and 21 separate newspaper proprietors. 227 Syndication
and mass-circulating newspapers were common, and this resulted in political, social
and cultural issues being widely disseminated, in various guises, across the nation.228
The press had real control over public opinion. It could educate and entertain readers.
It could to sway public opinion by sensationalising, criticising, endorsing or
moralising any contemporary social issue or governmental policy. The press could
reassure readers in times of crisis or it could publish alarmist propaganda. The
influence of the press on the masses was so great that it prompted one editor to
declare: “Its influence is destined to supersede that of the pulpit and Parliament as a
means of advancing the moral and material welfare of humanity, and spreading the
blessings of civilisation…” 229
Newspaper proprietors, including James Fairfax (1863-1928) and David
Syme, exercised enormous influence over government policy before and after
Federation. Syme, in particular, used his proprietorial and editorial influence at the

225

Higgins, above n 166, 142.
W K Hancock, above n 14, 66.
227
K S Inglis, The Daily Papers, cited in William Peter Coleman (ed), Australia Civilization: A
Symposium (F W Cheshire, 1962) 147.
228
Ibid.
229
“The Education of An Australian Journalist”, Brisbane Courier, 28 September 1882, 2.
226

93

Age in Melbourne to voice his form of male-dominated liberalism 230 that was
serious, progressive and moral. 231 He was a persuasive communicator and an astute
political commentator who clearly influenced government policy, particularly when
he zealously championed tariff protection and land reform. He was considered to be
not only the ‘father of protection’ but also the “the maker and unmaker of
Governments.” 232 Syme made clever use of new technologies of communication,
such as the rotary press, to significantly increase his readership and his circle of
influence. His biographer claimed that for almost fifty years, Syme was the most
powerful person in Australia. 233
He and his son Geoffrey (1873-1942) both proved to be valuable allies to
influential men such as Higgins J, 234 Herbert Brookes, 235 and Alfred Deakin, who
was said to have an “almost filial intimacy” 236 with the newspaper magnate. Deakin,
who had been converted to the cause of Protection, 237 declared in Syme’s biography,
that Syme’s newspaper “was a power because [Syme] was a power”. 238 Morrison
suggests, however, that whilst Syme took a prominent part in the politics leading up
to Federation, it was more often politicians such as Deakin who sought to influence
Syme in order to have certain views advocated in the Age. 239
The male-dominated Australian press used gendered discourse to reinforce
sexual stereotypes and social customs. News coverage was primarily written for men,
by men and scant attention was given to women’s issues except when they related to
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dress, appearance and moralisation. At a time when women were seeking a more
public role in society by entering the workforce and pursuing roles in government,
the press insisted on describing and defining them in gendered and often trivial or
idealised terms: by their dress, their physical appearance or in caricature. This type of
misogynist media coverage was particularly vitriolic when issues were raised
concerning women’s rights or social projects including suffrage, the temperance
movement, and female wages and working conditions. 240 Women activists were
mocked, abused and insulted. 241 They were often portrayed by the press, in words,
and often in cartoons, as unfeminine, frigid and hysterical.

242

We see in later chapters that femininity and women’s fashions became a
public site of conflict and contestation. 243 The press was complicit with religious
officials and Parliament in the condemnation of female consumers who favoured
imported fashion clothing and eschewed Australian manufactured lines. 244 These
women were not only accused of being unpatriotic but they were considered to be
responsible for all manner of social and economic ills. 245 It is ironic that, at the same
time women were being denigrated for their consumption practices, these
newspapers carried a plethora of special sexualised messages and fashion
advertisements that were especially aimed at enticing a feminine public. 246

3.9

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a brief contextual background for the chapters that
follow. It provides some understanding of the personalities, institutions and
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ideologies that contributed to the revival of sumptuary regulation in Australia during
the early decades following Federation and that feature so prominently in the
following chapters. The chapter illustrates the extent that patricians such as the
Brookes’ and institutions such as the Tariff Board played in shaping social and
economic policy Australia as a fledgling nation.
Chapter 4 will examine the birth and expansion of Protectionism in Australia
up until 1914. Protectionism was firmly embraced by early post-Federation
governments and touted by many as the panacea to protect nascent local industries
from aggressive overseas competition. It was a sumptuary policy that was closely
intertwined with notions of patriotism, nationalism and moral regulation.
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4 TAXATION IN AUSTRALIA UP UNTIL 1914: THE WARP AND WEFT
OF PROTECTIONISM

4.1

Purpose and Structure of the chapter

The power to tax is the one great power upon which the whole national fabric is based. It is
as necessary to the existence and prosperity of a nation as is the air he breathes to the
natural man. It is not only the power to destroy, but the power to keep alive.1

This chapter offers an account of the taxing policies in Australia from 1788
up until the beginning of World War I, when the exigencies of the First World War
forced the Australian government to reassess its tax policies. During the period from
1788 until 1914, Australia transitioned from being a collection of provincial colonies
with their own economic objectives and taxing policies to a Federation with
centrally-directed taxing authority. Whilst this political transition was taking place
there was also a transition occurring in government policy concerning the function of
taxation in Australia.
Government no longer used taxation just for revenue-raising but began to use
it more as an intrusive tool to modify the private behaviour of Australians to reflect
its own economic policy of protectionism. As a result, a strong symbiotic
relationship developed between taxation and protectionism and, by the end of the
first decade after Federation, Australia had become almost uniformly Protectionist.
This chapter argues that at the same time taxation was taking on this decidedly
protectionist character, the federal government’s policy of imposing high tariffs on
apparel began to markedly resemble what Hunt calls “a project” 2 of sumptuary
regulation. The federal government’s policy of imposing high tariffs on imported
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apparel had assumed a marked ‘sumptuary effect’. This meant that the Australian
government controlled what type and quality of clothing certain classes of people
could wear.
The purpose of this chapter is to lay the framework for one of the central
issues of my thesis; that taxation of clothing in Australia in the first three decades
after Federation can be regarded as a form of sumptuary regulation. This chapter
provides a textural 3 surface on which I can lay out the warp and weft of my narrative.
As I begin to lay out the threads of Australia’s early taxes, and then overlap them
with the newly spun strands of protectionism it’s not long before they all start to
intertwine and form a (con)textual fabric reflecting the social, economic and political
concerns that faced Australia as a transitioning nation. My fabric, at this stage in the
weaving process, begins to look like a fragment of a previously archived sumptuary
text(ile). In the following chapters, I will continue to lay other new and different
threads across the surface of this foundational fabric; including threads of
nationalism, of war precautions legislation and increasing government intervention.
By then, the fabric will have become an even more tightly woven replica of
sumptuary regulation. It will not be until chapters 9 and 10 that we notice this fabric
weaken and begin to lose its sumptuary character.
Following on from the introduction in Part 1, the second part of the chapter
looks at the main source of taxation in the early Australian colonies. It also argues
that at the time of the first white settlement there were some commonalities between
these early colonial taxes and sumptuary regulation. Part 3 begins by providing some
background to the taxation regime that came to be introduced at Federation. This part
also suggests that the form of protectionism that developed in the first three decades
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after Federation had its roots in the colonial taxing policies implemented in the first
three decades of white colonial settlement in Australia.
Part 4 describes the move from an Imperial-administered colonial taxing
regime to one where the colonial governor was in a position to impose local customs
duties. It shows that it was not until each colony had its own representative
government that it was in the position to implement its own taxation policy. Part 5
briefly explores how the original revenue-raising role of taxation in the colonies
morphed into a combined fiscal and protective device that was then used by colonial
governments to promote their social and economic objectives. Further, this part will
also show that protectionist duties provoked a spirit of provincialism in the colonies
which eventually became one of the main motivating factors behind the move
towards Federation, which, it was hoped, would solve inter-colonial trade disputes. 4
Part 6 deals with the shift of taxing powers from the colonies to the Federal
Government. It details the emergence of a centrally-directed taxing regime that
sought to provide funds to the States and to provide for the costs of the Federal
Government. This part also illustrates that although most of the revenue collected
during the first two decades after Federation came from customs and excise, these
same duties had also quickly become highly protectionist in character. Part 7
examines the second Deakin government’s attempt to attract labour supporters to its
protectionist ideology by linking protection with the provision of ‘fair and reasonable
wages’ for workers.
Part 8 attempts to proffer some explanations why, by the end of the first
decade after Federation, Australian politicians began to take on a more uniform
approach to protectionism. This part also provides a brief sketch of the political
discourse that was not only preoccupied with the potential effects of protection, but
which also had adopted a more pro-protectionist advocacy and fervour. Part 9 briefly
describes how government continued to increase tariffs on clothing after the failure
of the ‘New Protection’ to link protection with ‘fair and reasonable wages’. It also
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provides an overview of the functions of the Inter-State Commission which the
Federal government established as part of its continued experimentation with trade
protection.

4.2

Early Colonial taxes-a faint sumptuary pattern

This was the state of things in England at the time of the first settlement in Australia. 5

This part of the chapter looks at the main source of taxation in the early
Australian colonies. It also argues that even at the time of the first white settlement
there were some commonalities between these early colonial taxes and sumptuary
regulation. This part also suggests that the form of protectionism that developed in
the first three decades after Federation had its roots in the colonial taxing policies
implemented in the first three decades of white colonial settlement in Australia.
Australia’s earliest 6 colonial taxes on spirits, wine and beers 7 were ‘indirect’
consumption taxes in the form of customs 8 and excise duties. The fact that taxation
took this form in the Australian colonies was not an unusual phenomenon. By the
time of white colonization in Australia, most countries and colonies had taxation that
tended to be indirect. 9 In 1925, when Mills published his iconic Taxation in
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Australia, these types of indirect taxes” 10 were continuing to provide the largest
single item of revenue for the Commonwealth of Australia. 11 Mills argues that the
introduction of this type of “impost” 12 during the early stages in the history of
maritime countries such as Australia is “a priori probable” 13 because it was
commonly the first form of taxation levied by a young community. Historically, this
type of taxation also reflected the need for royal or State protection in light of the
real risks from piracy14 that importers and merchants faced with the transit of
precious and rare merchandise, such as wine, wax and cloth. 15
There is an interesting parallel between these types of colonial taxes and the
English sumptuary laws. 16 Both types of legislation depended to a large extent on the
economic control and security of maritime spaces and territorial borders. This meant
that it was often necessary, when protecting local industry, to regulate the ingress and
egress of foreign domestic goods. 17 In the Australian context, the perilous journey
involved in the importation of necessities and luxuries from the Motherland to
Australia during the colonial period caused persistent anxieties for both government
officials and merchants. However, when the goods finally arrived at the few
established deep-water ports, the exaction of tax was efficacious and did not require
sophisticated infrastructure for assessment and collection. 18 There are a number of
other commonalities between these early Australian colonial customs duties and
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sumptuary laws. Both were consumption-based and both involved restrictions on the
expenditure on dress, food and other items of consumption. They were also both
based on a plethora of ad hoc and often inconsistent legislation and regulations.
At the time of the first white settlement in Australia, not only was the
management and collection of Customs revenue subjected to “incredible abuses” 19
but “[t]he Statute Book was crammed with innumerable Acts relating to the Customs,
overlapping, chaotic, unintelligible.” 20 Mills suggests that it was this jungle of
legislation, concerning the imposition and collection of Customs duties, which
became the basis of the tax system applicable at the time of the first white settlement
in Australia. 21
For many decades, the colonies’ taxing policies were motivated by the need
to raise revenue to supplement those often meagre funds that were provided by
England to establish and maintain both a penal colony and a free settlement in a land
that was not only isolated by vast distance from ‘the homeland’ but which also
lacked any of those comforts and industries found at the time in England. 22 During
this period the British government provided food and clothing for most of the
convicts, their guards, some civilians and Aborigines. 23 Some taxes, in the form of
customs (tariffs) and excise duties, were also raised by the colony’s administrators to
ostensibly supplement the official stipend which was aimed at mere subsistence
husbandry. 24 It was expected that this stipend would continue to be provided by the
British Government until such a time that each colony, with its cheap prison labour,
could ‘keep itself’. 25 In fact, until 1824, public expenses for the Colony of New
South Wales consisted chiefly of expenditure connected with the support and
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management of British convicts 26 and were borne almost entirely by the “Imperial
Government.” 27
This form of financial assistance helped to shore up both Britain’s need to
establish and maintain colonies in which it could relocate surplus convicts 28 or
‘human riffraff’. It also allowed her to continue to carve out colonial outposts where
resources, both human and natural, could be regulated and turned to an advantage in
building up the expanding Imperial Empire. 29 Britain not only ‘owned’ the new
colonies and all their natural resources, but the Imperial government deemed itself to
be in the best position to minutely regulate and guide the activities of all British
colonial subjects. At the same time, it maintained public order and established a
clearly defined hierarchical social order. During the transportation period, for
instance, the British government regulated what clothing that most inhabitants could
wear. 30 Early convicts were in most part identifiable by a uniform that was made
distinctive by a coloured stripe. 31
This form of paternalism, 32 where the Imperial Government was the universal
provider, also created a widespread dependency that discouraged local enterprise and
eventually fostered strong reliance on cheap ready-made imported clothing and
accessories, particularly those of British origin. 33 The flood of ready-made clothing
into the colonies not only became a boon to British manufacturing, but also provided
colonial governments with an opportunity to alleviate economic insecurity by raising
substantial revenue on this imported clothing. 34 These social and economic bonds
and associations with Britain and the indefatigable crossing and re-crossing of the
oceans from one hemisphere to another in the transportation of convicts, government
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officials, free settlers and merchandise continued to ensure that there was a constant
flow of goods that would attract customs and excise duties; particularly imported
clothing and exported materials such as wool. 35 After the 1790s, there was also a
vigorous private trade in fabric, leather, sewing accessories and low-cost readymade
clothing for men and women

36

with British colonies, such as India. 37 Not only did

these goods supplement the supply of British-made clothing but it also meant more
money for the colonies’ coffers.
However, the collection practices and value of these taxes were nothing more
than an ad hoc exercise during a period when the Colonies’ administrators had to
deal with many exigencies: an uncertain economy, a disinterested British
government, unrest and dissatisfaction of prisoners and settlers, the irregularity of
shipments and the lack of local industries and businesses. 38 Harris suggests that the
Colonies “did not have a great need for revenue during the first half of the 19th
Century”. 39 Whilst most of the costs of transportations and the establishment and
running of the penal settlements were borne during this period by the Imperial
Governments, through the raising of funds from the London markets and the sale of
public land to free settlers, local tax collection in the colonies was still significant.
Not only did the added revenue help fill some of the gaps not covered by these fiscal
procedures but it could be argued that this type of taxation became the foundation
stone upon which the colonial tax regime and later the early Federal tax systems
were built.
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4.3

1819-1859- the formalisation of tax policy in the Australian Colonies

In 1819 the affairs of New South Wales received more than the usual amount of attention
and publicity in England.40

This part of the chapter describes the move from an Imperial-administered
colonial taxing regime to one where the colonial governor was in a position to
impose local customs duties. However, it was not until each colony had its own
representative government that it was in the position to implement its own taxation
policy.
In 1819, the British Parliament legalised 41 the collection of duties in the
colony of New South Wales. The New South Wales Governor was thus authorised to
impose customs duties of 10 shillings per gallon upon British spirits or British West
Indian rum shipped from Britain; of 15 shillings upon foreign spirits; of 4 shillings
per pound on tobacco and 15 per centum ad valorem duties upon non-British
manufactures and upon the importation of all goods, wares and merchandise not
being the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United Kingdom. 42
The first steps in establishing representative government were made with the
passing of a British Act 43 in 1823. This Act provided a very simple form of
legislative governance for the colony. It was not until 1842 that provision was made
for elected members to participate in the legislative council. The Australian
Constitutions Act (No 1) 1842 (Imp) established a blended Legislative Council that
consisted of thirty-six members, of whom two-thirds were to be elected and one third
to be appointed by the Crown. Responsible parliamentary government was finally
achieved in New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania and South Australia in 1856. In
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New South Wales, the existing Legislative Council was replaced by a bicameral
legislature that consisted of a Legislative Council and a Legislative Assembly.
Under the 1923 Act, the Governor exercised legislative powers on the advice
of a small legislative council constituted of five to seven members appointed by the
Crown. 44 Whilst the legislators envisaged a colonial constitution and court system
for New South Wales and Van Diemen’s Land, they did not consider expanding the
colonial taxing powers. 45 The colonial council could only levy taxes or duties “as it
may be necessary to levy for local purposes.” 46 Notwithstanding, these limited
colonial taxes and duties, which were mostly on imports of alcohol and luxuries, 47
became very profitable and the revenue raised by import duties increased from £28
763 in 1824 to £195 080 in 1840. 48
By 1850, the European population in the colonies was less than half a
million49 and most of the tradeable goods were connected with primary production,
whilst most manufactured articles, including clothing, were imported mainly from
Britain. 50 By 1858-1859 the population in the colonies had increased to one million51
and there was a very noticeable growth in the market for imported clothing and other
domestic goods and luxuries. 52 This growth in imported items reflected a period of
rising trade and the increase in economic prosperity of the colonies and the spending
capacity of their populations. In New South Wales, for instance, the total amount of
imported British-made clothing more than quadrupled between 1848 and 1853 53 and
much of the colony’s prosperity was generated by the rapid growth in exports of
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primary-produced tradeable goods. 54 There was also an enormous spike in the
demand for imported clothing during the gold-rush period when “a rising population
of prosperous consumers” 55 spent their newly found wealth on all sorts of imported
luxurious and superior ready-made fashion apparel, even though these goods
attracted high customs duties. 56 This rapid growth in exports and the dramatic
increase in disposable income in this period also soon resulted in a rapid expansion
of banking and commerce. 57
Colonial tariff policies continued to be controlled by ‘the Mother Country’
until self-government was granted to five of the six Australian colonies between
1855 and 1859. 58 From then on, and in a relatively short period, these colonies, albeit
in different degrees, began to achieve some economic and political independence. In
1850 the Australian Colonies Government Act, 1850 (Imp) 59 was passed and
provided for the formation of government in New South Wales, Van Diemen’s Land,
South Australia, and to Victoria as a colony separate from New South Wales. The
Act also provided for future application to Western Australia. 60 New South Wales
and Victoria subsequently achieved responsible government in 1855; Tasmania in
1856; and Queensland, which separated from New South Wales, in 1859. It was not
until 1890 that Western Australia achieved responsible government. 61
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There was a high degree of economic and political tension and competition 62
between these newly formed colonies and their governments and Allin suggests that
the history of the tariff relations between them can be read as “a sorry record of intercolonial jealousy and strife.” 63 One of the burning political issues in the colonies
before Federation was centred on the fact that each of the colonies raised their
revenue by not only imposing taxes on overseas imports but also on inter-colonial
traded goods; 64 it was their most “elastic and most important source of revenue.”65
The colonies, with their pre-federation rivalries had “scattered Customs houses along
their land frontiers.” 66 However, the great difficulty in the fifteen years prior to
Federation was “in working out exactly what would be the fair way(sic) and
sustainable way”

67

to return revenue to the States once a future federal government

acquired the sole power to impose customs and excise duties.
Despite the passing of the Australian Colonies Government Act 1850 (Imp), the
colonies were slow in taking on national status. Not only were they “small, isolated
communities in the pioneer stage of social and political organization” 68 but each
colony was oblivious to what was going on in “the contiguous but far distant
communities.” 69 Each colony was only focused on the development of its own
resources and to the furtherance of their own immediate political and economic
interests. 70 Their efforts were without the support of the British Parliament which
only took a spasmodic interest in the affairs of these distant colonies. Besides, the
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colonial office was “too ill-informed to be able to supervise the policy of
administration of the struggling settlements.” 71
As the colonies became more economically self-reliant and idiosyncratic in their
economic ideologies they also began to develop even more divergent social, political
and economic policies and rivalries. For instance, the two major colonies, Victoria
and New South Wales, had, for various reasons, 72 adopted radically different
commercial and revenue policies. New South Wales had a steadfast adherence to
Free Trade which was largely supported by the sale of public land, 73 whilst Victoria
exhibited a “doctrinal fervour” 74 for the theory of Protection. 75 Whereas New South
Wales’s consistent adherence to Free Trade was largely motivated by Sir Henry
Parkes, who was “for a long period was the most striking figure” 76 in Australia’s
political life, Victoria’s obsessive stance on Protection, which resulted in very high
tariffs, was fuelled by “the continuous and passionate advocacy” 77 of David Syme. 78
As the proprietor 79 of the Melbourne morning journal (The Age) he exercised
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powerful influence over local politics. 80 All these factors prompted, as between the
colonies, the creation of contrary self-referential interests and conflicting fiscal
legislation. 81 Each colony framed its taxing legislation with an aim to foster its own
particular economic and social needs and with little regard to the interests of the
other colonies. 82 This meant that each colony adopted “the easiest and readiest means
of taxation without regard to economic principles.” 83 Consequently, this
individualistic type of economic and financial policy throughout the colonies laid the
groundwork for economic discrimination in the form of a variety of inter-colonial
differential and preferential tariffs. Allin summed up the relationship between the
colonies when he stated : “[i]solation begat provincialism, provincialism begat protection,
and protection begat colonial envy, bitterness, and strife. 84

4.4

1860-1900-taxation and protectionism

85

It is true that a considerable number of Customs duties aim openly at revenue, but there is
also an unmeasured and a very large return to the Treasury from duties which are
intentionally, though clumsily, Protectionist.86

This part of the chapter will briefly explore how the original revenue-raising
role of taxation in the colonies morphed into a combined fiscal and protective device
that was then used by colonial governments to promote their social and economic
objectives. Further, it will also show that protectionist duties provoked a spirit of
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provincialism in the colonies that eventually became one of the main motivating
factors behind the move towards Federation, which, it was hoped, would solve intercolonial trade disputes. 87
Before the 1860s, colonial duties were “nearly always mainly for purposes of
revenue”. 88 Whilst protective motives were not always absent, Reitsma argues that it
would go too far to say that the infant colonies had established any commercial
policy at all at that stage, particularly in relation to a preference for free trade or a
structured tariff regime. 89 By the latter part of the 1800’s this position had obviously
changed substantially, for in 1883, Richard Twopeny, 90 whilst visiting the various
colonies, makes the observation that “[p]rotectionist duties and heavy freights form
an effectual sumptuary tax” resulting in “first-class articles” being “heavily
handicapped” and “a premium put upon the importation of shoddy91”. 92
Just as sumptuary regulation from its earliest inception in the fourteenth
century had existed in a “close symbiotic relationship with protectionism”, 93 in
Twopeny’s remark we see the same development of a close symbiotic relationship in
Australia between taxation tariffs and protectionism. And just as the discourse of
‘sumptuarism’ 94 later became integrated within, and then submerged within the
discourse of protectionism we can see the same integration and submersion of tariff
discourse within the discourse of protectionism. It is also at this time that we begin to
see within these protective policies the threads of the sumptuary impulse which were
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woven into the protective economic blanket which the Federal Government wrapped
around clothing manufacturing industries in the 1920s.
From the 1880s, Australian manufacturers and primary producers faced
heavy competition from the massive increase in all forms of imported goods from
Britain and Europe. 95 The first ostensible protectionist tariff introduced 96 in the
colonies was presented to the Victorian Assembly in 1865 with the objective 97 of
protecting new industries and overcoming the problem of expensive, but poorly
made imported goods 98 being ‘dumped’ 99 on the Victorian market. 100 Reitsma
suggests that the relentless force behind protectionism, particularly in Victoria, was
the “newspaper dictator” and ardent Protectionist, David Syme. 101 Even though
protection had a popular following in Victoria, colonies such as New South Wales
continued to embrace free trade which “fitted in with pastoral and financial
opinion” 102 in the colony. These diverging policies contributed significantly to “the
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inter-colonial custom troubles that characterized the period” 103 and the often difficult
debates plaguing the introduction of Federation.
By the end of the nineteenth century each of the six colonies had distinct tax
systems which were almost entirely reliant on customs and excise duties. 104 Not
only did Customs duties or tariffs underpin the newly emerging colonial economies,
but they also acted as barriers against overseas imported goods as well as effective as
trade barriers between the colonies. 105 Reinhardt and Steel 106 suggests that one of the
“significant results of Federation in 1901” was the removal of all duties on goods
traded between Australia states. 107 Federation was to be used as an effective
apparatus of economic intervention to relieve the colonial governments’ intense
rivalry and provincialism whilst at the same time providing a new paradigm of power
relationships between the colonies.
Although, as previously mentioned, each colony initially framed their tariffs
primarily for revenue purposes, gradually protective characteristics became more
pronounced. 108 Despite enormous protests from their ‘sister colonies’ about the
“growing evil of inter-colonial duties” 109 and the passing of hostile, retaliating or ‘titfor-tat’ legislation, each colony went on its merry way in exacting, often
complicated, inter-colonial duties as a ‘necessary’ measure for the protection of their
local industries. For instance, even though South Australia was mainly dependant on
primary industry and strongly in favour of inter-colonial free trade, the colony still
remained protective of its clothing and woollen industries. 110 The result was this
“strange melange of tariff anomalies” that completely ignored the “general welfare of
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the Australian group and the empire.” 111 It would be many decades and much
political lobbying and vitriolic debates before Federation finally settled the question
of inter-colonial tariffs.
It has also been argued 112 that the very isolation of the colonies engendered
the spirit of provincialism. Not only were the colonies cut off from the outside world
by “both time and space”, they had no external relations and no more than a passive
interest in what was happening in Europe for they “lived in a little world of their
own, a world with a distinct set of interests and problems from those of Europe or
America.” 113 Even their relationships with other colonies were strained and far from
intimate; 114 the Australian land mass was huge there was great distance between
settlements, with little interconnecting transport systems. The tariff, more than any
other issue had “aroused the latent spirit of provincialism in all the colonies... [i]t was
‘the lion in the path’ of all federal measures.” 115 It was the major cause that
contributed to the failure of imperial and colonial governments in their attempts to
improve the political and economic relations of the colonies.
Finally, on 8 October 1901 the first Federal tariff was introduced 116 by the
first Federal Parliament 117 and effectively ended inter-colonial tariff wars. 118 It was a
compromise between the revenue tariff of NSW and the protectionist tariffs of
Victoria 119 and was mildly protectionist by comparison with the level of protection
existing twenty years later. 120
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4.5

Federation –taxation, tariffs and morals

But the day of small things was passing away. A new Spirit of Australian nationalism was
beginning to find lodgement in the hearts of the younger generation. New imperial problems
come upon the scene. The political and economic life of the colonies gradually loses its
purely local significance and begins to take on a true national character.121

This part of the chapter deals with the shift of taxing powers from the
colonies to the Federal Government and the emergence of a centrally directed taxing
regime that sought to provide funds to the States as well as to provide for the costs of
the Federal Government. It illustrates that although most of the revenue collected
during the first two decades after Federation came from customs and excise, these
same duties had also quickly become highly protectionist in character.
The provincialism mentioned above meant that there was no unity of taxing
policy between the various colonies until Federation when the Federal Parliament
occupied the dominant position in Australian politics. Taxation policy had always
been at the centre of the pre-Federation debates 122 because the colonies were
concerned that Federation would mean that they would lose their major tax base
when they were no longer able to impose tariffs on imported goods. The Constitution
was designed to give the Federal Government the sole authority to impose customs
and excise duties. However, the colonies were placated to some extent by drafters of
the Constitution allowing the States to maintain their taxing powers in relation to
other taxes such as income tax. 123
To understand how the tariff grew so rapidly both outwards and upwards, one
must first look at the sources of the Commonwealth’s taxing power. This taxing
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power is contained mainly in s51 (ii) of the Constitution; 124 it gives the Federal
Government a general and unlimited power to raise taxes for the peace, order and
good Government of the Commonwealth. Section 55 125 provides that laws imposing
taxation shall deal only with the imposition of taxation. Section 90 not only removed
certain taxing powers from the colonies but it provided the Federal government with
the exclusive power to set and impose Customs and Excise duties.126 This provision
was to have a significant impact on the taxing powers of the colonies; at the time of
Federation, approximately 75% of colonial revenues came from Customs and Excise
duties. 127 This provision was to have a significant impact on the taxing powers of the
colonies; at the time of Federation, approximately 75% of colonial revenues came
from Customs and Excise duties. 128 After Federation tariffs would only apply in the
case of imports to Australia, and inter-State trade was thus free of tariffs, pursuant to
s 92 of the Constitution.
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At first, the scheme of Commonwealth finance was almost wholly based on
the revenues to be derived from Customs and Excise duties. 129 To give support for
this objective, s 88 of the Constitution required that “uniform duties shall be imposed
within two years after the establishment of the Commonwealth.” The Minister for
Trade and Customs, Mr Kingston proposed that stimulants and narcotics would raise
the most revenue (£1 959 306) and they attracted the highest rate of duty (145.21%).
It was expected that apparel and textiles would raise £1 441 863 with an average rate
of 17.73% duty. 130 Jewellery and fancy goods were expected to raise £120 580 at an
average rate of 21.03% duty. 131
Section 86 of the Constitution gave the Commonwealth, as central
government for the emerging nation state, the power to take control of the collection
and administration of these duties. 132 For at least ten years after Federation the
Commonwealth had to return to the States “three-fourths of the net revenue from
Customs and Excise, one-fourth 133 only being available for Commonwealth
expenditure” (The Braddon Clause). 134 Not only was “the paramount object of
Federation” 135 inter-State free trade with a uniform Tariff in the importation of
overseas goods but the preparation of a ‘uniform’ Tariff became the “most urgent
task of the new Commonwealth Government.” 136
The use of customs and excise duties, as the Commonwealth’s main source of
revenue, proved to be a very lucrative means 137of raising revenue and these taxes
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fitted in neatly with the growing nationalism 138 which spread throughout the colonies
and later the Commonwealth. 139 These taxes were easy to exact. They could also be
readily utilised to protect the interests of those local manufacturers, industrialists and
farmers who were worried that their wealth and reputation could be endangered by
the proliferation of cheap imported goods. They were also concerned the
‘dumping’ 140 of ‘end of season’ 141 clothing by an “outside world which struggled
for profit and cared nothing for Australia’s adventurous quest for justice.” 142
Protection had gained popularity as an economic policy because it promised
to be a policy of plenty. 143 The very word appealed to ordinary Australians because
they believed “in their hearts that both their enjoyments and their existence need[ed]
to be protected against extraordinary dangers.” 144 During the 1890s there had
emerged a number of ‘extraordinary’ factors that had adversely affected the lives of
most Australians and were subsequently instrumental in creating a general economic
climate which favoured protectionist tariff policies. Labour turmoil, falling prices for
agricultural and pastoral commodities such as wheat and wool, the failure of a
number of banks and a decline in consumer spending all contributed to a widespread
economic depression. 145 At the same time, the new labour movement began to seek
a high wage economy. This would particularly affect those thousands of agricultural
workers severely affected by ‘the worst and widest drought the white man had
seen’. 146 These workers had been moving to the cities in large numbers in search of
employment, in newly emerging manufacturing industries. 147 In the early years after
Federation, trade unionists, who had at first held the balance between Free Traders
and Protectionists, began playing what Hancock calls “the profitable game of

138

Allin, above n 62, 171.
Hancock, above 24, 89.
140
Ibid 83; House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee, Parliament of Australia, Customs
Tariff (1910) 1.
141
This term was sometimes referred to as the “fag end of season”. Ibid.
142
Hancock, above n 24, 83.
143
Ibid 89.
144
Ibid.
145
Shann, above n 98, 328-348.
146
Ibid 386.
147
Ibid 328-348.
139

118

‘support in return for concessions.’” 148 The unionists finally started to drift towards
the Protectionist side which pandered to their fears that “the competitive strength of
frugal Orientals” 149 might result in lower wages and conditions for Australian
workers.
So, whilst it seemed inevitable that the 1902 Australian Tariff would be of the
Protectionist type 150 questions remained about how much money was needed to
support local industry and how it was proposed to raise it. The Treasurer, Sir George
Turner, 151 argued in the first Commonwealth Budget speech, that “neither the Free
trader nor the Protectionist can have his own way entirely. The Tariff is a
compromise Tariff.” 152 The objects of the first Federal Tariff were manifold. Policy
makers such as Turner argued that the Tariff should be framed to raise revenue to
fund Commonwealth obligations to the States so they could maintain their solvency,
as well as to cover Federal expenditure. They also argued that the Tariff was meant
to keep faith with the States by providing “for moderate protection, particularly
avoiding unnecessary destruction of existing industries whose magnitude and
suitability rendered them worthy of fiscal protection.” 153 So whilst this first object of
this early Federal tariff was revenue-raising, it is very clear that protection, at least
for existing industry, was also of high importance in the government’s plan for the
new nation. 154
However, this ‘compromise tariff’ failed to please all stakeholders, mainly
because it was not a compromise between those who supported Free Trade and those
on the Protectionist side. Rather, it was only a compromise between what Mills calls
“the high” and “moderate”
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Protectionists. In addition, there was no ‘Compromise
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Cabinet’, because there were no ‘free traders’ in the Ministry. 156 The Commonwealth
taxation policy, from the beginning of Federation, had “been unmistakably
Protectionist, and every subsequent dealing with the Tariff … affirmed that policy,
with a deeper emphasis each time.” 157 Certain members of Parliament believed that
the tariff was neither a compromise nor a moderate Tariff because “the aggregate of
taxation on the working man” on items of apparel such as hats, woollens and boots,
was “enormous”. 158

4.6

A sumptuary tariff

In the first year after Federation, the Commonwealth raised £8.9 million from
customs and excise out of a total of £11.3 million and in accordance with s87 of the
Constitution £7.6 million was paid out to the States. 159 Under this 1902 tariff, duties
were imposed on luxury items, such as furs, and necessities, such as blankets.
However, it soon became apparent 160

that there were many anomalies and

inequalities “that bristled in the old Tariff”; 161 for example, for some time there was
a lower rate of duty on furs 162 than on blankets. 163
There were politicians who considered that protection meant the protection of
the privileged class, as it did not advance the wages “of the great industrial classes of
the community one farthing.” 164 They considered protectionism socially distasteful.
They likened it to the harsh interventionist sumptuary laws of the early modern
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period that authorised “men in parts of London to cut the ruffle from women’s
dresses when they exceeded a certain length and that also regulated the style of boots
to be worn.” Some parliamentarians, particularly the Free Traders, considered tariff
taxation to be an overt method of regulating the affairs of the lower classes by
“depriving the poor man or woman of practically everything, except proved
necessities.” 165 They questioned whether clothing and accessories were still
necessities of life for the poorer classes. 166 High protective duties had even made
socks 167 and hat pins 168 luxury items.
On the other hand, there were some Protectionists who took a vastly different
view as to the economic effect of these old laws. 169 They strenuously argued in
favour of the value of the English protective sumptuary laws, which had compelled
the wearing of English goods and prohibited the exportation of raw materials. They
contended such laws were at the heart of England’s success in world trade and
commerce under Queen Elizabeth I. 170 They argued that the imposition of a
protective tariff along with rigorous navigation laws, which prevented free trade in
shipping and compelled English colonies to trade in English ships, had made
England “the great workshop of the world.” 171 Protectionists, such as McColl MP,
argued that just as England was “built up under protection”, Australia’s
manufacturing industries could prosper in the same way under “moderate,
reasonable, and discriminating protection.” 172 Yet, they continued to object to any
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high protective duties which were “unreasonable and unwise” 173 because they would
tend to discredit protection and could diminish the revenues of the States. 174
Still, there continued to be some resistance 175 against protection, generally
by those 176 on the Liberal or Labor 177 sides who advocated a free trade policy. There
was also an ongoing contentious dialogue between various stakeholders about the
issue of granting preferential tariffs to Great Britain. 178 Preferential treatment had
been afforded to English trade by various Australian colonies prior to 1850 in
accordance with the principles of imperial monopoly whereby colonial trade was
directed and monopolised by England. 179 However, the Australian Colonies
Government Act 1850 (Imp) abolished all preferences, even to Britain. 180
It would not be until August 1906 that Sir William Lyne, then Minister for
Trade and Customs, proposed a Tariff resolution in the House of Representatives

181

concerning approximately thirty British products, 182 with a view to giving Great
Britain or “the Mother Country” 183 favourable or preferential treatment as against
similar products from other parts of the world. 184 The proposal was to leave the tariff
untouched for these British goods and to increase the duties against all other
countries by 10%. Such favourable treatment was conditional upon the goods being
produced or manufactured solely in the United Kingdom and they should be
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imported direct in British ships.185 As a result of hostile criticism from the Free
Traders and the problems relating to the demand for amendment to the tariff Bill by
those who wanted the Bill to contain even stricter racially-based conditions 186 to be
placed on these favourably-treated British goods, the British Preference was
postponed.

4.7

New Protection, 1905-1908–protectionism and wages

The old protection contented itself with making good wages possible. The new protection
seeks to make them actual. 187

This part of the chapter examines the second Deakin government’s attempt to
attract labour to its protectionist ideology by linking protection with the provision of
‘fair and reasonable wages’ for workers. Whilst this project failed, it still had, as we
will see in Chapter 5, some lasting effects for workers, particularly as regards to the
definition of what constitutes a ‘worker’s normal needs’. 188
Between 1905 and 1908 189 ‘The New Protection’ permeated Commonwealth
legislation. 190 Plowman argues that:
[i]n essence, it was major plank of that Parliament’s social engineering platform. In
common with other newly formed countries, the Commonwealth of Australia sought
to determine the type of society it wished to be and to implement policies towards that
end. The society envisioned was that of an affluent, white society. 191
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Acts of Parliament, 192 such as the Customs Tariff Act 1906 (Cth) and the
Excise Tariff Act 1906 (Cth) 193 encouraged and protected certain industries
“contingent upon fair and reasonable wages being paid.” 194 Deakin, an ardent
protectionist, actively promoted 195 ‘New Protection’ by linking tariff protection to
workingmen’s wages 196 via providing assistance to the manufacturer to “that degree
of exemption from unfair outside competition which will enable him to pay fair and
reasonable wages without impairing the maintenance and extension of his industry,
or its capacity to supply the local market.” 197 The concept of ‘New Protection’ thus
envisaged was that protection would walk ‘hand-in-hand’ with employers in
protected industries. To avail themselves of the enormous benefits of protection
policies, these employers had to provide superior conditions of employment,
including higher wages to their employees. 198
What were ‘fair and reasonable wages’ was to be decided by a Board of
Trade 199 and once done, the Board would then be in position to determine, with some
degree of precision, the question whether the measure of protection given to a
particular industry was sufficient to pay those wages.

200

The government declared its

intention to also protect the consumer against the charging of unduly high prices. 201
At the same time that this new centralised form of tariff and wage board were being
proposed, Justice Higgins, 202 also began considering in the Arbitration Court, what
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was “fair and reasonable remuneration” 203 for “the normal needs of the average
employee, as a human being living in a civilised community.” 204 In developing his
principle of a basic ‘living wage’, which was to be based on frugal and reasonable
comfort, he took into account the average worker’s needs 205 for basic commodities
such as food, shelter and clothing. 206
Reitsma suggests that this ‘New Protection’ was an attractive wage policy
because it “caused the complete conversion of Labor to trade protection.” 207 The
Labour Party’s newly found belief in the popular policy of protection, coincided with
the basis of its co-operation with the Deakinites in passing the 1907-1908 tariffs 208
that projected increases in duty far in excess of the 1902 tariff. The increases were
the result of recommendations of a Parliamentary Tariff Commission which took
nearly two years to complete its reports. 209 This new tariff, known as the Lyne
Tariff, 210 proposed that over 440 articles attract duties which very nearly double
those fixed in 1902.211 For instance, the rate on wool and silk ‘apparel and attire’ was
set at 45% compared to 25% in the 1902 tariff. 212 The new Tariff schedules also
contained much higher duties on woollen piece goods. 213 The 1907 Tariff was to be
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“the first really protectionist tariff” 214 that sought to protect certain industries from
“unfair outside competition.” 215 It was also the first Federal tariff that provided for
preferential treatment for the United Kingdom. 216 However, its glory was short lived:
the Excise Tariff Act 1906 was challenged as being unconstitutional and the High
Court declared it to invalid in 1908. 217 The High Court comprising of Griffith CJ,
Barton, O’Connor, Isaacs and Higgins JJ held that the Excise Tariff Act 1906 (Cth),
which attempted to indirectly regulate the working conditions of workers, was not a
valid exercise of the legislative powers of the Commonwealth Parliament. The
majority (Isaacs and Higgins JJ dissenting) held that the Act was not in substance an
exercise of the power of taxation conferred upon the Commonwealth Parliament by
the Constitution; that the Act was invalid as being in contravention of s 55 (taxation
laws only to deal with taxation), and that even if the term ‘taxation’, uncontrolled by
any context, were capable of including the indirect regulation of the internal affairs
of a State by means of taxation, its meaning in the Constitution is limited by the
implied prohibition against direct interference with matters reserved exclusively to
the States.
However, there was a positive legacy for workers that arose from this failed
New Protection paradigm. 218 As we will see in Chapter 5, Justice Higgins

219

continued In the Arbitration Court to develop and consolidate his rules relating to
arbitration and wage determination. So whilst the new Protection failed to
successfully link protection with the workingman’s wage, Higgins’ principles and
methods for determining what was a ‘fair and reasonable remuneration’, with
margins for skill, 220 became the bedrock for future legislation 221 and arbitration
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practices linking the minimum wage with the cost of living. This meant that
protection, albeit without any statutory nexus, became a basis for Australian living
standards. 222

4.8

Uniform Protectionism-sumptuary threads

Consumers have always been a weak countervailing force against protection because of the
free rider problem of collective action. 223

By the end of the first decade after Federation Australian politicians began to
take a more uniform approach to protectionism. 224 There are four main reasons why,
after Federation, Australia became uniformly Protectionist. 225 First, the strong legacy
of protection in Victoria, and less populated states such as South Australia and
Tasmania, had created numerous vested interests who sought to maintain the
protection which they had enjoyed up until Federation. 226 These interest groups,
comprising of pastoralists and industrialists 227 as well as various Chambers of
Commerce
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wanted to avoid the type of free trade policies that New South Wales

espoused and to ensure this they vamped up their demand for a continuation of this
protection. 229 The voices of those who argued that the Tariff was only an artifice to
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“protect and coddle the local producer” 230 by placing the burden “on the shoulders
of the consumer,” 231 were drowned amongst the fervent rhetoric emanating from
protectionists. 232 The latter sincerely promised that a protective policy would provide
a system that could regulate social conditions and was absolutely necessary to build
up industries and “benefit equally every class of the community.” 233 The widespread
political and media 234 support for protection, the diminution in support for the Free
Trade Party and the successful lobbying of various interest groups all ensured that
protection became more than a policy: it became “a faith and dogma.” 235
Secondly, the Braddon Clause 236 meant that three quarters of federal revenue,
raised by the imposition of customs and excise duties, would have to be returned to
the States. To this extent the imposition of high import duties made it easy to
introduce incidental protective effects into the current tariff regime. 237 The third
consideration, 238 which also helps explain why protection became a widespread
dogma, is that the exercise of ‘nation-building’ required economic and political
compromise between the States. 239 The compromise, which was eventually nutted
out between the States lay between the high level of protection provided in Victoria
and the free trade policies followed in New South Wales. 240 When New Protection
legislation was passed in 1906, the Free Trade Party had lost most of its appeal and
was defeated decisively in the elections that year. 241
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Anderson and Garnaut argue that it was the fourth consideration that was
decisive in the victory for protectionism. 242 Those who led the protectionist
movement in Victoria turned out to be very skilful in ‘wooing’ the support of the
Labor Party with the promise of a share in the material benefits and “happiness”. 243
This alliance proved to be an ingenious tool to align Labor with protection. 244 Until
1906, when New Protection was given legislative force, 245 Labor Party members in
New South Wales and other states such as Queensland and Western Australia246
repeatedly claimed that protection was only favourable to manufacturers in
increasing their profits and that the burden of protection fell disproportionately on
workers whose expenditure was in the main concentrated on mass consumption
goods. 247
Labor also believed the only way workers could have improved working
conditions and higher wages, which were needed by these workers and their families
to face a significantly higher cost of living, was for the Federal Government to
implement budgetary measures to effect a means of financial redistribution. 248 The
promise of higher wages and better working conditions for workers in protected
industries dispelled the concerns of the Labor members, and the Labor Party then
effectively resolved its own divided position to become more united behind
protection. 249 These government promises not only highlighted the rise in the relative
importance of manufacturing in Australia since the 1890s but also reflected a direct
correlation with rise of the Labor Party and its aim for a high wage economy.
During this early post-Federation period of socio-economic development,
when protectionists were “wooing” the working classes, protectionist rhetoric also
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began to take on an even more noticeable semiotic engagement with the language of
sumptuary regulation. Politicians such as Millen 250 and Lynch 251 directly spoke of a
natural relationship between the Australian protective tariff and sumptuary
regulation. For instance, during a debate in 1908 on the protective duties imposed on
floorcoverings, Senator Lynch suggested that this form of duty was ‘a sort of
sumptuary tax.’ 252 There were also numerous articles 253 in the press, either
highlighting the similarities between the rise of protection and sumptuary
regulation 254 or facetiously alluding to sumptuary law as a potential means to control
extravagance and appearance. 255 Even advertisements 256 used sumptuary discourse
glibly, and sometimes even perversely, to promote imported luxurious women’s
apparel. 257
During this period of intense tariff debate we begin to see more tension about
the dichotomous relationship between the rich and poor and their respective
consumption practices. 258 Tariff schedules specifically targeted many items of ‘lower
end’ female apparel and accessories with high rates of duty, whilst ‘high end’ goods,
such as velvets, silks, furs and gloves, which were usually purchased by wealthier
women, attracted lower duties. 259 The language of tariff and ‘luxury’ were frequently
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coupled in Parliamentary debates 260 and in the press. 261 Often, the polemic was
whether high tariffs, even in a prosperous period, 262 should impinge on the rights of
the poorer classes to be able to enjoy the same luxuries as the rich, especially if these
luxuries were now regarded by the poor as their ‘new necessities’. 263 Senator
Clemons, in arguing against protection, stated that he “should like to bring some of
the luxuries of rich… within easy grasp of the poorer classes of the community.” 264
Further, it was claimed that under a policy of indirect taxation most of the revenue
was provided by the poor; 265 for “it is the poor who have to pay the Customs
duty.” 266 Others sought to placate these concerns by arguing that protection, although
not “a panacea for all the ills of humanity,” 267 was absolutely necessary because it
was linked to desirable labour conditions and had flow-through benefits for the
consumer. 268
During this period there was also much moralising rhetoric 269 about the ‘evil’
of imported fashion apparel and women’s extravagance of dress, 270 fickleness in
women’s fashion 271 and women’s desire and demand for “ever-changing fashion”
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fabrics.

272

Some even argued that “the old [sumptuary] laws” needed to be revived

to address these issues. 273 The implementation of the ‘old laws’ was not necessary as
the protective tariff was having the same effect as sumptuary regulation; but only for
the poorer classes. Poorer women had to depend upon cheap imported apparel,
including corsetry, because they could not pay for the locally-made item. 274 Yet,
cheap apparel was denied to them

275

and they had few, if any, alternatives. 276 A

working girl employed in a factory at a wage of 10s a week could not afford the
luxury of a locally made pair of corsets, at prices that ranged from four guineas to
thirteen guineas, with an additional charge of 6d for suspenders.

277

This was

especially because of the strain of her work, which was so great that the life of the
corsets was no more than three months. There was no relief for “the great masses of
people” 278 who had a “natural craving for cheap articles.” 279 During this period of
high protectionism not only was there a widespread obsession with luxury and
extravagance in women’s dress, but we also see other sumptuary signifiers making
an appearance. There was also an increased hostility to the importation of alien
products

280

and a preoccupation with the placing of a metaphorical “ring fence

around Australia” 281 which we shall see in Chapter 6 becomes later more
pronounced, especially during the war years.
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4.9

The establishment of the Inter-State Commission-the new scientific
approach towards Protectionism

There shall be an Inter-State Commission with such powers of adjudication and
administration as the Parliament deems necessary for the execution and maintenance of this
constitution relating to trade and commerce and of all laws made thereunder.282

This part of the chapter will briefly describe how government continued to
increase tariffs on clothing after the failure of the ‘New Protection’ to link protection
with “fair and reasonable wages’. It will also provide an overview of the functions of
the Inter-State Commission which the Federal government established as part of its
continued experimentation with trade protection.
The Tariff was further amended in 1910, 1911 and 1914. Most of the 124
amendments in 1911 were to remove anomalies, to assist in interpretation and to
remove difficulties of classification. 283 However, there would be no further general
revision of the Tariff until 1920-21; although the schedules of rates, particularly in
relation to preferences, 284 were varied regularly before then. The 1911 and 1914
tariff increases specifically targeted clothing. 285 The duty on felt hats (per dozen) in
1911, for instance, was increased to 16s (12s as British preferential rate) and in 1914,
duties on these hats were further increased to 20s per dozen (15s preferential rate). 286
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The 1914 the tariff increases reflected the recommendations made by the Inter-State
Commission that was established pursuant to s101 of the Constitution. 287
It seems that the authors of Federation feared that the exercise of its powers
over trade and commerce would be so overwhelming and difficult that parliament
would “need an organ of adaptation to unforseen changes, a board whose rulings
might be more flexible than the decisions and precedents of the law-courts.” 288 By
August 1913, the Inter-State Commission was appointed with functions which were
similar to those later attached to the Tariff Board pursuant to the Tariff Board Act
1921 (Cth).The only difference was that the Commission’s recommendations were
based on pre-war ‘normal’ circumstances, and as we will see in Chapters 9 and 10,
these considerations became largely irrelevant in the greatly changed post-war
situation. 289
The Cook government set up this Commission and authorised it to formally
investigate claims for increased tariff protection. 290 Not only did the Commission
have the power to investigate any industries in urgent need of tariff assistance but it
also had the power, which it did not ever exercise, to scrutinize the “lessening, where
consistent with the general policy of the Tariff Acts, of the cost of the ordinary
necessities of life, without injury to the workers engaged in any useful industry.” 291
Shann suggests

292

that the instigation of this Commission resulted from the natural

anxiety of a government, having committed itself to protection, that industry would
then take advantage of the consumer and that the lack of competition would result in
inefficiencies. 293
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The Commission’s “scientific” investigations proved that this anxiety was not
without foundation. 294 The Commission found that the 1908-1911Tariff prompted,
amongst manufacturers, a widespread neglect of accurate costing, and a lack of
attention to what their rivals in other countries were doing. 295 The Commission
suggested that there was a waste of power, a waste of by-products, and a lack of
applied science which could enhance the cost of manufacturing. 296 It considered that
the failure to use efficient modern standards in manufacturing meant that higher
duties were sought by inefficient industries and these duties were then being passed
onto the consumer. 297 The Commission recommended that the greatest assistance be
given to those industries which used the greatest amount of skilled labour. 298 In
Chapter 9 and 10 we see similar concerns being expressed by the Tariff Board in the
mid-1920s.
In formulating their recommendations to government, the Commissioners took a
practical and reasoned approach about the need for increased protection. 299 Not only
did they venture to remind Parliament that every burden of trade is paid for by
someone, but they also predicted that it may be an economic advantage to withdraw
Tariff encouragement from certain subordinate 300 industries because such
encouragement might become more of a hindrance than an aid to the whole scheme
of industrial development. 301 Despite the fact that the Commission’s term was shortlived it only continued into existence until 1920 when the Commissioners’ terms
expired, the Commission lapsed and no other Commissioners were appointed. There
was much legal and political controversy about the Commissioners’ terms of
appointment and their role. It appears that the Commissioners worked extremely hard
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and took their role seriously302 in determining the efficacy of increased protection for
local industries. At the same time, they appeared to be fully cognisant of the possible
repercussions of this new, more formalised method of “scientific protection.” 303

4.10 Conclusion
This chapter argued that echoes of sumptuary regulation were evident in
Australian taxes from the earliest colonial taxes through to the restrictive and
onerous protective tariffs of the first two decades after Federation. The chapter began
by showing that the early Australian colonial taxing regime had much in common
with the sumptuary paradigm. Not only were they both consumption-based but they
were, to a large extent, also both dependent on regulating the ingress and egress of
foreign luxuries. Both legislative regimes were also based on a plethora of ad hoc
and often inconsistent legislation.
The chapter also provides an overview of the move towards a more
formalised colonial taxation policy, which was then followed by a shift of taxing
powers from the colonies to the Federal Government. In the course of the transition
to this centrally-directed taxing regime, there was an increased growth in the ‘strong
symbiotic relationship’ between taxation and protectionism. This chapter also shows
how Australia’s tariff policies after Federation became more uniformly protectionist.
Not only did numerous vested interests seek to maintain the strong legacy of
protection, existing in Victoria and other less populated states, but those who led the
protectionist movement in Victoria proved skilful in ‘wooing’ the support of the
Labor Party for their protectionist policies, by the promise of increased wages and
better working conditions for workers. In addition, massive surges in imported cheap
apparel triggered an increased protectionist response from the Australian
government.
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Whilst the government’s rationale for this response was the need to protect
local manufacturers and the nation’s economy, this chapter illustrates how this
protectionist response also placed an unfair burden on poorer consumers.
Correspondingly throughout this period, protectionist and taxation discourse also
began to take on an increased semiotic engagement with the language and objectives
of sumptuary regulation. As a result, sumptuary threads began to be woven even
more tightly into the fabric of taxation and protectionism.
Chapter 5 briefly digresses from the topic of protectionism and its sumptuary
effect on imported clothing. Instead, it follows another thread that was briefly
alluded to in Chapter 4, namely the relationship between arbitration and wage
determination. Chapter 5 will suggest that the imposition of prohibitive tariff on
imported clothing was not the only form of sumptuary regulation that surfaced
during the early decades following Federation. The Chapter will examine the
sumptuary effect of the female ‘living’ wage determinations made by Australian
Arbitration Courts and Tribunals immediately before and after World War I.
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5 THE SUMPTUARY IMPULSE IN ‘LIVING WAGE’ CASES

We are developing a system of continual supervision of everything. 1

5.1

Purpose and Structure of this chapter

This chapter explores the emergence of a different kind of sumptuary impulse
in the contestation over female dress in female labour cases during the first two
decades after Australian Federation in 1901. It argues that male hegemony was
reinforced through discrimination against working women. Moreover, the work of
Justice Henry Bournes Higgins, and his fellow Arbitration Court and Board of Trade
judges, reveals the establishment of prescriptive sumptuary standards for these
women based on dress. 2 The chapter will focus on two female ‘living wage’ cases,
the Fruitpickers in 1912 3 and Archer in 1919, 4 as well as other wage cases and
inquires that took place during this period. The chapter reveals that judicial officers, 5
imposed normative ideas about ‘appropriateness’ in female dress. As men of
authority and power, they positioned themselves to determine issues such as whether
£1/7/10 represented a reasonable amount for a female factory worker to spend on a
hat 6 and whether “women wage earners” should make their own dresses. 7
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Glynn).
2
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Pioneer, 19 July 1912, 14.
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August 1919, 1.
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During this period, the local and national media disseminated on a daily basis
the more ‘interesting’ parts of the evidence heard in these living wage inquiries about
the private lives of female workers. This material gave the public an unprecedented
insight into the personal lives of those working-class women who were making their
“demands for justice” 8

in the new Arbitration Court and Boards of Trade. In

particular, the press gave graphic and intimate accounts of female workers’ trials and
tribulations as members of a national workforce where women continued to be
treated as second class citizens. 9

5.2

Living Wage Inquiries: the ‘normal needs’ of the worker

Higgins decided to seek a suitable measure of ‘the normal needs of the average employee,
regarded as a human being living in a civilised community.’ 10

Although the Arbitration Court had been established in 1905, 11 it was not
until 1912 that “the problem of female labour” 12 was first considered by the Court;
this was despite the fact that women made up over 20 per cent of the Australian
workforce in that year. 13 Higgins J, who had used the pioneering Harvester
judgement 14 to give practical expression to New Protection, now found himself with
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the task of grappling with the complex and problematic issues of a ‘living wage’ and
equal pay for women. 15
Higgins J considered that a ‘proper’ family life was one based on “sobriety,
health, efficiency, the proper rearing of children, morality [and] humanity” 16 and that
ideal could only be achieved if the male was the breadwinner and the female
remained in the domestic sphere as wife and mother. Brown P agreed with Higgins J:
“I look upon the maintenance of home life as of supreme importance to the
community.” 17 Moreover, Brown P argued that a man’s duty to maintain his home
was a “part of traditional organisation of society” 18 that Industrial Courts should
recognise as a general ground for “differentiation in wages between men and women
workers.” 19
Despite the claim that “the minimum wage could be found only in
patriarchy”, the evidence of household budgets suggested that Higgins and his
colleagues should make an award in male living wage cases based on women’s
experience: 20
One of the two women stated that her husband had a cheap tailor-made suit, but he would have
to wear it until it fell off his back, while as for her man’s working trousers, well, she had
patched and patched until she didn’t know which were patches and which were trousers. 21
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5.3

“The principle of the living wage has been applied to women, but
22
with a difference”

It is in Higgins’ resistance to the provision of equal pay for women workers that the
contradictions and tensions of his notion of liberal citizenship in a civilised
community were most sharply manifested. 23
Higgins, although a “cautious progressive”, 24 struggled in his “great
experiment” 25 to offer Australian female workers the same consideration as male
workers. He was reluctant to accept that women should be afforded the same
opportunities for economic independence as men. Furthermore, Higgins J was
disinclined to apply his masculinist test of ‘normality’ to them, and made only a
tentative effort to seriously serve the needs of those female workers who appeared
before him seeking equal pay. 26
He was evidently ill at ease when asked by the unions to apply the same
‘justice’ for women that he had applied for men when fixing their basic wage. 27
Higgins J preferred to ignore any argument about the pressure of the conditions of
modern life that Vida Goldstein 28 claimed were “so fierce that women had to go into
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the world.” 29 For Higgins J, working-class women were supposed to live at home
and, at best could only be expected to “incidentally ma[k]e a small contribution to
the family income”. 30 As women were not usually “legally responsible” 31 for the
maintenance of a family, their domestic and ‘biological’ work in the home, which
had no ‘legal’ recognition in society, appeared to have no financial value. Without
external employment, women would continue to remain economic dependants who
were “utterly dependent on men’s generosity,” 32 especially when they wished to
purchase the clothing they needed and/or desired.
In Archer, Mr Carter, counsel for the unions, asked that Higgins J give
women “fair play…and let them earn their living”. 33 Moreover, Carter tried to
convince Higgins, that “in these days” 34 there was no reason why a stumbling block
or hurdle should be put in front of women and that they should not be “shut out from
an industry any more than a man.” 35 Higgins J retorted: “I will not shut them out. I
will let the employers shut them out if they think fit as a matter of judgement.” 36 It
seems that whilst Higgins J claimed that the Arbitration Court was for ‘the benefit
for employees’, he would not risk eroding his keystone code of gender demarcation
by extending the same rights to female employees in their battle for economic
independence. This was particularly the case for those young girls who, because of
their age, had to live on 15/- a week and who “eked it out by doing something for
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their landladies in the way of housework or sewing.” 37 He would leave the economic
fate of these employees to the munificence or otherwise of their employers.

5.4

Matrimony and Motherhood: the real life-work of the average
woman

It was an unpopular thing to state nowadays, but it was nevertheless broadly true that
women’s true apprenticeship for her future career was to be found not in the workshop or
the sales room but in some form of training or apprenticeship directly related to wifehood
and motherhood. 38

Higgins J and other industrial judges, in their female labour determinations,
strictly adhered to the traditional notion for the organisation of society where
women “should be engaged in domestic duties” 39 and where men were to be the
sole ‘breadwinner’ for his wife and children. These judges saw part of their task as
industrial relations judges to “combat” 40 those social “evils” 41 that challenged this
convention. For them, the supreme factor in the formulation of principles by the
Industrial Court was “the good of the community”. 42
Higgins J adhered to the then popular middle class belief, that the substantially
higher rates of female workers engaged in factory work was the root of the
“increasingly important” 43 problem of ‘domestic aid’ in Australia. 44 Traditionalists
argued that working-class women, if they had to work, should be engaged in
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domestic service rather than factory work. 45 Brown P agreed and further contended
that domestic help was of vital importance in “maintaining the rate of increase of the
population”. 46 Higgins J saw no reason at all why an employer should be told to pay
a female employee “more because she happens to have parents and brothers and
sisters dependent upon her” 47 or to pay her less because she “merely wants some
money for dress”. 48 It was conceded that a single woman who could not afford to
“dress nicely” would be seriously handicapped in regard to marriage. 49 But this
concession was countered by Higgins J and other industrial judges by Seerbohm
Rowntree’s claim 50 that a single woman who dressed expensively and above her
position was also considered to be handicapped in regard to marriage. 51 Rowntree
also claimed that one who “dresses expensively and above her position is also
handicapped in the matter of marriage”. 52 He insisted that working women should
therefore not be paid too much. Rowntree was a“[l]iberal-minded social
investigator” 53 and was a contemporary and correspondent of Higgins J. Higgins J
and his successor Powers J both often quoted Rowntree in their ‘living wage’
judgments.
The traditional hegemonic view was that marriage and motherhood were “the
real life-work” 54 for the average women. 55 Furthermore, it was considered that
society would be in a perilous position if female wage earners, with “easy means and
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limited working hours,” 56 found employment in the public sector “too attractive to
relinquish for matrimony.” 57 Brown P noted:
The unchallengeable principle [is] that the living wage must have regard to what is necessary
for the maintenance of a married man with wife and children to support. The adoption of any
other principle would have placed a premium on celibacy and infecundity (sic). 58

It was reported that Heydon J was even more explicit in his account of the
traditional dichotomous gender relationship of marriage which he used to justify his
decision to fix the female living wage at 30/- in 1918:
The industrial position of women is different from that of men, and is subject to a greater
variety of influences and conditions, bringing about more difficult conditions. The boy, from
his birth, is known to be destined to be the breadwinner… He knows that he must keep himself
and his wife and children. There is never any doubt about this at all; that is his lot in life… It is
different with women. When a girl is old enough to work, she learnt in all probability she will
marry. Her work will be only an episode in her life. 59

5.5

Keeping women in their place at home rather than them “having to
60
go out and seek employment in man’s realm”

The tendency of lower wages for women in jobs for which men and women were in
competition, was to make the woman the wage earner, and to leave the man to look after the
house. 61

Higgins J made it quite clear in his judgement in the Fruitpickers 62 that the
‘public good’ 63 would be better served if women stayed at home ‘protected’ 64 from
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having to compete with men in the public workplace. However, he argued that
“[f]ortunately for society… the greater number of bread winners are still men. The
women are not all dragged from the homes to work while the men loaf at home.” 65
Ruth Ford suggests that employment in the factories gave lower class
women more personal freedom; they could even buy their own clothes and dress as
fashionably as they wished. 66 Ford argues that not only could women earn more
than in domestic service 67 but that they were also able to enjoy a work culture of
companionship that was not otherwise available to them. These positive advantages
to women made no difference to Higgins J:
this exercise of choice was not viewed very sympathetically by Justice Higgins, who came
from a class which was concerned about the ‘servant problem’ and feared working-class
idleness. 68

Even though Higgins J acknowledged that the cost of living had risen
everywhere during and after the ‘Great War’, 69 he made no effort to accommodate
female employees or recognise that women, for various reasons, were seeking
personal and economic freedom in what he called “troublous [sic] and critical
times.” 70 He contended that it was not for the industrial court to “assume the
responsibility of sanctioning social revolutions.” 71
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The formal regulation of the female minimum wage, at almost half of the
male wage, was considered an effective tactic to discourage these women from
exercising their choice to work in the public sphere even when working conditions
were difficult. 72 For instance, one newspaper reporting upon Archer contended:
“[t]he award of 35/ a week is not unduly high, and it is well perhaps that this
occupation should not be made over-attractive.” 73 It was argued that a “false or
inflated standard of wages,” 74 which considered only the desires of the male
employee, might imperil the nation’s whole economic and industrial structure. What
would have been even more disastrous was that
judgement”

75

if “an indiscreet or faulty

upon the living wage was made for women, for this would have

triggered “the most dangerous and injurious effect upon the social and domestic life
of the community.” 76
Higgins’ J anxiety about women in the workforce was closely aligned with
his apprehension about the decline in the family as a social institution, which he
linked with the disregard of what Brown P called “the spirit of authority.” 77 He
considered women’s ‘desire’ to participate in the public area as undermining “the
known and taken-for-granted gender order.” 78 Brown P similarly argued that it was
undesirable that women should be encouraged “to indulge in a standard of
expenditure so high that marriage may appear to them an intolerable sacrifice:” 79
Modern legislation, by … sanctioning divorce has made marriage less sacred; and by
protecting womankind has created a rival to marriage in the shape of a career for women. 80
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Higgins J and other industrial judges, including Brown P and Heydon J,
considered that this decline in the “traditional organisation of society” 81 to be the
main reason that the social order was in danger in a “transitional period” 82 when “old
faiths have lost much of their authority and power.” 83 Brown P declared that the
spread of knowledge and the growth of “plutocracy” 84 were undermining the
foundations of “class supremacy”: 85
Although we are far from social equality, although we still have classes, the power of class to
train men to reverence is lacking. Envy, not reverence, is the plant that thrives in the soil of a
plutocratic society. 86

Both Higgins J and Brown P were fearful that an increase of women in the
workforce was not only having an impact on family life but it was, in fact,
threatening the hallowed institution of matrimony. In turn this seriously affected the
provision of domestic help that in turn impeded the population growth of the new
nation. 87 President Brown argued that women in the workforce were a direct cause of
“the growing sterility of the population.” 88 It was contended by Brown P of the South
Australian Arbitration Court that if female factory worker’s wages were increased
substantially then all domestic help would seek commensurate wages. 89 He opined
that, domestic help would then be a luxury only available to the rich. 90 Other
commentators suggested that the shortage of domestic help was also partially
responsible for the introduction “of two new and undesirable phases into Australian
domestic life”: 91
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an increased demand for flats and apartments, with a corresponding lack of the
valuable influence of real home life, and a marked decline in the birth rate. 92

Brown P considered that this decrease in the birth-rate would continue
if there the traditional division of labour in a society such as Australia was not
maintained Moreover, he argued that it was in women’s own interests and the
interests of the community that they should foster and improve their domestic
talents and virtues. 93 They should be inculcated with the principles of “wise
buying which are the essence of good housekeeping and the foundation of
family comfort and security.” 94

5.6

Justice Higgins: The Cost of Dress is What Makes Women’s Needs
Different from those of men

It was significant that any little indulgence of vanity in dress was at the sacrifice of other
things. 95

Judicial discourse in early female living wage cases became a powerful
sumptuary regulatory apparatus that acted not only to regulate dress but also to
regulate gender relations. The part of the chapter will in the main focus on Justice
Higgins and his comments relating to female workers’ dress in Fruitpickers and
Archer.
Higgins P, in his role as President of the Commonwealth Court of
Conciliation and Arbitration, took a very active and often intrusive role, in shaping
the male-dominated Court’s processes, as well as in categorising and choosing the
type of evidence presented to the court. Higgins J had privately conceded to Deakin
that in the Harvester judgement he had engaged in ‘legislative work’, usually
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considered beyond the bounds of the judiciary, but quickly justified his foray into
‘legislative’ territory by adding that he had done so only after “carefully considered
every possible aspect of the problem.’ 96
Higgins J not only ‘suggested’ 97 the form and extent of the evidence he
wished to hear 98 but he also played a significant role in the direct examination of
witnesses, especially in the ‘female labour’ cases. 99
At my suggestion, many household budgets were stated in evidence, principally by
housekeeping women of the labouring class, and … [I] select[ed] such of the budgets as were
suitable for working out an average… 100

Higgins J favoured a “forensic interrogative approach,” 101 where sworn 102
witnesses, particularly female witnesses, 103 were constantly challenged about the
veracity and significance of their evidence concerning the reasonableness of their
clothing ‘needs’. 104 Whilst Higgins J used the same criteria for assessment to
determine the minimum wage for both female and male packers in Fruitpickers and
Archer, namely the cost of “their own food, shelter, and clothing,” 105 he placed a
skewed emphasis on gendered expenses for female workers. Whereas men were
questioned mainly about food, board and lodging, women were primarily grilled
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about the cost of their clothing. 106 The interrogation in these cases about the clothing
needs for the male wage earner was not nearly as intensive as for female workers. 107
Furthermore, the press coverage of the men’s claims in this case was almost cursory
compared to the flood of coverage about female workers’ claims and their ‘dress
needs’. 108
Higgins J made it quite clear in the Fruitpickers and Archer judgments that
the factor that he considered distinguished the living costs of working women from
working men was the latter’s expenditure on dress: 109 “[t]here is considerable
difference between males and females-say, from the age of fifteen onwards-in the
expense of dress.” 110 In both cases Higgins J had no compunction in actively
criticising female workers’ expenditure on dress. 111 On the contrary, his moral
critique in regards to this expenditure enabled him to eventually justify his decision
to discriminate against female workers by denying them the right of equal pay. 112 For
instance, in Archer he rejected the female workers’ claim of £2 and set women’s
wages at 35s by making a discount for their clothing. 113 He saw fit in this case to
encourage “women wage-earners” 114 to make their own dresses and suggested that
“this extra work on their part in the time of their leisure should ensue to their own
benefit.” 115 He munificently assured these women that saving “effected thereby
[would] not be taken into effect in assessing the living wage.” 116 Deputy President,
Powers J, 117 on the other hand was not so confident about rejecting female workers’
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claims. He stated that he “found it to be a very unpleasant duty to criticise women’s
claims and expenditure” 118 and believed that it would be “much more pleasant to be
able to grant the claims in full”. 119
Higgins J was not interested in what such women considered to be their
‘normal’ dress needs, nor was he inclined to apply the masculinist ‘normal needs’
test in assessing women’s dress needs. For him, the test for women was one of
‘reasonable necessity’. What was ‘reasonable’ was to be determined by the Court and
not by the workers. For instance, in the Archer judgment, he contended that
employers should not have to “pay for all that a girl may fancy.” 120 Further, he
argued that if “the girls” 121 wanted their finery at the sacrifice of other things more
necessary, such as charitable donations and lodge and church dues, then that was
their business, but he was not about to make an allowance for clothing that was more
than what was necessary for human requirements. 122 It is notable that throughout the
judgments and court transcripts in Fruitpicker and Archer, Higgins J consistently
referred to the female workers as “girls” even though some were older women and
some were married.
In both cases, clothing became not only an indicator of social status, but also
an unassailable mechanism by which Higgins J could criticise the mimetic ambitions
of young female factory workers. He asserted that these workers were willing to
spend a large proportion of their wages in their attempt to dress fashionably. 123 He
considered this preoccupation with dress and fashion as a form of social dissipation
and exhibitionism that was socially harmful because it blurred the ‘natural’ structure
and boundaries of gender and class. 124 His focus on the type and cost of workingwomen’s dress in the ‘female labour’ cases reflected his anxiety that ‘modern’
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working-women were publicly challenging the traditional hegemonic belief in the
ascendency of men over women. 125
It might be argued that Higgins’s J focus on feminine dress in the female
labour cases was in fact a cloak under which he hid his real anxieties about the social
mobility of the female working class and their social aspirations. In the female wage
cases, he sought to construct what Hearn calls a “plausible rationale” 126 to
discriminate against women workers who sought equal pay. Higgins J treated dress
as a signifier or symbol of female personal freedom. When he contested the
‘reasonableness’ of the amount working women were spending on their apparel and
the ‘appropriateness’ of their dress, he was in fact contesting their right to enjoy new
personal freedoms. 127

5.7

Judicial Interrogation

Why this poking of judicial noses into the household affairs of the working class?128

During the female wage cases, the ‘girls’ were put “through a humiliating
examination as to how much they paid for their clothing.” 129 These cases provided
male judicial officers with the opportunity to expound their middle class views and
criticisms as to how a young female working ‘girl’ 130 should spend her weekly
wages, and to prescribe what they considered to be the ‘appropriate’ clothing that she
should or ‘needed’ to buy. Moreover, female workers’ bodies became targets of
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judicial power and the courtroom became a site of interrogation. Not only were these
women subjectified but were exposed to the “normalizing gaze” 131 of both the Court
and the media in order to correct their consumer practices and to admonish them for
transcending class boundaries. In early female labour cases, Higgins J and the other
industrial judges became the authoritative ‘evaluators’ of ‘appearential’132
‘appropriateness’ and arbiters of taste and style. In such cases, evidence concerning
women’s clothing was ‘ferretted’ 133 out through a form of “inquisitorial probing”134
of female worker’s personal lives. 135 These judges then exercised their ‘institutional’
power to quantify and classify women’s apparel and to ‘judge’ the ‘reasonableness’
into female workers’ clothing ‘choices’. At the same time, they were able to
‘discipline’ these women by berating and ridiculing 136 them in open court for their
alleged extravagance and lack of thrifty habits: “ [i]f the girls will have their finery at
the sacrifice of other things more necessary… it is not fair to force employers to pay
for all that a girl may fancy.” 137
The ‘superior’ role of these ‘judicial interrogators’ in the Arbitration Court’s
‘ceremony of power’ was hallowed and undisputed. Initially, their alleged expertise
on working women’s apparel was rarely contested. By 1918, however, there was a
discernible demand that women should be appointed to assess the dress requirements
of female workers. 138 Court transcripts and press reports concerning the female
living wages cases illustrate that these ‘inquires’ or “life evidence” 139 of working
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‘girls’ were supposed ostensibly to be about ‘fact finding’ or gathering evidence
about the cost of living:
The facts were not glibly volunteered but given piecemeal, as counsel sought, each in his turn,
to draw from the facts of her life evidence in the enhancement or depreciation of a Woman’s
Living Wage. 140

However, the judicial process also provided an opportunity for the judiciary
and defendants’ counsel to cross-examine the female witnesses with a view of testing
the accuracy of their figures, 141 as well as to berate them for their ‘alleged’
extravagance and malign them for the ‘inappropriateness’ of their attire. For instance,
Mr Scovell, counsel for the employers in Archer, confronted one witness, Miss
Wootten, as to whether she considered herself to be “extravagant” 142 by spending £6
on hats in a single year. 143 In the same case, Scovell had also rebuked Wootten for
spending a “considerable” 144 amount on her dress (£34.11.6) and the fact that she
spent nothing on newspapers, journals or church fees for “furnishing the mind”.145
Although Higgins J later adopted Scovell’s comments, he made no reference to the
direct evidence of the seven female witnesses in his judgment. 146 Following their
gruelling interrogation of the callow female workers, Scovell and Higgins then
attempted to controvert and disparage the girls’ evidence by the use of testimony
from court-approved female ‘experts’ such as Margaret Cuthbertson 147 and Brenda
Sutherland. 148 Miss Cuthbertson, for instance, was asked by Mr Scovell to comment
on the girls’ testimony’ and their perceived’ extravagance:
Would four hats yearly, costing a guinea each also be extravagant?
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What do you think of twelve blouses in the year costing £8? 149

After hearing all the evidence, Higgins J, as an active ‘official’ interrogator,
then sought to weed out what he considered to be ‘the waste’ from ‘the necessary’. 150
Once this was done, he would then proceed to place his own arbitrary value on “the
necessary things of life rather than the desirable.” 151 It was argued by Mr Considine
MP that it was obvious during this interrogative and ‘averaging’ process, that
Higgins J, with his middle class values, was approaching the evidence from the
‘other side’ and with “no knowledge of the subject.” 152

Considine argued that

Higgins treated these female witnesses, as “small people,” 153 and as “machines of
toil”: 154
The working classes of Australia have reached the stage that they are no longer going to allow
the other side to treat them like machines, to put them in the witness-box, and estimate how
much coal and oil they will consume, to average up how much it will take to keep a family in
good working order, just as in the case of a draught horse. 155

Despite his blatant ignorance about what was ‘essential’ clothing for female
workers’ dress, the female living wage cases nevertheless provided Higgins J with a
discursive apparatus to expound his own views on working-class women and also to
prescribe a ‘reasonable’ standard of dress for them. 156 For instance, in the Archer
transcript, there are an inordinate number of probing questions directed to female
witnesses about the precise “items of dress which an average young lady would
149
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require” 157 as well the cost of this clothing. Specifically, “the girls” 158 were grilled
about the number of blouses needed for a year,

159

the number of pairs of boots a girl

might own, 160 what was a “reasonable amount for a girl to spend on dress and
adornment in a year” 161 and whether they considered 21 shillings for a blouse was
“fairly high price”. 162
The test set by Higgins J for female workers in Archer was one of ‘reasonable
necessity’ rather than the Harvester male ‘normal needs’ test used in the male living
wage cases. This ‘reasonableness’ test then acted as an exclusionary hierarchic
norm 163 which Higgins J and other industrial judges used to curtail the consumption
practices of the female working class. 164 They set out to ‘judicially’ determine what
they believed to be a ‘reasonable’ maximum amount that all ‘factory girls’ should
spend on their dress without concern for their individual needs or desires. One critic
parodied this type of ‘judicial’ determination of women’s dress:
Justice Heydon and the rest …got some girl to choose clothes for herself for a year so that they
would have something to go on. Fancy giving any girl the chance of saying what clothes she
would buy in a year-giving her free selection, mind you, and trusting to her to remember the
limits of her income. You might as well expect a man to make a rational choice of his annual
supply of drinks. 165

In Archer, after hearing evidence from “the [seven] girls”, Higgins J
calculated that their average expenditure on dress and adornment was £25 13/4 a
year. 166 He decided that £25 was not an excessive estimate for dress even though
Miss Sutherland, 167 one of the expert witnesses suggested that the price of women’s
clothing had increased substantially over the preceding six years. Sutherland’s
157
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evidence pointed to the fact that the ‘girls’ were in reality ‘economical’ and spending
a lot less on clothing than one would expect was necessary. Sutherland estimated that
similar clothing to that which she had herself purchased six years before would cost
£32/8/- at the time of the hearing: 168
Miss Sutherland throws light on the problem of clothing. Six years ago, her expenditure on
clothing, when economy was a necessity, was £23 or £24 per annum; and she estimates that the
cost of similar clothing at the present time would be 30 to 40 per cent. more. That is to say,
adding 35 per cent. to £24, the cost is £32 8s. 169

Higgins J proceeded to ignore Miss Sutherland’s evidence by suggesting,
fallaciously, that her situation was not “precisely parallel” 170 as the factory girl who
“makes many of her own clothes and has to go out more than this resident
teacher”. 171 Although the ‘girls’ were claiming £2 per week (£104 per annum), he
fixed their new basic wage at 35/- a week, or £91 per annum. Higgins did not think it
would be just to compel employers to pay 15/ for clothes alone, “as was urged” 172 by
Mr Carter for the Union. 173 Counsel for the employers was also persistent in his
scorn for the spending practices of the female workers. Mr Scovell high-handedly
suggested to one female witness “[that] in regard to women’s dresses and adornments,
boots, hats and all that sort of thing…every girl is a law unto herself in these matters?” 174

Scovell then officiously recommended to the Court that women could be more
‘economical’ if they sewed their own clothes. He remarked: “[i]t seems instinctive
that women should sew for themselves”. 175
Mrs Kate Dwyer, President of the Women’s Workers’ Union, protested
against the Board of Trade’s decision in 1918 to award women only 30/ per week. 176
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She contended that this amount was based “on the two blouses and 5/11 skirt
evidence”, 177 and argued that the award only just put women on the bread line.
Dwyer posed the question of how could a “business girl dress on 5/- a week?” 178 She
then argued that being well dressed was essential to gain employment:
It doesn’t matter what position a girl is in, an employer is always looking for the best-dressed
one, and with the best experience. To allow such a girl to live honestly she can’t live under 35/a week; to enable her to buy proper clothes without the aid of the lay-by system which is a
curse. 179

There were others who contested that whilst the judiciary might scoff at
“so-called feminine vanity” 180 that one must not forget the power of personal
appearance because the world has no place for its “shabby citizens”. 181 One
critic argued that it was not vanity that prompted every woman to spend
“perhaps more than she should” 182 on clothes:
It is the knowledge, learnt in a hard school, that in many instances, she will be judged
on her face value. For this reason we find women sacrificing their food for the sake of
saving money for clothes. 183

Whilst Higgins J may have argued that his probing and imperious questions
in ‘female labour’ cases were underpinned with legal notions of fairness and societal
and economic responsibility, his questions were nevertheless also heavily overlayed
with what Hunt calls ‘common-sense conceptions of a natural order of gender
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relations’. 184 The female witnesses were not in a position to challenge the prejudiced
manner of the interrogation, to which they were subjected, nor the subsequent
misogynous vilification and scrutiny from the press. For instance, in Fruitpickers,
Olive Gray was asked if she was “perfectly satisfied” 185 with 4s 6d per hour, a rate
considerably less than the hourly rate for male workers. When she hesitated in her
response, Higgins J asked: “Is that a hard question to answer?” 186 Although the
employer’s counsel explained to him that the chairman of the Defendant Company’s
Board of Directors was present in the courtroom, intimating that this might make the
girl reluctant to respond, Higgins J pressed Olive:
Why is it a hard question, (tell me frankly) whether you are perfectly satisfied with 4/6 or not.
You have just promised to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. 187

When Miss Gray explained that she was not satisfied with the hourly rate
because “it did not seem enough,” 188 particularly as she had others to support, he
retorted:
I cannot fix wages for those who have others dependant on them and those who have not. By
your father’s death you have to help your mother. At the same time is that your only reason? 189

Often, Higgins’ J inquiries were patronising. For example, in his haughty and
“scientific” 190 examination of Nellie Stoor, a coat machinist, he even went so far as
to ask her the unrealistic question of whether she kept a log of her expenditures.191
His question not only reflected his own class’s anxieties 192 about the contemporary
state of gender relations, social hierarchy, sexual equality and Christian values but
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also pointed to his hegemonic belief that working-class women such as Miss Stool
needed to be ‘judiciously regulated’ because they were naturally prone to waste and
extravagance. 193 This extrapolation is supported by the comments of one MP who
contended that Higgins J was one of the members of an elite judicial fraternity who
were regularly criticised because they were “always preaching thrift to the workingclass community”. 194

5.8

Judicial Probing

The articles produced and described by the witness were handed round, and examined by the
advocates, and the female witnesses; the corsets apparently attracting keenest interest. The
knickers were put on the heap unnoticed.195

The questions directed at “the girls” 196 were frequently overtly personal and
invasive. Numerous, detailed, and often ‘delicate’, questions were asked by Counsel
and Judges about their dresses, undergarments, hats, ribbons, boots and associated
repairs. 197 Mr. Considine, who, at the time was actively supporting industrial action,
was prompted to assert that the Arbitration Court, as a vehicle of the upper classes,
aimed to “fool the workers” 198 and “insult their womenfolk by asking them the most
intimate details with regard to their clothing, before [Higgins J] will give them a
decent living wage.” 199 Higgins J evidently understood, by his reference in Archer to
a decision by Brown P in a South Australian female wage case, that arbitration
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judges were venturing into sensitive ground when questioning female workers about
their dress. He quoted Brown P:
I refrain from giving precise details as to the way in which the amount (i.e. the bedrock living
wage for women) is arrived at. There are obvious reasons for reticence on the part of a ‘mere
man’ dealing with a problem so intricate and so delicate. 200

Other arbitration judges, such as Heydon J, were not as reticent as Brown P
when delving into questions about the cost, quantity and quality of female workers’
clothing. It seems that by 1918, it had become common practice in female living
wage cases for samples of various items of clothing, ‘usually’ or typically worn by
female witnesses, to be tendered as exhibits.201 Sometimes this clothing was supplied
by the girls themselves, but more often the Court or Board would direct that clothing
samples be selected by a female shop assistant employed at a large retail shop.202
Counsel and judges then had the opportunity to inspect and handle this clothing
during the examination of the female witnesses. In the 1918 Board of Trade inquiry,
many items of women’s intimate apparel were inspected, handled and liberally
discussed. 203 This ‘judicial’ process of handling of this apparel became infamous. In
one living wage inquiry, the press sensationalised the manner in which the Board’s
President, Heydon J, and advocates, ‘pawed’ over these personal items of female
clothing. 204
Before the commencement of the inquiry in this instance, the Board of Trade
had requested a large Sydney drapery store to arrange for one of their female
employees “to choose from their stock wearing apparel suitable for a working
girl.” 205 It was expected that the Board would hear testimony from the “head” 206 of
the store about these ‘selected’ clothes, with a plan to compare them against the
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clothing purchased by the female workers. 207 Mr Cantor, Counsel for the workers,
objected to this official giving evidence about the clothes and insisted that the girl
who selected the apparel should be called. 208 He was told by Counsel for the
employers that the girl was ‘sensitive’. 209 Mr Cantor retorted: “[m]y witnesses are
also sensitive, but they have to give evidence all the same.” 210
Many women (and men) considered this ‘pawing’ practice to be both
humiliating and embarrassing for the female witnesses and for women in general. 211
The poet and journalist Mary Gilmore expressed her disgust about this practice in her
newspaper column:
Can anyone imagine anything more absurd, more out of place than a lot of men pawing over
women’s underwear, and holding it up to unclean public gaze per medium of supposed
humorous remarks…It is an offence to all women that such a thing should be allowed; it is
worse!- it is an obstacle to true and to the best evidence in such cases, because what woman
would willingly face such an ordeal as that involved? 212

Gilmore pointed out that the living wage fora were conducive to both
“shameful publicity” 213 and to the “mishandling of a girl’s right to her privacies”.214
She insisted that, although she had travelled the world and mixed with “all sorts of
conditions of men and women”, 215 she would be unable to face “the unpleasant
publicity and the remarks of the men engaged in these inquisitions into the working
girl’s private apparel”. 216 Furthermore, she argued that these types of ‘judicial
investigations’ were an insult to women because they were conducted by men. 217 She
suggested that it was unnatural and indecent for men to paw round “the boxes and
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baskets where working girl’s wear is kept,” 218 particularly as such men would not
“paw around the cupboard where his wife’s or his daughter’s underwear is kept.” 219
She concluded that this sort of investigation was no place for a “man’s clumsy
fingers” 220 but it should be left to a committee of women. 221
Gilmore was not alone in her condemnation of the ‘judicial’ treatment of
female witnesses and their choice of clothing. One journalist mocked this invasive
inquiry:
After weeks of inquiry, after pawing intimate articles of women’s dress, after questioning girl
witnesses with indelicacy typical of the master, after portentously declaring that corsets at 2s.
11d. are quite good enough for working girls- after all this and more, the New South Wales
Board of Trade, through its President (Judge Heydon) has decided what is the living wage for
women in Sydney. 222

The same journalist suggested that, although the Board of Trade “did not utter
[any] word on the subject”, the “munificent” 223 decision to award women only 30/per week, including 1/6 for clothing, led to the inference that if female workers
wanted more than the lowest level of existence that they would have to resort to
prostitution:
If they desire any of the ordinary sweets of life, such as good food, good clothes, pleasant
residence, reading, amusement, etc., they can help themselves out by going on the streets. 224

One ‘official’ female witness was so chagrined with the manner in which the
female workers were derided by the Court and the press because of their ‘alleged’
extravagance that she bravely challenged the court to examine the quality of the type
of stockings that these workers were forced to purchase because of their low wage:
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‘Just look at these stockings’ she said handling a pair of these articles to Mr Cantor, who
examined them with a critical eye, and passed them to Mr Ferguson. The latter handled them
tenderly. Mr Stuart Thom merely looked at them.
The stockings were then returned to witness, who turned to the reporters, and invited them to
pass judgement. The reporters looked surprised and blushed.
Seeing the embarrassed state of the Press, the witness went up with her story. She said the
stockings cost her 1/11 a pair.
‘I put them on Saturday’ she added, ‘and my toes went right through them.’ 225

5.9

What is a camisole?

226

We have a number of societies for spreading knowledge among the heathens, but not one
which has for its aim the mitigation of the ignorance in which some poor benighted Judges
move and have their being. 227

The issue of ‘reasonable necessity’ that Higgins J had earmarked as the test
for assessing the appropriateness of female workers’ apparel became even more
problematic when judges were discovered to be uninformed about the type of
clothing women customarily wore. This was the situation in a 1918 cost of living
inquiry before Heydon J in the New South Wales Board of Trade. A female witness
made reference to a camisole, whereupon His Honour asked innocently “[w]hat is a
camisole?” These remarks triggered considerable public comment concerning how
male judges were capriciously determining what female factory workers should
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wear. 228 One reporter sardonically questioned how could such men judge a woman’s
dress needs when some did not even know what a camisole was? 229
The innocence of some learned Judges is amazing. A witness giving evidence regarding the
cost of living before the N.S.W. Board of Trade, presided over by Mr Justice Heydon, made
reference to a camisole, whereupon his Honor asked innocently: What is a camisole?” 230

Another reporter highlighted the problem with male judges determining the
style and quantity of clothing that women should purchase:
[t]he psychological niceties of the case are not judicable by the masculine mind, fed on mere
facts. The joy and the love of fallals lies deep in the feminine soul. Yes, the list of necessities
must allow ‘a little bit of ribbon, and a little scrap of lace. 231

It was suggested that, quite apart from their personal standing in society, it
was apparent to anyone following the evidence via the press that members of the
Board of Trade struggled to deal with the issue of women workers:
As workers they are presumably not entitled to the good things enjoyed by those who live in
happier circumstances…The Board was hopelessly at sea, especially when dealing with the
question of clothing and other articles necessary to give women workers a decent
appearance. 232
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5.10 Independent Evidence
A lady doctor…said it is necessary for a girl to have frocks away from the clothes in which
she goes to work… 233

By 1918, the presentation of evidence about female workers’ clothing ‘needs’
became more equitable and balanced. No longer were just the Court and/or the
defendant employers calling ‘expert” female witnesses about the ‘appropriateness’ or
otherwise of the female workers’ apparel. Employee unions began to call expert
female witnesses, including the ‘unnamed’ witness mentioned above, to counter the
expert testimony of the employers’ witnesses. This witness was an official of the
Federated Clothing Trades Union and was particularly forceful in supporting the
workers’ claims, notwithstanding the ridicule meted out by the press about her
alleged brashness when presenting her evidence. 234 She argued that “a girl absolutely
dependent upon her own earnings” 235 required for her wardrobe a minimum of a coat
and skirt (£5), a frock (£3), two skirts (£4/4/6), six blouses (£3/15/3), four hats
(£3/11/6), boots and shoes (£3/11/6). 236 The witness “emphatically” 237 argued that a
girl “wants a little comfort” 238 and that her clothing should be durable and that she
should not have to waste her money on the “cheap kind” 239 of clothing that the Board
expected her to wear. Otherwise, she suggested: “[y]ou might as well throw your
money into the streets.” 240 This same witness also “vehemently asserted” 241 that the
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quality of the clothes that working girls were forced to buy was “shocking.” 242 After
Mr Ferguson, counsel for the employers, examined the samples of underclothes
brought in by the draper, he expressed surprise at the absence of lace and then
suggested that it was unnecessary. The expert witness “emphatically” 243 exclaimed:
“A girl might as well be dead without some trimming.” 244
In 1919, a similar scenario played out in a Board of Trade Inquiry when Mrs
Blanch Singleton 245 confronted Edmunds J and told him that she wanted to
demonstrate the effect on women’s clothing after a “season’s working”. 246 The judge
declared that the members of the Board were “all married men”, 247 suggesting that
they knew all about such things. Blanch retorted: “I don’t care whether they are or
not. They have to be shown”. 248 She then asked him: “[d]on’t you want to hear
me?”249 His Honour replied: “[o]f course we will hear you right through, but you
know you show these things to men and they forget them immediately.” 250 She
quickly responded: “But I will put them to you in such a way that you will not forget
them. You men have got to understand what we women want.” 251 Blanch then
proceeded to show the Board a garment that “to the male eyes of the court looked
like something that might have been intended to clothe a good-sized doll”. 252 She
then proceeded to explain that the adult garment was a singlet that now only fitted a
girl of ten and that it had shrunk to that size “after a season of washing”. 253
It is notable that the evidence sought by the Courts or Boards of Trade in
many female wages inquires related only to clothing required for a woman’s
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employment and this evidence rarely made mention of the women’s life away
outside of her work:
Was this good enough or that good enough for work? Not whether this or that was good
enough for play. Nobody apparently was expected to pay anything for amusement. For 365
nights every year the 30/- minimum wage worker is expected… to sew those serviceable
garments or she may, except for the effect on her boots, take the recreation of walking
abroad… she might sole and heel her own boots… spin her own wool, knit her own stockings
and make her own corset. 254

In 1919, during a living wage case in New South Wales with Edmunds J
presiding, an unnamed “lady doctor” 255 was called by the claimants to give evidence
about how clothes were not merely a medium for covering the body but were
necessary for a girl’s health and happiness. 256 The doctor suggested that shabbiness
could affect a female worker’s health. 257 After being questioned as to whether a
working girl should have an evening dress (“not necessarily a low neck one but one
to wear when going to a party or a dance”) 258 she confirmed that she considered that
it was necessary for a girl to have frocks “apart from the clothes in which she does to
work.” 259 The ‘doctor’ suggested that a girls’ nervous system was very delicate and
sensitive and that it meant a great deal to a girl “to go out for recreation and
amusement.” 260 Furthermore, she argued that if a girl felt “shabby” 261 she was
mentally depressed and this would affect her health. 262
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5.11 Female Input

Could this matter be referred to a committee of Matrons? 263

By 1918, some Boards of Trade had come to acknowledge the efficacy of the
appointment of a committee of women to assist them in their determinations
concerning the clothing requirements of working women. Whilst committee
members were not always unanimous in their opinions regarding this issue, the
creation of such a gendered committee was nevertheless a positive step towards
providing women with a voice in an otherwise male-dominated judicial forum. For
instance, in the New South Wales 1919 wage inquiry, Edmunds J suggested that if
the Board had to go into the cost of clothing “it might be advisable” 264 to have a
committee of housewives “of experience” 265 to investigate that issue. Subsequently,
a committee representing employers and employees was constituted to assist
Edmund J and the Board in determining what articles of clothing were “deemed
necessary” 266 for working women. 267 The committee’s task was to “advise on a
number of subjects on which men, as a rule, were very poorly informed” 268 and to
come to a common agreement as to the standard and cost of this clothing. 269 In
regards to clothing, the committee was to meet and carefully consider “the
requirements of a woman in regard to clothing, boots, and toilet requisites for one
year”. 270
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The employees’ representatives 271 provided a list of clothing that would
require a “generous allowance” for dress. 272 However, the allowance was specific to
girls living in lodgings and doing their own laundry and mending. 273 There was no
allowance for “veilings or jewellery or articles of personal adornment”. 274 The list
only included clothing items “considered absolutely essential”. 275 The employers’
representatives, 276 on the other hand, only agreed to the list “on the assumption that
the prices for the articles would be on the basis of the cheapest procurable.” 277 Whilst
the committee members agreed on a number of articles of clothing that could be
deemed necessary and on the cost (normal not sale cost), there were a number of
other articles that “one side claimed to be essential” 278 and the other held to be
“luxuries”. 279 After Edmunds J examined the committee’s report he acknowledged
that the committee of women “had rendered very valuable assistance” 280 to the
Board. He even admitted that it was “unfortunate in a matter of this kind”281 that the
Board did not include some “representative women.” 282 However, he confirmed that
this form of representation was not within the power of the Board when he said:
“[w]e are not in control of the situation.” 283 The Report’s schedule showed that it
was ‘essential’ that a woman should be able to procure certain articles as
“necessaries” 284 every 12 months. 285
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5.12 The Press’s foray into working women’s wardrobes
The [press] turned the courtroom into a daily spectacle by presenting a constant parade of
young women witnesses and selecting abstracts from the court dialogue for the amusement
and titillation of an assumed male audience.286

In Archer and Fruitpickers, Higgins J’s comments about women’s dress
effectively defined the standards of apparel that he sought to prescribe for female
factory workers. The press was always keen to repeat Higgins J’s comments and to
portray the personal details of the lives of these young women as “interesting
sidelights”, 287 which could be then held up for ridicule and derision. Not only did the
arbitration process place these women’s personal consumption habits under a
microscope to be examined and adjudged as fickle and wasteful, but the press
unveiled their extravagant habits to the public as a moral polemic that needed to be
further scrutinized and maligned. 288
For instance, an article entitled “Problem of Dress” made much of the fact
that one girl, whose wages were 29/6 per week, spent £32 per year for dress. 289 Her
annual income was £70 and her total expenditure was £86. The nation was told that
she had purchased 12 blouses at an average price of 5/- each, 14 pairs of hose, four
pairs of boots at £1/1/ each, five pairs of gloves and six hats. To make matters worse,
it was also reported that the girl, in response to a question from Higgins J, had
‘shamelessly’ admitted that “she could not afford newspapers, lodge fees, or church
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contributions, and she was not able to allow anything for amusements.” 290 This
woman was thus depicted as being more interested in fashion to the neglect of her
social and religious duties.
In a related, but later article, the message was clothed in more the specific
moralised language of sumptuary regulation: “[i]t was significant that any little
indulgence of vanity in dress was at the sacrifice of... amusements, lodge, toilet
requisites, and church.”

291

Despite the fact that there existed empirical evidence to

establish that neither the increased cost of clothing, nor other living expenses, were
in step with wages, 292 this witness, in the eyes of the Court and the community, had
clearly failed her social and moral obligations to balance the needs of “adorning the
body and furnishing the mind.” 293
Not only was this girl’s consumer choices underscored by the Court and the
press as a public example of ‘real’ female waste and fashionable excess, but she was
also targeted because of her alleged failure to adhere to those moral and civil
standards and duties that Higgins J and his class prescribed as ‘normative’ for the
working class. Moreover, the girl was to be regarded with suspicion for she was
unable to explain “how the remaining debit of £8 over income was provided for.”294
All in all, she was portrayed in the press as an untrustworthy spendthrift who wasted
an inordinate amount of her wages on clothes rather than using her money on selfimprovement and her religious responsibilities. 295
This form of moralising discourse that regularly emanated from the press
proved to be a powerful tool for members of anxious upper classes who regularly
proclaimed that the traditional social order was in danger and in need of regulation.
At the same time, there were few who challenged the sexist diatribe and moral
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indignation, which the press disseminated about working class women and their
circumstances. 296
Often the wage case evidence was shamefully restructured to capture the
attention of voyeuristic readers. 297 Denigrating titles were used to catch public
attention. For instance, in the “telephony” 298 case, the press carried an article,
entitled “Nothing to Wear: Tragic Tales of Telephone Tarts”, 299 which introduced
readers to these particular female claimants’ quest for a pay rise. The body of article
continued in the same vulgar vein and contained a large amount of scurrilous ridicule
in the form of offensive ditties and suggestive cartoons of women in their
underwear. 300
Not only did the press use the girls’ personal and intimate testimonies to
deride the ‘girls’ for their profligacy but also, at times, used it as a “little bit of
fluff” 301 to entertain their readership:
When Counsel expressed the opinion that it was not essential for a jam factory girl to have kid
gloves at 6/6 a pair, he did the rash thing. He was met with a real old lecture which wound up
with an indignant protest of ‘Because a girl works in a jam factory is there any reason why she
should be less human than any other girls?’ Counsel subsided: and all concerned in cross
examination made a note that care should be taken in framing questions.

302

This type of media coverage, which subjected female witnesses to
unwarranted voyeuristic public scrutiny and mockery, occasionally generated some
concern and admonishment about this public invasion into the girls’ private lives:
Can anyone imagine anything more absurd, more out of place than a lot of men pawing over
women’s underwear, and holding it up to unclean public gaze per medium of supposed
humorous remarks…It is an offence to all women that such a thing should be allowed; it is
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worse! - it is an obstacle to true and to the best evidence in such cases, because what woman
would willingly face such an ordeal as that involved? 303

Demands made by the dominant classes and institutions for economy and
thrift amongst the working class women generally reflected a wide-ranging and
persistent anxiety about luxury and extravagance that early sumptuary law had
commonly associated with personal and national ruin. 304 During the war, this same
concern with ruin was a polemic that was regularly discussed in the press 305 and
within organisations such as the National Council of Women, particularly when lead
by such exponents of austerity as Ivy Brookes. 306 Single working women,
‘indulging’ in the freedom of buying luxuries and fashion clothing were especially
targeted by the press and those in authority, for being economically irresponsible and
profligate. 307
Moreover, there was a widely held fear that if such women were paid higher
wages they would become accustomed to an ‘unrestrained’ lifestyle and consumer
habits that were at odds with the expected privations and frugality usually associated
with a family surviving on a basic ‘family’ wage. 308 In the press, many considered
that it would be untenable for single female workers to be in a better economic
position than the average married woman who had to ‘make do’ on her husband’s
income:
From every standpoint it is obvious that the ‘normal and reasonable needs’ of the woman
wage-earner must be as strictly assessed as those of the men, and considered always in just
relation to the basic family wage. To do otherwise would not only be economically unsound
and socially unjust, but would react deleteriously upon the women themselves by unfitting
them for their future, and accustoming them to a standard which it would be impossible for
them to maintain. 309
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Furthermore, it was argued that if women’s wages were fixed as high as those
of the opposite sex “they would be too much for women’s needs.” 310 In some
instances the press provided a censorious

forum for thrift campaigners who

demanded that women’s wages should be curtailed so as to instil thrift and economy
“into the woman,” 311 at the earliest stage, for she would ultimately be in charge of
the domestic economy: 312
Thrift and economy cannot be too early instilled into the woman who will ultimately control
the family purse-strings; and no worse training for wifehood and motherhood could be imaged
than a wages system which makes no demands for such virtues from the single women. 313

One “significant and by no means pleasing” 314 anxiety ‘highlighted’ by the
press was that female witnesses had in some ‘living wage’ cases admitted that they
had done no sewing since school. 315 These ‘confessions’ presumably suggested that
this class of female worker were indolent during their ‘brief’ leisure hours. Such
indolent behaviour was to be condemned; it had an injurious effect on the natural
order of things as these young women were “unfitting” 316 themselves for their future
and becoming accustomed to a standard of luxury or freedom which would be
impossible for them to maintain once they were married: 317
It may be presumed that women on the basic line will marry men on the same economic level,
and to allow them a wage which permits luxuries and extravagances impossible to the
industrial wife and mother would unfit them for what, after all, is the real-life work of the
average women. 318
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In the past, the social ‘sins’ of laziness and intemperance had been associated
with the sumptuary impulse, 319 and were considered serious impediments to
gendered requirements of female respectability and familial responsibility. 320 Society
needed to put a check on such social sins:
In their own interests, and in the interests of the community, their economic position as wage
earners should foster and develop their domestic talents and virtues, and inculcate in them the
principles of wise buying which are the essence of good housekeeping and the foundation of
family comfort and security. 321

Some members of the press insisted that it was incumbent on industrial
judges such as Higgins J and Brown P to ensure that female factory workers were
only paid sufficient wages to meet their ‘normal and reasonable needs’. 322 This
would be a sum that would allow a “decent livelihood” 323 with a margin for
emergencies but which would not encourage idleness or waste. 324

5.13 Style and Taste: the exclusive domain of upper class women
It is for women who could afford it, to show the way of simplicity and good taste. 325

The female ‘living wage’ awards effectively ensured that working women
would continue to remain passive and marginalised by the industrial relations process
that bonded male capital and male labour in what Reekie refers to as “a validation of
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men’s experiences”. 326 These women were not just discriminated against on the basis
of gender; they also suffered discrimination because of their class.
Although Higgins J suggested, when prescribing the basic wage for female
clothing workers, that he could not forget “the important social function of girls’
dress as a bulwark for self-respect,” 327 he would not countenance an award that
would allow them to purchase anything but the most basic apparel. The living wage
awards made by the Arbitration Court and The Boards of Trade effectively denied
these women the right to choose the type of clothing they wanted to wear. Yet, this
approach demonstrated a gendered double-standard, with Higgins’ contending in the
“Badge Case” that there is a “common law right for every man to dress as he
pleases.” 328
Furthermore, at the time Higgins J and his fellow judges were denying
working women the right of equal pay and consumer freedom, they were also
disparaging their choice of dress by comparing their fashion style and taste with that
of middleclass women. Similarly, Mr Parson KC, in a wage case before President
Brown, compared the extravagance of working class girls who would spend between
£1/7/10 and £2/5/- on hats with the admirable economy of “one of the most beautiful
women in Adelaide” 329 who only paid 8/- for her hat. 330
These types of comments reflected the then current hegemonic view that only
women of means and class were innately endowed with good taste and style as well
as a thrifty disposition. 331 These ‘women of means’ would no doubt take the advice
of Brown P and have forgone fashionable boots and worn “plain strong boots [from
which] they would get much better wear for their money.” 332 Obviously, the female
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factory worker could not be trusted to develop the characteristics of simple good
taste without guidance from the upper classes.

5.14 Conclusion
It has been the purpose of this chapter to explore the manner in which Justice
Higgins J and other industrial court judges, during the first two decades after
Federation, used the female ‘living wage’ cases as an opportunity to prescribe what
they considered to be ‘appropriate’ standards of dress for working-class women.
Notwithstanding their middle class stance on gender relations, Higgins and other
industrial judges were forced, in this period of social and economic flux, to
reluctantly deal with ‘the complex question of woman labour’.
This chapter also illustrates how Higgins and other industrial judges in these
female labour cases encouraged their judicial forums to become sites of inquisitorial
interrogation and normative regulation. In particular, they focused on the
‘contentious’ gendered issue of female dress in their castigation of those ‘gentle
invaders’ 333 who dared contravene traditional norms by seeking work in the public
sector and having the audacity to ask for equal pay. These judges embraced dress as
a means to justify their gendered intervention in the female wage cases and to award
female workers lower wages than men who did the same work. Moreover, they
alleged that women, particularly young women, wasted an inordinate amount on
fashionable clothing. It was argued by the judiciary and the press that it would be
better for society if these women were to curtail their extravagance in dress and
instead, equip themselves for marriage by adopting thrifty practices.
Rather than applying the masculinist Harvester ‘normal needs’ test in
assessing the wage that a female worker should be awarded in various industries, the
Arbitration Court and Boards of Trade instead focused on the ‘reasonable necessity’
of these women’s expenditure on clothing. In doing so, these male judges, many of
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whom were ignorant about the dress ‘needs’ of women, then became the selfappointed ‘experts’ and institutional ‘arbiters’ of working-class women’s dress. It
was not until 1919 that women began to have the opportunity to contribute to the
‘judicial discussion’ about the appropriateness or otherwise of women’s dress.
It was through these female ‘living wage’ cases that Higgins and his fellow
judges began to perpetuate the institutionalised vision of what Hunt calls a “‘ideal’
hierarchical and instinctively male order.” 334 Higgins’s nation-building mission was
to create “a new province for law and order.” 335 However, it proved to be a
masculinist paradigm that exposed “gendered conceptions of work and citizenship,
based in a recreation of patriarchy in national wage structures.” 336 Working-class
women in particular were expected to remain marginalised and closed off from the
public sphere, notwithstanding their individual or personal aspirations or needs. 337
Women, who did work for whatever reason, were viewed with suspicion and often
vilified in the courts and in the press for their alleged profligacy and adverse impact
of the nation’s social order. 338
This chapter has also demonstrated the manner in which the press not only
put these girls’ choice of clothing and their personal consumer habits on show to the
public as interesting “sidelights,” 339 but also how it frequently and widely chastised
these working women for their alleged profligacy and fickleness. 340 Female workers’
wage claims also provided a fresh opportunity for the press to disseminate moralising
attacks on women’s dress. Often, female working class witnesses were admonished
for their profligacy and fickleness, and it was often alleged that these ‘vices’ were
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having an adverse effect on national prosperity and on public interests. 341 This form
of moralising commentary often sought to denigrate those female working women
who dared to disrupt the natural order of gender and class relations by seeking equal
pay for equal work. 342 Furthermore, this gendered criticism of working women’s
dress and appearance proved to be a powerful tool for the anxious upper classes
anxious who proclaimed that traditional social order was in danger and in need of
regulation. 343
Chapter 6 will demonstrate the level to which luxury excited moral
condemnation and stimulated the sumptuary reflex during the War. The chapter
focuses on the establishment in 1917 of the Federal Luxuries Board and explores its
sumptuary role in serving the Hughes government’s moralised pattern of prescribed
thrift and patriotic sacrifice.
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6 THE PROHIBITION OF LUXURY – THE PLAN TO STITCH-UP
AUSTRALIANS WITH A JINGOISTIC YARN

The War has Wrought Great Changes. 1

6.1

Purpose and structure of this chapter

In Chapter 4, it was argued that by the end of the first decade after Federation
the Federal government’s policy of imposing high tariffs on imported apparel had
assumed a marked ‘sumptuary’ effect. Once the war commenced, this newly
fabricated form of protectionism began to be laced with heavy supplementary threads
of nationalism, patriotism, war precautions legislation and other forms of
governmental intervention. The government, and in particular Hughes, became
progressively obsessed with winning the war ‘at any cost’ and looked to the people
to assist the war effort by providing not only men to fight at the front but also funds
to pay for the war. 2
Both this Chapter and Chapter 7 suggest that the early years of the war were
paradoxically prosperous ones for many Australians. 3 Increased employment
opportunities for the lower classes, for both men and women, meant that some had
surplus funds to spend on those imported ‘luxuries’, particularly fashionable apparel
and amusements, which had hitherto been denied or unavailable to them. 4 There was
also a general belief 5 that there were many people living just as extravagantly as they
had during peacetime and that these people were disinclined “to practise that
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measure of economy which is declared to be necessary to the successful conduct of
the War.” 6
This chapter describes how this sort of conspicuous consumption riled the
government and those actively involved in thrift campaigns. 7 It was suggested, both
in the press and in Parliament, that there were thousands who could preserve the
nation’s wealth by saving money “now spent on mere luxuries, excessive
amusements, and comforts which could partially, at least, be quite easily done
without.” 8 All Australians were expected to be ‘patriotic’ by saving surplus funds for
future exigencies or by investing in war bonds. 9 They were also informed by the
ruling class that it was their obligation to be morally strong in a time of sobering
conflict by resisting the temptation of luxuries, and in doing so they would help to
avoid economic ‘mischief’ for the nation. 10
Appeals to patriotism went unheeded 11 and Prime Minister Hughes, in his
quest to regulate the consumption of imported ‘luxuries’, sought to emulate Britain’s
sumptuary regulations which aimed to encourage local industries 12 and free up
additional shipping space for troops and necessities. 13 The Chapter argues that the
keystone of Hughes’ sumptuary project was the establishment of the short-lived
‘Luxuries Board’. Its role was to decide what ‘luxuries’ were to be prohibited for the
Australian consumer for the remainder of the war. 14 The Board’s creation was clearly
a sumptuary project aimed at quelling traditional anxieties concerning waste,
extravagance and mimesis.
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This project not only had many of the markers of sumptuary regulation but,
unlike the protectionist project discussed in chapter 4, it had a stated and unequivocal
sumptuary objective – the regulation of what imported goods could be consumed- as
well as a sumptuary effect. It was a true ‘sumptuary project’ in the traditional sense. 15
This chapter will focus on the establishment of the Luxuries Board and its role in
serving the government’s moralised pattern of prescribed thrift and sober sacrifice.
This chapter will also show how this pattern, although ostensibly drafted with the
intention of doing ‘everything’ to win the war for the Empire, was spotted with
slippages of class and gender and streaked by intrusions of idiosyncratic executive
power.

6.2

Twisting sumptuary threads around the notion of Luxury

If those who ‘have more than they want for the ordinary needs of life squander their surplus
on forms of expenditure unproductive and wasteful…they do a double injury to the nation.
They reduce protanto the wealth available for spending on productive efforts, and they
demoralize that part of the population whose lives are spent purely in ministering to the
useless pleasures of the rich.’ 16

Whilst the figure of Luxury has always “excited moral condemnation and
stimulated the regulatory reflex”, 17 its denunciation has always been magnified even
more during periods of conflict. 18 This was certainly the case in Australia during
World War I. 19 The notion that any Australian was “squandering” economic
resources on the “indecent” 20 importation of luxuries during the war was abhorred 21

15

Alan Hunt, Governance of the Consuming Passions: A History of Sumptuary Law (Macmillan
Press, 1996) 3. See above Chapter 3.
16
Bound Table, December 1916, quoted in Commonwealth, House of Representatives, 14 March
1917, 106, (Mr Fenton).
17
Hunt, above n 15, 77; See above Chapter 3.
18
Ibid 78.
19
“War Notes”, Albury Banner and Wodonga Express, 16 March 1917, 29.
20
“Importation of Luxuries”, above n 3, 4.

184

and reviled by both ‘patriotic’ individuals and organisations such as the National
Council of Women. 22 Anyone committing this social ‘sin’ was labelled, by “every
right-minded person”, 23 as disloyal and reprehensible. 24 Contemporary moralising
discourse depicting luxury as a ‘sin’ was further skewed towards the economic
wrong of ‘extravagance’ which was considered as a waste of personal and national
resources that could be more usefully and gainfully employed. Luxury was
associated with economic ruin and wastefulness, particularly for the working classes.
It was a time when people were expected to be frugal and live simply and without
extravagance. 25 The money ‘wasted’ on non-essentials such as furs, motor cars and
alcohol was adjudged by many as weakening the nation. 26 It was staunchly
advocated that the money expended on such non-essentials should be devoted to
‘prosecuting’ the war. 27
Much of this moralising discourse emanated from the ‘pro-war’ press, an
anxious Parliament and those who were ‘the truly patriotic’. 28 It was mostly aimed at
the ‘lower order’ wage earners, particularly women, who were reprimanded for being
“loath to deny themselves luxuries to which during prosperous periods they had have
grown accustomed, and [having] come to regard [them] as being almost necessary to
their existence.” 29 This form of social censure carried with it the same strong traces
of patrician disapproval that had been previously evident in the hierarchical paradigm

21

“War Notes”, above n 19. The author decries the lack of thrifty practices in Australia and the
manner in which Australians “run riot...in unparalleled and reckless individual and national
extravagance.”
22
Nance, “The National Council of Women”, Leader, 7 July 1917, 47-48.
23
M A Blee, Letters to the Editor, “National Economy”, Examiner, 10 August 1917, 7.
24
“The Importation of Luxuries”, above n 3.
25
“The Simple Life Must Be Lived”, The Advertiser, 28 April 1917, 12.
26
“The Importation of Luxuries”, above n 3; “The Appeal to Economise”, Shepparton Advertiser, 1
March 1917, 3. The author argued that “[b]y excess in frivolity and gaiety we are only paving the way
to a condition of things that will press very heavily upon us in the future.”
27
“Australia’s Part in The War”, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 February 1917, 12.
28
Patriotism was often spoken in personified, gendered and class terms. See “Ladies Letter”, Punch,
16 August 1917, 32: “Patriotism turned out in force and its best evening duds to see Jo Smith blow the
bugle for “Reveille” last Wednesday night…The Lady Mayoress sat enthroned over the Union Jack.”
29
“The Importation of Luxuries”, above n 3.

185

of traditional sumptuary regulation of the early modern period. 30 The hegemonic
view was that the best the lower classes should expect, with careful economy, to
make ends meets and maybe save a small amount for contingencies. 31 Not only was
it considered ‘appropriate’ for the nouveau riches 32 to be circumspect in their
consumption practices 33 but it was presumed that they should not be allowed to rise
above their status in life by being allowed to engage in “vulgar waste”. 34 The
conspicuous consumerism of the rising classes was regarded by some as uncouth and
distasteful: “[t]he worst sections of the wealthy lower orders are squandering on the
barbaric fineries which appeal to their crude taste.” 35
In their attempt to protect their privileged position, the dominant elite
employed this salacious and derogatory form of ridicule to admonish the
‘lower orders’ for their social insubordination 36 and their tenacious pursuit of
material goods. It would seem that such corrective discourses acted to soil and
unpick those newly constructed subjectivities arising from social and political
reforms, and to reinstate a consumption-based system of social distinction.
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6.3

Fashionable acquisition trumps self-denial

It is most likely that it is in the hope of restraining the wild extravagance of these young
people that a thought is being given to sumptuary regulation.37

Soon after Australia entered the war, the nation was beset by demands to
assist the British war effort. 38 In addition, widespread appeals were made to “the
people of the Empire” 39 to voluntarily exercise the spirit of self-denial 40 and all
possible frugality. 41 Not only was the Australian government seeking ‘patriotic’ men
for the fighting line 42 but it proclaimed that everyone else should be personally
responsible to engage in thrifty and economical practices to support Australia’s
contribution to the war effort and to alleviate the pressures on a “sorely-burdened
Britain”. 43
Whilst thrift campaigns were reasonably successful in encouraging
economies in dress, food and pleasure 44 this level of success did not satisfy an
anxious government and those alarmists who were ‘sanctimoniously’ obsessed with
thrift 45 and imagined future shortages. It was evident 46 that many ignored these
“exhortations to patriotism” 47 and the frequent calls from the press and
parliamentarians that Australians restrain from using their surplus funds on “useless
luxuries.” 48 For instance, in the nine months up to the end of 31st March 1917, there
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had been a steady growth in imported ‘luxuries’. 49 The value of ‘apparel and textiles’
had increased in 1917 to £2 694 72 50 as compared to £2 136 279 51 in 1916. Similarly,
the value of ‘jewellery and fancy goods’ had increased from £249 323 52 to £265
174. 53 It was believed by many that some form of restrictive action had become
absolutely necessary even though there was no compelling evidence that the money
‘wasted’ on imported luxuries would instead be spent on war bonds 54 or retained as
savings.

6.4

Ruling Australia from Downing Street: a sumptuary pattern drafted
for the Empire

Mr Lloyd-George officially asked the Commonwealth to cease the importation of luxuries
and to make locally for its own use most of the manufactured articles which it had been in
the habit of importing from Great Britain. 55

Because the early war years proved to be relatively prosperous for some,56
Australian cities “were roaring with trade, big profits and amusements of every
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description.” 57 There was plenty of food and many enjoyed the kinds of luxuries that
were being denied to people elsewhere. For example, in France and in Great Britain,
people were living under food control 58 and enduring other economic deprivations.59
Of course, these people were living in a very different social and political
environment to the one that existed in Australia. The poorest classes and women in
the United Kingdom were still without suffrage and wages remained extremely low
for some workers. 60
The Australian press, the self-appointed ‘guardian’ of morals and national
duty, regularly castigated workers and clerks for spending their money freely “upon
the most absurd excesses and extravagances of one kind and another, from motor
cars and wearing apparel to imitation jewellery”. 61 However, the lower classes
seemed reluctant to deny themselves those luxuries to which they had grown
accustomed and had come to regard as almost necessary to their existence.62
‘Patriotic’ Australians condemned this behaviour as morally and economically
‘improper’, 63 especially when so many lives were being lost in conflict and when
earnest campaigns were being waged to ‘conscript’ funds to pay for the war. It was
not only the Australian press that castigated those ‘wasting’ the nation’s liquid
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capital on luxuries. There were those in Federal Parliament, such as Dr Carty Salmon
MP, who claimed that the money spent on ‘unnecessary’ luxuries was adversely
affecting Australia’s financial stability. Moreover, they attacked those who had the
‘audacity’ during a time of war to insist upon “having a number of articles for their
daily use which are regarded elsewhere as luxuries, and as entirely unnecessary for
either the comfort or convenience of mankind.” 64

6.4.1 Prime Minister Hughes condemns wartime extravagance
Prime Minister Hughes also considered such ‘wanton’ behaviour 65 at odds
with his ‘win the war at any cost’ ideology. 66 In an attempt to counter this ‘wasteful’
behaviour he began to make more use of the War Precautions Act 1914 (Cth) and
Regulations 67 as a form of sumptuary law. 68 Likewise, he increased customs duties
on most imported goods to ensure that his government could raise sufficient funds to
do whatever was necessary to aid the Empire to win the war. 69 It is not surprising
that he was enthusiastically supported by the press and by those ‘avowed patriots’
such as Herbert Brookes, who claimed that “indulgence” 70 and “folly” 71 was causing
serious economic mischief to the nation. 72 Some suggested that Protectionists (such
as Herbert Brookes) had spurred Hughes into his rush to set up the Luxuries Board. 73
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There seems that this view could be true, especially when it is remembered that
Brookes was the ‘leader’ of the Protectionist cult and had, in 1916, already
campaigned for the prohibition of imported luxuries:
One cannot help remembering that the ball was set rolling by a deputation to M. Hughes of a
small and interested body of protectionists, who want everybody’s business and profits for
themselves. 74

The need for sumptuary regulation was never far from the minds of those
who supported the scheme to curb imported luxuries. For example, Randolph
Bedford, a well-known journalist and politician, publicly urged Hughes to “find a
sumptuary law in the War Precautions Act. The craze for foreign luxury requires as
many war precautions as anything.” 75 The strict curtailment of wasted ‘luxuries’ was
no longer to be left to the individual but became a national and imperial imperative 76
that was primarily driven by the British Prime Minister. 77

6.4.2 Lloyd-George demands the implementation of sumptuary regulation
To avert the possibility of further 78 ‘danger’ from the importation of ‘foreign
‘luxuries’, the English Prime Minister Mr Lloyd-George officially asked the
Commonwealth to cease the importation of luxuries and to ensure that it locally
manufacture most of these same goods for its own use. 79 He asked all British
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Dominions to do this.80 Even though Lloyd George made this an official request,
more than likely the strategy was worked out together with Hughes who was a
sycophantic Anglophile and ardent imperialist. Manning Clark suggests that Hughes
was an “England to the last man and the last shilling supporter. He was a King and
Empire man.” 81 In 1916, Hughes visited London and went on a lecturing tour all
over the country (except Ireland-he was very anti-Catholic) to promote his particular
‘battle cry’ to the locals. 82 He told them that the war was doing great things for the
Empire and that victory must be achieved no matter the cost in men and money. 83 He
was well received and fawned over. 84 Arthur Balfour called Hughes ‘the apostle of a
great cause’ and Lloyd George “joined in the praise and thanksgiving”. 85 No doubt,
ebullient from this praise, he was willing to accede to any English interference in
Australia’s freedom to make its own policies and legislation. 86
Lloyd-George also directed that a Luxuries Board be created to determine
what articles should be restricted, and to consider “articles [that] should during
wartimes pass out of consumption and use, save by express sanction and
authority.” 87 Canada was another country besides Australia that set up a Luxuries
Board. 88 However, it encountered problems implementing Lloyd George’s directives.
Trade treaties with France and Italy meant that there were fixed customs duties on
articles such as table luxuries, wines, embroideries, velvets, ribbons and
manufactured silks. 89
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Lloyd George had already implemented sumptuary regulations 90 in Britain.
These regulations sought to render economy compulsory, 91 to encourage local
industry and to free up additional shipping space for troops and essentials. 92 It was
not only apparel that was targeted. On November 22 1917, the Food Controller
prohibited the sale and use of cream, for luxury purposes) between December 8 and
April 30. 93 In March 1917, there were restrictions imposed on meals in British
restaurants. Luncheons were limited to 2 course and dinner to three. 94 It was also
anticipated at this time that the Food Controller might impose a “meatless day” 95
every week and “war time bread” made with maize, oats and barley rather than
“bleached flour.” 96
During this period, similar sumptuary restrictions were imposed by the
French and American governments. In Paris, women who dressed “extravagantly
[had] to pay dearly for their selfish folly.” 97 The Luxury Taxation Board added 10%
on dresses that cost more than £8. Expensive boots and gloves were regarded as
luxuries and attracted tax. 98 As one female correspondent wrote,
everything that is desirable is to be taxed. This means that women must learn to do with less
and take care of what they have. They must change the fashion of their clothes less often, and
be content to look nice in the same clothes for more than one season. 99

There was also a sumptuary ordinance that prohibited the wearing of evening
clothes to theatres that received a State grant. Opera goers were not to be admitted
90
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into theatres “unless dressed in ordinary city clothes…Any other attire would be
rigorously refused admittance.” 100 In addition, in order to save power, all theatres,
concerts, circuses, music halls, and cinemas were to be closed one night per week. 101
The prescriptive form of sumptuary legislation that was enacted in Great
Britain during this period was not overtly directed at reinforcing and legitimising the
pre-war hierarchical social order. However, it still had the same hierarchical effect.
Female war workers who had become “dress-mad” on their vastly enhanced
earnings 102 were, for instance, restrained from further extravagance and in dressing
as they pleased. 103 Before such restrictions were imposed, these women had enjoyed
new opportunities to purchase fashionable headgear, clothing and footwear, and were
used to paying the sorts of prices for their “bijouterie”

104

“which had never entered

into wildest dreams in pre-war days”. 105 Even upper class Englishwomen, who were,
at one time, the leaders of “haut ton” (sic), 106 were forced by Lloyd George’s
sumptuary regulations to discard their “fripperies of fashions for plain matter-of-factattire.” 107 The sumptuary regulations proved to be an effective tool to control
important aspects of personal behaviour and represented a tangible expression of a
hierarchical ideal.
The Imperial Government had the same attitude to controlling the affairs of
Commonwealth nations as they had toward leading Australian military campaigns.
The era of British supremacy over the colonies had not yet ended and would continue
throughout the war. Lloyd George maintained that what was good for the Motherland
should also be obligatory for the dominions, 108 and he set about spreading the
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‘gospel’ of enforced thrift 109 throughout the Empire. It was suggested by one
commentator that there was no doubt that Lloyd George was trying to rule Australia
and that some Australians seemed to have more allegiance to England than to
Australia. He sarcastically suggests that Hughes came back from his ‘pilgrimage’ to
England “with a whole pocketful of instructions” 110 and that he had become “a sort
of diplomatic representative of the British Government. Otherwise why all the
mystery, his secrecy, his refusal to take Parliament into his confidence?” 111
Lloyd George was primarily concerned with future shortages and economic
hardship and ruin. 112 In his ‘gospel’ of austerity, there was also an underlying
condemnation of luxury with its strong association with moral weakness. 113 He
maintained that those who failed to resist the temptation of luxury goods in the
‘sober’ days of war and would not exercise “a little rigorous economy” 114 were to be
condemned as selfish 115 and unpatriotic. 116

6.4.3 Hughes ignores British interference in Australia’s domestic affairs
Hughes, the ardent imperialist, with many other self-serving protectionists,117
championed this imperial dogma and “clamoured insistently” 118 for the prompt
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appointment of a Luxuries Board. Yet, there was little 119 or no objection to Lloyd
George’s direct intrusion into Australia’s trade and domestic policies. 120 In this time
of crisis, Hughes, with his “feet of British clay,” 121 threw off the autonomous cloak
of independence and nationalism, reverted to colonial dependency, and sought
direction and succour in the arms of the ‘Motherland’. Hughes adopted this position
despite the creation of the Nationalist Party in 1917 that was made up from his proconscription followers and sympathetic conservatives. Clearly, the party’s nationalist
platform did not necessarily mean it was to have an independent voice-it seems that
deference to Britain was the true nationalist agenda for Hughes and his supporters.
At the time, the Australian and British press bombarded their public with
articles, often cautionary in nature, harking back to the salutary effects of sumptuary
restraint on luxuries. 122 This meant that many Australians began to anticipate that
their own Government would force upon them similar forms of sumptuary
legislation; they too might each week have to suffer “meatless “and “sugarless
days”. 123 The government appeared to be determined to intervene in the private lives
of it people to ensure that Australia could “most effectively” 124 play her part in
helping to win the war: personal sacrifice in the service of the nation was expected
from all. 125
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Just as the moralisation of luxury was at the core of discourses surrounding
sumptuary law, 126 Lloyd George made the moralisation of luxury a marker in the
discourses of war and patriotism. In fact, what Lloyd George was proposing for
Australia and “the sister dominions” 127 was a sumptuary project that was to have all
the semiotic and ideological markers of traditional sumptuary law:
It is a sumptuary measure calculated to make the people more economical than might
otherwise be, simply because they will no longer be able to gratify their desires along
accustomed lines. 128

6.4.4 Hughes embraces Lloyd-George’s directive

Hughes embraced this highly interventionist project and declared to the
Australian public his intention to implement Lloyd George’s command to establish a
Luxuries Board. 129 In fact, it became an important part of his “win the war” platform
leading up to the Federal elections in May 1917. 130 In this speech delivered at
Bendigo, Victoria on March 27 1917 Hughes made it clear that he had embraced
Lloyd-George’s edict:
The Government intends to follow the example of Great Britain in regard to the regulation of
the importation of luxuries during war time. Such a policy seems to be dictated both by
common prudence and circumstances in which we now find ourselves. It is obvious on the face
of it that to send money out of this country and out of the Empire at a time when every atom of
wealth is essential is a suicidal policy… [i]t is obvious that in so complex a matter we must
proceed with great care. To prohibit the importation of luxuries, and so give employment to 10
people, and at the same time throw 250 out of work, would be folly. The question is most
difficult, but, having regard to all its difficulties and complexities, the Government will
endeavour to achieve the end I have mentioned.”
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In the interim period, and before Hughes could establish the Luxuries Board,
Lloyd George, once more intruded into Australian foreign trade policy. He exerted
imperial control and instructed his Controller of Shipping131 to effectively pre-empt
the function of the Luxuries Board by taking “perfect control” 132 of all goods being
shipped to Australia from the United Kingdom 133 whilst at the same time keeping a
“tight grip” on the issue on the issue of permits; they were practically unobtainable
for any but goods of prime necessity. 134 Again Hughes made no objection to this act
of paternal meddling or intervention from the ‘mother country’.

6.4.5 Herbert Brookes supports the establishment of the Luxuries Board

Protectionists, such as Herbert Brookes, welcomed the establishment of the
Board as an additional boon 135 to Australian industries. 136 Local manufacturers were
already receiving a large measure of protection “through high freights and war risks
that was never dreamt of a few years ago. Many of them are already benefiting
enormously through the war.” 137 One journalist labelled the protectionists as
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“prohibitive tariff doctrinaires” 138 who saw the establishment of the Luxuries Board
as an “excellent…chance to further their sectional aims and policy.” 139 However, the
‘patriotic press’ was, in the main, extremely supportive of the edict that Australians
must buy only Australian-made goods. One journalist even called for a decree
“forbidding the unloading of cargoes of luxuries and stuff we can and should weave
and spin and hammer and forge for ourselves.” 140 There were, of course, those who
took a more cynical view of the protectionists’ support for the Luxuries Board:
One cannot help remembering that the ball was set rolling by a deputation to Mr Hughes of a
small and interested body of protectionists, who want everybody’s business and profits for
themselves. 141

At meetings and in the press, protectionists were constantly advocating the
need for the Australian Government to protect Australian industries at any cost. 142
Much of their discourse was marked with xenophobic warnings. They insisted that
the continued importation of foreign products, particularly those produced by nations
who were not part of the Empire, could prove dangerous to Australia’s industries and
to her way of life. 143 They insisted that Australia should carefully maintain her
‘social purity’ and national identity by protecting her borders from contagion by an
influx of unwanted ‘aliens’. 144 Moreover, she also needed to protect her ‘economic
purity’ from the dumping of cheap imported goods. One protectionist cautioned that
if “somebody is not vigilant in the near future, Australia is going to be made a
dumping ground, a spoiltip for the products of foreign countries not so good as this
to whom we have no obligation.” 145 Even though protectionist rates on most
imported goods were already high, manufacturers continued to call for the urgent
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imposition of even higher rates that were allied with “the strictest penal laws against
dumping.” 146 There were some who even wanted tariff rates to be modelled on
ancient sumptuary laws:
and made so stiff that those who bought diamonds and furs would pay enough in duties
for the upkeep of an efficient fleet of submarines; while those on silks, laces and
millinery would maintain a complete aerial service. 147

6.4.6 Hughes forms an alliance with Brookes

The Prime Minister relied on Brookes’ counsel and was in an ideal position to
promote the latter’s protectionist interests. Rohan Rivett, Brookes’ biographer and
brother-in-law confirms this close symbiotic relationship between the Prime Minister
and the wealthy industrialist. He contends that by 1917-1918, Brookes was providing
funds and giving platform assistance to the coalition that Hughes formed after
leading his followers out of the Labor Party. Rivett also suggests that “Brookes was
one of several outside Cabinet to whom Hughes turned on occasion.” 148
No doubt Brookes advised 149 Hughes that prohibition of imported luxuries
would help win the war, preserve Australian national life and maintain empire
solidarity. 150 In 1916, Brookes had apparently suggested a similar method of
prohibition of luxuries to the Minister of Customs. 151 Hughes was at the time deeply
impressed with Brookes, who was then the National President of the Chamber of
Manufactures. Hughes especially wanted Brookes to accept an appointment to the
Luxuries Board and in early 1917, had asked him to place his services “at the
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disposal of the Government.” 152 This relationship worked well for Hughes who was
at the time looking for every opportunity to advance his popularity and political
power 153 leading up to the 1917 May Federal elections. He gained a great deal of
positive media coverage 154 about this proposal to limit the importation of luxuries 155
and his assurance that he would do everything to encourage local industries. 156 Other
stakeholders were not so certain about the efficacy of the Board. Whilst some
predicted that there may be adverse effects upon revenue, 157 the main concern for
industry and the ordinary person centred on the question of what goods were to be
defined as luxuries. 158 This was to be a polemical question that the Board was to
struggle with throughout its short life. 159

6.5

The establishment of the Luxuries Board: an ensemble of the Prime
Minister’s making

It is provided that three persons who are to comprise the board shall be appointed by, and
hold office during the pleasure of the Prime Minister.160

The Board, which was selected by the Prime Minister, 161 first met on 7 June
1917. 162 Although the regulations 163 under which the Board 164 was appointed clearly
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set out what it was expected to do, 165 its activities were, from the beginning, always
clothed in secrecy. 166 The Board comprised of two nominees of the Associated
Chambers of Commerce (Mark Sheldon of Dalton Bros., Sydney and J McIntosh of
Ball and Welch Melbourne), two nominees of the Associated Chambers of
Manufactures (W J Gibson, Vice-President of Victorian Chamber of Manufactures
and Mr Hitchman of New South Wales), together with “a Member (sic) of the InterState Commission as chairman” (NN Lockyer). 167 These men were considered to be
“some of the ablest businessmen in the Commonwealth”. 168
Not only were the Board’s meetings held in private but no indication was
given to the public or Parliament 169 as to the subjects discussed within these
meetings. 170 Whereas some welcomed the possibility that the Board would have
scope “for useful action” 171 to impose a judicious curtailment 172 of luxuries, there
was still much speculation and anxiety about the functions and scope of the Board. 173
The Chamber of Manufactures, of which Brookes was the President, warned Board
members to “be alive” 174 to their interests, their trade and the people generally. 175
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One critic went so far as to compare in pejorative terms, the Board’s arbitrary and
secretive methods with those of a Star Chamber. 176
The Board’s reports were deemed provocative and “necessarily” 177
confidential. 178 They were provided directly to the Prime Minister who, in a
Leviathan manner, took on the conduct of the Boards’ activities as his own personal
mission. The reports were never even seen 179 or discussed 180 by Parliament,181
despite numerous requests that they should be made available to both Houses.182
Hughes was on a singular mission to implement Lloyd George’s directives. At the
time, Hughes appeared unconcerned that he was interfering with the free course of
trade. More importantly, he seemed to be oblivious to the possibility that the
prohibition of so many potential ‘luxury lines’ would seriously interfere with the
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raising of Federal revenue and that it could prove to be a major threat to employment
in Australia. 183

6.5.1 The Board’s powers
The Board was given very wide powers 184 to control the importation of
luxuries into the Commonwealth. 185 The Luxury Restriction regulations provided the
Board and the Chairman with all the powers of a Royal Commission pursuant to the
Royal Commission Act, 1902-12 (Cth). This meant that witnesses could be
summoned and evidence taken on oath, particularly in those cases where there was a
diversity of opinion amongst members about whether any commodity was to be
regarded as a luxury. It appears that during the time when the Board sat, no witnesses
were summoned nor was there any evidence presented to it. 186
This form of regulation ‘from above’ 187 was expected to control the
extravagance “that must more or less hamper the efforts of those who are anxious
that Australia shall render all possible assistance in the struggle for liberty.”
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The

Board’s duty was to make recommendations to the Prime Minister from time to time
as to the goods or classes of goods the importation of which, in the opinion of the
Board, should be prohibited or restricted. 189 Once the recommendations had been
approved by Cabinet they were then to take the form of a Proclamation and “would
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have the force of law under the War Precautions Act.” 190 These recommendations
could be characterised as a form of ‘proclamatory’ law. They had much in common
with the royal proclamations and edicts of the early modern sumptuary period; both
took a negative form and both were issued by a supreme executive power. The Board
had the exclusive power to determine what clothing and accessories to which the
public could have access. 191 There is some evidence that Hughes did not even
consult with his Cabinet on these issues. 192
Some parliamentarians felt so estranged from Hughes’ despotic 193 and highly
centralised methods of determining wartime policy and governance that they began
to refer to Hughes and his Cabinet as a “super Parliament.” 194 Macintyre suggests 195
that Hughes was law unto himself: he exploited his special executive power to the
full and cut across the normal lines of administration. This was certainly the case
with the Luxuries Board. Not only did Hughes personally direct the Board in both its
scope and the procedural aspects of its activities, but he orally instructed its
Chairman 196 to investigate those issues which he considered as pertinent in
conserving Australia’s ‘liquid capital’ by the restriction of all unnecessary
expenditure on importations.
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6.6

The Board to decide what was a ‘luxury’: not an easy task

When will the Prime Minister take steps to prohibit the importation of luxuries, and how far
does he intend to go in that direction?197

The Board members faced enormous difficulties in their attempt to resolve
what was to constitute a ‘prohibited luxury’. Despite the fact that the directions in the
Regulations, 198 which were issued on 19 May 1917, “were not accompanied by any
qualification” 199 Mr N C Lockyer, the Board’s Chairman, was able to identify three
“comprehensive groups” of goods for the Board’s particular consideration: 200
1. Articles of luxury;
2. Any articles the importation of which is not essential to the general comfort,
health, or welfare of the community; and
3. Any goods or class of goods, the production of which in Australia should be
induced, encouraged or stimulated either by payment of a bounty upon such
production or manufacture or by any other means.

6.6.1 The Board’s role
The Board, as a locus of power, wisdom 201 and law, was expected to
fabricate, with haste, 202 a regulatory schema to control the wanton behaviour of those
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who could or would not self-regulate their consumption of luxury or non-essential
goods whilst there was “a world-wide struggle…raging”. 203 It was for the Board to
determine what was a luxury204 or a non-essential item. Although Mr Cook205
suggested that “all sections will … be represented on the board-consumer,
manufacturer, imported and Government”. 206 Yet, in reality, consumers, particularly
the working class, had no real input into this determination. 207 Chambers of
Commerce repeatedly asked the Board to give three weeks’ notice of its intentions to
deal with goods that might be considered to be luxuries, in order that traders could
submit objections. 208 These requests were ignored, for the Board had already decided
to make its own arbitrary decision about what goods were to be classified a
‘luxuries’. 209

6.6.2 What is a luxury?
It was not a simple task to define “a luxury”; 210 according to a person’s social
status, the question as to what constituted a luxury was seen to vary considerably.211
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There was no strict line of demarcation between raw materials and finished
products, 212 or between luxuries and necessities. 213 It was a perplexing issue for
merchants 214 and the public;

215

how could the Board “legitimately” 216 pick and

choose between the ‘alleged luxuries’ consumed by the community:
It cannot, of its own motion, differentiate between man and man, or class and class, or
trade and trade. It cannot set up its necessarily arbitrary standard of use, taste, or habit
just because it happens to be clothed with the large…though…as yet ill-defined powers
of the War Precautions Act. It cannot rob the poor of their luxuries because they are
poor; the poor, in fact need luxuries more than the rich; nor should the Government
highhandedly interfere with the simple pleasures of the rich-the odds are those folks will
spend the money on some other kinds of pleasure. 217

It was expected that the Board would include a large number of imported
goods in its list of ‘prohibited luxuries’. 218 There was no doubt that many expected,
and some were even eager, that costly women’s apparel, 219 fancy goods 220 and
alcohol would be the first targets in the Board’s sights. 221 Imported furs, 222 silks,
satins, velvets and feathers were all considered by most to be luxuries and, as such,
were also targets of prohibition.223 Furriers predicted that furs would double in price
after the Board had made it determinations. 224 It is clearly evident why such goods
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were to be targeted. For the year ending June 30 1916, £1 616 211 was paid for silks
and satins alone. 225 For the same period £48 287 was spent on feathers; £158 424 on
perfumery; £486 027 on trimmings for apparel and £100 568 on furs. 226

6.6.3 Silk: a perennial target

Silk was a controversial subject and its classification was never going to be
an easy task for the Board. During the early stages of the war, silk was regarded by
the British Government as a luxury and thus its importation was restricted. 227 In
Australia, whilst its popularity228 was also on the rise during this period, silk was still
regarded as a luxury item 229 and its importation was considered to be a “sinful
waste.” 230 Hughes could see no justification for the importation of one and half
millions’ worth of silks in six months. 231 Others argued that it was a great mistake to
assume that all silken goods should come under the heading of luxuries; 232 certain
kinds of silk were not only cheaper than linen but silk was the essential raw material
from which a substantial number of dress goods were made up by Australian
manufacturers. 233
Silk sold for about 2/- or 2/6 a yard compared to woollen stuffs which ranged
from 3/6 to 15/- per yard. Silk was considered “economically and intrinsically the
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best value in the textile trade” 234 and much less of a luxury than woollen dress
goods. 235 Due to its scarcity the price of cotton was abnormally high 236 and this
tended to make silk a favourite for all classes, particularly because of the great utility
of the material. 237 It was not only used for women’s and children’s clothing but also
for men’s shirts and suits. 238
Although Herbert Brookes, as a Protectionist and manufacturer, was totally in
favour of the Luxuries Board, 239 he took a different position to Hughes about
classifying silk as a luxury. He reminded Hughes that the prohibition of the
importation of silk would throw hundreds of young women who were engaged in the
manufacture of silk clothing out of employment. 240 The silk clothing manufacturing
industry in Australia was so robust that some even suggested that Australia should
have its own silk industry. 241

6.6.4 Jewellery

Jewellery was another contentious item of apparel, and many expected that it
should also be targeted by the Board. 242 It was argued that jewellery, the ultimate
ostentatious display of sumptuosity, needed to be controlled and that women of all
classes should be restrained from buying imported precious and imitation
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jewellery. 243 One critic suggested that Australian women were capable “from a lofty
patriotic thrift” 244 of doing without such decorations, and that even “Eve’s poorer
daughters” 245 could sacrifice their “trumpery imitations” 246 on behalf of the Empire.
Jewellers were quick to rebuke 247 those ‘patriotic preachers’ who demanded that the
Board restrict the importation of unset stones and other raw materials that were
considered necessary for the jewellery trade in Australia. 248

6.7

Women: the usual target

Dress is the world over, a feminine speciality. 249

Wartime discursive moralising practices surrounding luxury mainly targeted
women, particularly those in the ‘lower orders’. Not only were they condemned for
wastefulness and their ‘unhealthy’ mimetic fashion impulses but were also
denigrated for contributing to national ruin in a time when men were seen as the
stalwarts of the nation and the Empire.
In discussions about luxury, it was inevitable that the moralising discourse
would concentrate 250 on women and their desire for imported ‘female luxury’ goods
such as furs and silks. During the war period, there were many profound social
ambiguities and contradictions relating to mercantilism and consumerism. Whilst
many men profited immensely from the increased trade in luxury items and were
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esteemed for their business acumen, women were chastised for their profligacy251
and their ‘fickle’ fashion choices. Women’s conspicuous consumption was easily
detected and targeted for regulation. 252 Censure of women’s new aesthetic autonomy
came from all quarters; Archbishop Duhig 253 suggested that nine-tenths of all
imported “useless luxuries… were for the comfort and convenience of women.”254
Another clergyman admonished those females in his congregation for wasting money
on their “ducky little hats.” 255
Much of this public condemnation and desire to intervene in private lives was
directed at working class women. They had more disposable income than before the
war 256 and were buying the type of fashionable clothing, albeit cheap versions, which
had never been available to them prior to the war. These changing patterns of
consumption produced anxieties in those who saw an inherent instability between
what ‘they imagined’ working class women ‘needed’ and what they ‘wanted’. 257 The
war highlighted the fact that the world had been turned upside down; society’s
system of relative consumption was no longer operating reliably to differentiate
between various members of society. The governing classes in Australia, in an
attempt to reverse these ‘unacceptable’ social changes, used various discursive
moralising tactics to dissuade and admonish the lower classes from continuing to
‘waste’ the nation’s wealth. Simultaneously, wealthy ‘fashion leaders’ were chastised
by the press and others for leading the lower classes astray. 258
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6.7.1 Imitation from below
A persistent feature of this moralising discourse was the suggestion 259 that the
over-spending on luxury apparel by lower-class women was propelled by their desire
to imitate the fashionable apparel adopted by the ‘respectable’ upper classes. 260 It
was further suggested that those women, who had “more money than they want, set
the pace by dressing themselves in expensive clothing.” 261 The result was that
thousands of others “who cannot spare the money at all are dragged into an attempt
to follow them which runs away with a great deal more of their income than they can
really spare.” 262
Another critic reproached women by arguing that “the most unthrifty (sic)
thing upon this earth is fashion” 263 and that “[f]ashion is organised gigantic
waste.” 264 He contended that women who aspire to lead in dress, endeavour by every
possible means to get ahead of other women both in appearance and in the cost of the
garments they wear. He suggested that ‘fashion leaders’ only bought new clothes to
excite envy. 265 He claimed that:
unthrifty people with full purses, and probably empty minds, spend so much of their money
upon dress and appearance they impress others who have not the same ample means, and who
ought to have larger minds, with the idea that to be fashionable is to be that which is most
desirable. 266

This form of moralising discourse is analogous to the traditional sumptuary practice
of viewing luxury through the metaphors of moral contagion and envy. 267 Such
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discourse continually raised the spectre of social and economic ruin that was
expected to occur if the “natural and necessary social order” 268 was not preserved.

6.7.2 A censorious press

The press heaped further spurious rebukes and pressure on lower class
women by continually ridiculing their fashion choices and ascribing them with poor
taste and vulgar tendencies. 269 These women were considered to be easy targets of
moral and economic regulation; their moral character was frequently called into
question and they were told that they needed to be saved from their own folly. 270
They were scolded for daring to resist the ‘old’ social order in which only
‘privileged’ or ‘refined women’ were entitled to wear displays of wealth and where
lower class women should remain on the margins of society and wear what the
dominant classes considered to be ‘proper’ for their station in life. 271 It was argued
that lower class women should not attempt to ‘disguise’ their status by wearing the
traditional “indexical symbols of hierarchy” 272 such as furs, jewellery and silks. It
was suggested that they had not been ‘trained’ from birth, as superior ‘respectable
women’ had, to be stylish, moderate and ‘classy’ in their choice of clothing and the
manner in which they wore it. Moreover, when lower class women attempted to look
fashionable 273 their clothing was often chided as ‘absurd’, 274 ‘freakish’275and
‘barbaric’. 276 Even their choice of jewellery was denigrated: “…in the matter of
jewellery they have developed a taste as barbaric as an Ashantee (sic) chief.” 277
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This form of vilification harks back to the type of dichotomous tension
between class and taste (refinement) that was so marked in those hierarchical and
elitist manifestations of early sumptuary regulation that detailed the sites and forms
of luxury display. 278 When all classes dressed in the same manner and fashion it was
“was impossible to distinguish the rich from the poor, the high from the low…from
their appearance.” 279 The vitriol spread by the Australian press during the war years
sought to replace visual ‘luxury attire’, a traditional and tangible marker of status and
hierarchy, with a more esoteric and aesthetic marker associated with taste, quality
and refinement.
Women, of all classes were encouraged to exercise their natural ‘womanly
ingenuity’ to maintain clothing for longer than dictated by “fickle fashion.” 280 One
critic suggested that during the war, women should look past fashionable trends and
be more interested in clothing that was well cut and properly fitted. 281 The same
critic considered that government intervention in the importation of clothing and
fabric was a godsend to working class women who were ‘compelled’ to keep up with
fashion:
If the clothing materials permitted to be imported were restricted to plain serviceable
stuffs of the most durable character, and with not too great a variety of colors (sic), this
restriction would be welcomed with joy in nine-tenths of the workers’ homes. 282

Not only were women the main targets for sumptuary regulation but women,
with their “comfortable but nevertheless reprehensible” consumption of luxuries,
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were also, as always, called 283 to make the biggest sacrifice for the good of the nation
and the Empire. 284 Naturally, they had little opportunity to resist the regulation of
those fashion items which was so dear to their hearts:
’Minds me whilst writing of whispers, that the National Anti-Luxuries Board, has
finished sitting, and as far as I can learn it’s made so many sweeping recommendations
concerning women’s luxuries that it’s left us very little to wear in the future (until the
war is over) ’cept our bones…The list has not seen daylight so far, but judging by hints
heard, we women are in for a most chilly time. I can see Cissie, Flossie, Fannie and
Ruby rushing to borrow overcoats from their Sunday-best male friend, such a course
being necessary when all goods of attraction are set out on this very anti-female list. 285

Whilst some wealthy conservative women, 286 led by such luminaries as Ivy
Brookes, 287 welcomed the Board’s findings and readily embrace the notion that
patriotic women should give up all these luxuries, 288 others could only make a
perfunctory effort to alter their consumer practices. 289 Some instructed their
dressmakers to reduce the amount of fabric used in the construction of a costume’s
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bodice and skirt, 290 whilst others continued to wear their furs and frippery, 291 for the
prohibitions only aimed to prohibit future imports of luxury apparel items but not at
the display of wealth itself. 292

6.7.3 Women of means (and taste) should show the way
The National Council of Women targeted “women of position and means” 293
to set the example “of economy in dress, food and pleasure.” 294 The Council then
pulled the tension tighter by insisting that “any women buying luxuries of any
description will be regarded by the community in much the same way as the slacker
and shirker.” 295 This was harsh condemnation, particularly as men who ‘shirked’
their duty to fight were at this time being treated so abominably by the ‘patriotic’
majority. 296 Some critics believed that it would not be going too far if the authorities
“should interfere with affairs so much to restrict the too frequent changes in
fashion”. 297 On the whole, many women felt that they had no alternative but to be
‘loyal’ 298 and stoically accept the burden of these restrictions. 299 Occasionally, some
even tempered their loss with humour:
Is it not very “warrible”? I am already dreaming of the forbidden imports. ‘Corse-with
the exception of shells and love letters-man will miss but little. But women! Well just
image! Hats, dear Mary, glove, and silks and perfumery! The unfortunate females will
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soon be reduced to wearing---only our expressions. Wonder what our over-worked
social prevaricators will do when they can only describe the dressing of their special
pets in this way: “At Mrs S-D- party held last night Mrs W-looked well.” 300

6.8

The Board’s determinations: the thread quickly runs out

The more one looks into this question, the more complex and difficult it becomes. At first
sight nothing is more simple than to cut the Gordian knot with a sword, but its ramifications
are such that one seems to be cutting into the very ganglia of the economic life of the
country, and we must proceed with the utmost caution.301

There was no such flippancy in the Board members’ interpretation of their
objectives. Lockyer solemnly argued that the recommendations of the Board
concerning the restriction of imported luxuries were based on four desired goals or
principles: 302
1.

The government desired to “conserve the liquid capital” of the

country for “the prosecution of the war” 303 by the restriction of all
unnecessary expenditures on importations 304
2.

The financial obligation of the Commonwealth and the “very

grave economic developments arising out of the war” 305 might be materially
neutralised by the people being thrifty, 306 which may in part be encouraged
by restriction of articles of luxury and articles “which are not really essential
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for general use, pleasure or adornment; or articles which may be reasonably
met in Australia” 307
3.

Industrial unemployment resulting from war conditions and

the disorganisation of trade rendered it “very necessary, as far as practicable”
that local manufacture and production should be stimulated 308
4.

In view of the increasing diminution of shipping facilities,

freight space should be reserved for the importation of raw materials for the
purpose of Australian industry and “for other indispensable articles of public
necessity” 309
The Board insisted that its activities were justified and were closely
interrelated with the “campaigns for the encouragement of Thrift and in advocacy of
the investments of savings in our War Loans.” 310 Despite this, its members,
particularly its Chairman, had attracted much adverse criticism in the press because it
conducted its proceedings in private. 311 However, the Board members would not be
deterred in their desire to retain secrecy when making their determinations. Lockyer
argued that publicity would give the public “a clear indication of the articles it
proposed to deal with” 312 and this would then inevitably be followed by speculation,
additional disturbance to trade and by attempts to anticipate and thus nullify the
effect of the prohibitions or restrictions. 313
The Board submitted only three reports to the Prime Minister, even though it
had expected to submit an ongoing series of reports ‘in due course’. 314 The Board’s
first report, 315 which was accompanied by succinct draft regulations, 316 was
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submitted to the Prime Minister on 14 June 1917, only seven days after its first
meeting. The report was expected to “embrace imports that by stretch of imagination
can be regarded as essential to the community.” 317 The report targeted many
domestic items such as blacking, bottles and flasks and writing paper. Lockyer
advised Hughes that, in the attempt to save unnecessary delay in the issue of the first
report, 318 the members “avoided any procedure which might be safely dispensed
with” 319 and confirmed that they had called no evidence. 320 The Board had devoted
special attention to the possibility of extending a preference to the products of France
“in recognition of her unexampled and heroic sacrifices in the cause of Liberty and
Humanity.” 321 However, the members declined to do this as this would have meant
the importation of luxuries that “would only advantage the more affluent of our
citizens.” 322
On 19th June 1917, a second report concerning the importation of
pharmaceutical preparations was sent to Hughes and the Board recommended that it
was unwilling to deal with these imported goods by means of prohibition. 323 The
Board suggested that the local production of the preparations would diminish the
need for their importation. 324 The third and final report was submitted to Hughes on
22 June 1917. Its scope was much broader than the first 2 reports. The report

Commonwealth, Letter from Nicholas Lockyer to William Hughes, 14 June 1917 (Luxuries Board
Papers, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, CP290/1).
316
The regulations, particularly the provisions relating to exemptions, make interesting reading. It is
notable that prohibition would not apply to passengers’ personal affects and this would be advantage
to those in the upper classes who purchased luxury clothing and accessories whilst overseas.
317
“A Ban on Luxuries: Order to be issued shortly”, The Advertiser, 15 March 1917, 8.
318
Lockyer stressed in his report that “the determinations represent the unanimous opinion of the
whole of the members of the Board.” See Commonwealth, Letter from Nicholas Lockyer to William
Hughes, 14 June 1917 (Luxuries Board Papers, National Archives of Australia, Canberra, CP290/1).
319
Ibid 1.
320
This meant that the Board would not be “an itinerant body” or “a roving commission of inquiry”
and would meet at the Inter-State Commission rooms in Melbourne.
321
See Letter from Nicholas Lockyer to William Hughes, 14 June 1917 (Luxuries Board Papers,
National Archives of Australia, Canberra, CP290/1) 2.
322
Ibid.
323
Letter from Nicholas Lockyer to William Hughes, 19 June 1917 (Luxuries Board Papers, National
Archives of Australia, Canberra, CP290/1) 1.
324
Ibid.

220

recommended the absolute prohibition of such imported items as tobacco, most
forms of liquor, feathers, furs, felt hats, caps and bonnets, parasols and perfumery.
Partial prohibition was recommended for velvets, lace, gloves, millinery and dress
nets and buckles and clasps. 325
None of the reports were released by the Prime Minister. 326 When challenged
about this non-disclosure, Hughes became evasive. 327 He sought to justify the delay
in the release of the reports by arguing that the issue of importation of luxuries was
complex and full of difficulties and was “receiving the most serious consideration of
the Government.” 328 Even as the Board was in the process of making its
determinations Hughes began to have reservations about the efficacy of the Board.
He was realising 329 that the prohibition of luxuries was not the simple exercise of
curtailing the waste of “liquid capital” on luxuries by recalcitrant citizens, which he
had so unreservedly foreshadowed in his press releases earlier in the year. At the
same time, the Board members were being criticised for their partiality, 330 their
secrecy and failure to call evidence. It was becoming obvious that there were serious
commercial ramifications concerning the schema to prohibit imported luxuries and
that it now needed more consideration:
Its ramifications are so extensive that it is not to be determined without due
consideration of the effects of prohibition in all quarters. It would be foolish, and even
suicidal, to shut out, by sort of guillotine procedure, goods which are essential to the
industrial life of the nation, and, although it is a minor matter, there is also the question
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of revenue to be considered in relation to the industrial and national welfare. Above all,
we must keep in mind the effect on shipping of the prohibition of a not inconsiderable
body of imports. The word “luxuries” has now a very wide meaning. 331

By 20 July 1917, Lockyer and the other members of the Board had become
uneasy

and

very

frustrated

about

Hughes

ambivalence

towards

their

recommendations. They were defensive about their assignment and were worried
about Hughes’ lack of positive response to their reports. 332 Moreover, they were
vexed that their work seemed to have been met with disapproval by Cabinet. 333 In
addition, they were continuing to be bombarded with numerous petitions and
representations 334 about the scope of their determinations as well as receiving
persistent “adverse criticism” 335 from the daily press. 336 Lockyer insisted that the
Board members had conscientiously done their best despite having never been
provided with any proper ‘qualifying directions’ and without being advised that the
question of revenue “should in any way influence [the] Board’s deliberations”. 337 In
reality, the Board had become the scapegoat for Hughes’ hastily prepared and ill
conceived ‘prohibition of luxuries’ policy, and its members were expected to wear
most of the adverse criticism that was being directed towards this sumptuary policy.
Prime Minister Hughes began to panic about his hasty decision to restrict
luxuries. He sought advice from various quarters to assist him in determining
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whether he should release the Board’s full reports and whether he should then
proceed to prohibit the various items as recommended by the Luxuries Board. He
sought advice from Stephen Mills, 338 the Comptroller-General of the Department of
Trade and Customs about potential lost revenue. He also verbally directed Perry
Whitton, the Chief Prices Commissioner of the Commonwealth, to provide a
“personal opinion” 339 to him about the proposed “Prohibition of the Importation of
Luxuries”. 340 Only two days before the prohibited luxuries list was to be proclaimed,
Whitton provided Hughes with a comprehensive statement. In most part, Whitton’s
missive provided Hughes with a justification why the list of prohibited imports,
which the Luxuries Board had so painstakingly prepared, should be reduced. Whitton
confirmed the difficulty involved in defining what a luxury was. He suggested that
all classes, except the very poorest, were making use of articles that were not wholly
necessary to their welfare. He suggested that Hughes should adopt the following test:
To decide what articles can be dispensed with with the least detriment to the general public
and those, the restriction of which, would tend to increased activity in the labour class locally
and thus provide employment to both male and female workers. 341

Whitton took a pragmatic view as to what should constitute the notion of
luxury during the war period. He suggested to Hughes that it was important for the
value of certain lines such as silk, cotton and woollen to be reassessed. In his
correspondence with Hughes, he stressed that:
[i]t is almost beyond doubt that silk for some considerable time will be a cheaper article than
woollen piece goods and probably than many of the cotton piece goods, whereas prior to the
war, silk was looked upon almost as a luxury. 342
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Whitton identified furs, gloves, 343 jewellery–including cameos, precious
stones and imitation jewellery- as items “which may be regarded as
extravagances”. 344 He also recommended that clothing, including shirts, collars, ties
and women’s and children’s clothing, that were “over a certain price,” 345 be treated
as luxury items. He claimed that perfume could be manufactured locally and this
industry could provide employment for both sexes. 346 Interestingly, the liquor trade
was given a huge reprieve from sumptuary restraint. Whitton argued that the
restriction in liquor lines would affect wine and spirit merchants, hotelkeepers,
certain café proprietors, and certain houses in the grocery trade. 347
Whitton explored the arguments for and against the necessity for Australia to
prohibit luxuries during the remainder of the war. In Britain, the problem concerning
the lack of shipping space had been regularly raised as a justification for the
prohibition of imported luxuries. However, he discounted this issue for Australia. He
maintained there was there more than sufficient shipping available “to convey troops,
foodstuffs and other necessaries.” 348 Whitton also confirmed that, whilst the issue of
revenue was hardly worth the consideration for Britain, this was not the case for
Australia. Here the tariff was essential in raising revenue for the Commonwealth.349
In addition, he suggested that the Customs administration, rather than a luxuries
Board, was the best and fairest method to deal with imported luxuries for “the
persons, who can afford to indulge in them, would appear to be those who are best
able to pay the taxation on them.” 350
According to Whitton, Australia was in no danger of being deprived of
essential supplies. He maintained that Australian producers could supply all
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necessary “foodstuffs, clothing, etc.,” 351 for all local needs and still leave them a
wide surplus for export. 352 He did, however, caution Hughes that if “effect was given
to general prohibition” 353 then care would have to be taken to see that monopolies,
leading to excessive prices and profits, should not be allowed to ‘rise” in
Australia. 354
Eventually, 355 a small list 356 of prohibited luxuries was proclaimed on 10
August 1917. 357 As expected, fur apparel, 358 perfumery and jewellery were included
in the list.359 What is noticeable about the prohibited items is the items favoured by
the lower classes were again expressly targeted. For instance, only “imitation
precious stones”, 360 and not “precious stones” 361 as favoured by the wealthy, were
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featured on the list. When challenged with the question: “[a]re those all the luxuries
that you intend to prohibit?” the Minister for Trade and Customs, Mr Jensen
responded with caution:
There are many things which might be deemed to be luxuries, but the Government have
to take into consideration the effect of a prohibition on the revenue. 362

The brevity of the list proved to be controversial and disappointing 363 to those
protectionists 364 and others 365 who had insisted that Australians should be ready to
sacrifice all creature comforts to eliminate waste and conserve the wealth of the
community. 366 One journalist pronounced it to be “a shallow and palpable counterfeit
solution.” 367 Another described the list as “a poor, almost laughable prohibition”. 368
After taking into consideration the budget figures Hughes and his Cabinet
argued that there were three reasons why the list was so short. 369 First, as mentioned
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above, there was a question of lost revenue. 370 Stephen Mills had advised Hughes
that the prohibition of goods recommended by the Luxuries Board would result in a
loss of revenue to the Commonwealth of £1 038 834. There would be £25 000 lost
from imported fur apparel; £36 290 from perfumery and £44 463 from jewellery
(rolled gold and jewellery under 9 carat as well as imitation jewellery). The biggest
item affected was ‘Spirits and Spirituous Liquors’ which, if 25% was prohibited,
would lose £450 000 in revenue. 371 Secondly, it was argued that there was the
complex problem as to what precisely should be embraced in the elastic term
‘luxuries’. And thirdly, there was the issue as to whether such ‘luxuries’, whether
they be imported or locally produced, when ascertained and gazetted, should be
wholly prohibited. 372
By mid-1917, it had finally become clear to Hughes that he could no longer
adhere to a sumptuary project which, despite its moral and thrift-based objectives,
carried with it so many actual and potential economic problems for Australia. 373
Hughes had no alternative but to ignore Lloyd George’s intrusive imperialist edict
that he had enthusiastically embraced in the early months of 1917. It had become
evident to Hughes, his advisors and the press that the sumptuary restrictions imposed
by Great Britain on her own people, were underpinned by different trepidations to
those being experienced in Australia. 374
Great Britain was running short of foodstuffs and this meant that shipping
space was one of the most important considerations when Lloyd George decided to
implement restrictions on the importation of luxuries. This was not a problem for
Australian shipping. The issue of lost revenue was also a different matter for each
country. The effect on British revenue “was so small a matter that it was hardly
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worth consideration.” 375 Unlike Australia, there was practically no Tariff imposed on
imported luxuries in Great Britain and the latter did not have to rely on customs
duties for the raising of revenue to the same extent that Australia did.
Despite the fact that Hughes and his supporters desperately wanted to use the
British sumptuary regime as a sumptuary template to curtail waste and extravagance
in Australia, the dire economic effects of such a regime in an Australian context
could not be ignored. 376 It was no longer a question of conserving Australia’s ‘liquid
capital’ but rather a question of maintaining the important and substantial income
that was being generated by Australians’ consumption of imported luxuries. Hughes
could no longer allow the Board to proceed with its sumptuary task, as there was no
feasible alternative way for the Australian Government to raise the money 377 that
would otherwise be lost in customs duty on imported luxuries. 378 Although the
Government promised that the 10 August proclamation would be “only a start” 379 in
the prohibition of imported luxuries, it became apparent by the end of August 1917,
that the death knell had rung out for the Luxuries Board; without a report ever being
released to Parliament or the public. 380 The failure of the Luxuries Board as a
wartime sumptuary project echoed the failure of the sumptuary laws of the early
modern period.
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6.9

Conclusion

It may be argued that the sumptuary laws of the early modern era were
unique in that they visibly protected and reinforced hierarchical access to items of
dress and ornamentation that carried the symbolic expression of that hierarchy.
However, this chapter suggests that the motives underlying the establishment of the
Luxuries Board and its recommendations, albeit transitory, had the same objectives
and effects as sumptuary law. By prohibiting the importation of cheap motors cars,
imitation jewellery, furs and perfumery, “workers and clerks and others who before
the war had been content with careful economies” 381 were to be denied access to
what were traditionally “indexical symbols of hierarchy.” 382 Instead, they were
limited only to those items that the dominant classes considered to be essential for
their survival.
It was not the object of the Board to restrict the wearing of luxurious
apparel

383

but rather to prevent ‘workers and clerks’ from imitating the wealthy by

spending their money on ‘luxuries’ that were previously unavailable to them. 384 The
wealthier classes could continue to wear their ‘exclusive’ furs and jewellery whilst
the poorer classes could only continue to dream of owning and wearing such
luxuries.
After this Chapter’s deviation into the war-time sumptuary project known as
the ‘Luxuries Board’, Chapter 7 will briefly explore two other sumptuary projects
that ‘erupted’ during the First World War. The chapter will argue that these projects
also shared many discursive features of sumptuary laws of the early modern period.
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7 SUMPTUARY IMPULSES TIED UP WITH FILM AND KHAKI

A revival of the sumptuary laws, a heavy tax on all amusements and luxuries might help to
check the extravagant tendencies of the times, but something severe will have to be done if
the war is to be brought to a successful termination. 1

Mr Blacket is surely not blind to the teaching of history in all countries that sumptuary
regulations may be easily invoked-as is the case in Australia at the present time-but are
extremely difficult of enforcement. 2

7.1

Purpose and structure of the chapter

The purpose of this chapter is to briefly explore two ‘non-appearential’3
sumptuary projects in the context of war time conditions in Australia: the proposed
Anti-Shouting laws and the Entertainments Tax Act 1916 (Cth).Whilst the main
focus of this thesis is on the sumptuary regulation of women’s dress in Australia
during the first three decades after Federation, one cannot ignore the presence of
other forms of projects of sumptuary regulation that were manifestly present during
this period. These ‘other’ sumptuary projects were particularly ‘alive’ during the war
years; a period marked by comparable social and economic anxieties and
preoccupations with national security and morality that prompted the creation of the
original sumptuary laws.
In the early modern period, sumptuary laws were not limited to just to the
regulation of personal appearance through rules relating to dress. 4 They also targeted
the private consumption of food and alcohol, social ceremonies, entertainment and
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economic wealth.

5

Whilst these laws often aimed to limit or regulate the private

expenditure of citizens, 6 they were also was concerned with the social manifestations
of consumption and always involved some combination of social, economic and
moral regulation. 7
This chapter argues that the Anti-Shouting laws as proposed by the Australian
government in the latter part of the war, and the Entertainment Tax Act 1916 (Cth)
were clear sumptuary measures and analogous to those of the early modern period.
These sumptuary measures focused on the wartime control of alcohol consumption
practices and the taxing of public amusements. They were also entwined with an
impulse for moral regulation that operated in response to wider governmental
concern for Australia’s public well-being and economic future.
The first part of the chapter will deal with the Anti-Shouting laws as proposed
during the latter part of the war, and the second part will provide an overview of the
Entertainments Tax Act 1916 (Cth). Drawing on the various discourses that
surrounded these projects, this chapter will reveal that whilst these projects were
ostensibly focused on alcohol consumption practices and the taxing of public
amusements respectively they were also clad with same impulse for moral regulation
found in the early modern period. This chapter will also illustrate that this impulse
for moral regulation was, in most part, a response to a wider concern which the
government, in a time of crisis, had for the public well-being and economic future of
the Australian population.
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7.2

Anti-Shouting Laws

7.2.1 Drowning out the Shouting
To “shout” or not to “shout” that is the question which is agitating the minds of many folk.8

‘Anti-shouting’ or ‘no-treating’ laws that were promulgated in countries such
as the United Kingdom, New Zealand 9 and Australia to control alcohol consumption
practices during World War I. 10 This form of sumptuary regulation was encouraged
in Australia to a large extent by the Australian Temperance Movement. 11 This
Movement, with its push for national sobriety and prohibition, sought to interfere
with the private autonomy of the military and civilian populations by controlling
their drinking practices. 12 Numerous other temperance organizations and churches
also sought to “protect outgoing and returned soldiers from temptation” 13 by
advocating the total prohibition of alcohol, particularly during the war and the period
of demobilisation. 14 At the same time, many anti-shouting campaigns were also
instigated by individuals and other groups concerned with the impact of shouting on
the wellbeing and maximum efficiency of servicemen and the level of their
contribution to the ‘win-the war’ project: 15
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The evil effects of shouting are so obvious that it is scarcely necessary to stress them…
Nowhere is the harm more apparent than among the soldiers in camp, or those who are
outgoing or homecoming. At a time when they are particularly susceptible to the influence of
alcohol, the recovery of our brave heroes is seriously menaced because their friends press upon
them as a sign of appreciation of their bravery. 16

The Interim Select Senate Committee’s Report (Intoxicating Liquor-Effect on
Australian Soldiers and best method of dealing with sale) was presented to the
Senate on 1 May 1918 and recommended: “[t]hat there should be no discrimination
between soldier and civilian in the matter of drink supply.”
Although the Temperance Movement had achieved a major success in
1915/1916 by forcing the government to bring about a mandatory 6 PM closure of
hotel bars and public houses in the four southern States, 17 it continued to zealously
campaign for a drastic decrease in the liquor trade and the elimination of its
associated ‘abuses’, including the practice of ‘shouting’, 18 a practice that had become
more widespread during the war years. ‘Shouting’ had become a popular social
custom for many of those men who drank at hotels and other licensed premises. They
sought to acknowledge and reward the ‘gallant’ efforts of returned soldiers by
‘shouting’ or ‘treating’ these soldiers to gratuitous alcoholic drinks. 19 Some critics
argued that this type of largesse or bonhomie was a misplaced form of benevolence
provided by “false patriots” 20 who “persist[ed] in buying drinks for the man in khaki,
[even though it was] not always for the good of the nation.” 21 Although many
considered that this sort of ‘matey’ largesse was a distinctive ‘Australian custom’,
there were others who believed it to be an ‘evil’ curse or menace that adversely
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impacted on the happiness of the family, 22 the health of the community and the
efficiency and wealth of a nation at war. 23
A more reprehensible custom centred on the practice of touting. Soldiers,
after drawing their deferred services pay, were often targeted by “those who looked
out for them, hotel touts, and all sorts of men who want to be treated.” 24 Touts would
‘shepherd’ vulnerable returned soldiers to specific hotels and encourage the latter to
cash in their pay-cheques so they could then treat all their ‘new friends’. 25 Soldiers
would frequently not leave the hotels until all their money was gone 26 and would
often become so inebriated that they could hardly walk. 27 The effects of such
drunken behaviour had become very worrisome for the Australian Parliament and
those authorities involved with recruitment and troop mobilisation. 28 In its efforts to
curb the ‘deplorable’ and ‘horrible’ scenes that were common when transport ships
‘touched’ the Western Australian coast,

29

the government ensured that all harbour

hotels within a certain radius would be closed whilst soldiers were in port. 30 Whilst
this strategy “resulted in a very great deal of good” 31 it was not in itself sufficient to
control the problems associated with the drinking habits of soldiers, particularly
those who were invalided from active service. 32

22

“Anti-Shouting”, Sydney Morning Herald, 9 May 1917, 5. The reporter suggests that the ‘jolly good
sport’ in the bar, ready with a smile and a slap on the back for all and sundry, and an invitation to
‘have another’ “turns into a very sour and bad tempered specimen as soon as he gets on the inner side
of his own front fence.”
23
Chick, “Anti-Shouting”, Donald Times, 6 August 1918, 2.
24
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 5 December 1918, 82 (Senator Guy).
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
31
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 16 May 1918, 54 (Senator Thomas).
32
Ibid.

235

7.2.2 A call to stop the shouting

Here…in this our young Commonwealth we are allowing politicians to become dictators,
and to impose upon us restraints and coercion … 33

The problem of shouting or treating was also seen as a form of extravagance
and moral degeneration associated with the ‘wasting’ of economic resources in a
time of crisis. 34 Further, some argued that these practices that would be responsible
for bringing about the moral and financial ruin of individuals and the nation.35
Organisations such as the National Council of Women, 36 which supported some of
the temperance ideals, 37 sought the cooperation of all national women’s councils of
Australia in petitioning the Federal Government. They demanded that the War
Precautions Act 1914 (Cth) and regulations be used to prohibit this allegedly
pernicious practice of ‘shouting’. 38 Senator Guy suggested that if amendments to this
legislation were not passed, Parliament would have “criminally failed” 39 the true
interests of Australia. 40 Reverend B S Hammond contended that there was “an urgent
desirability” 41 for establishing an anti-shouting policy that would considerably help
the ‘win-the-war- movement. 42 He used the familiar tropes and rhetoric of war to
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impress the dangers of alcohol upon the general public and to castigate its
interference with the efficiency of Australian troops:
The time had come when a long suffering community had a right to demand that alcohol,
which had so often proved itself a traitor to the Empire, be cast aside, and like alien traitors, be
interned. 43

Many politicians 44 responded to the demand for interventionist action,
particularly those who already advocated the 6 PM closure of hotels, by arguing that
effective legislation, similar to that of Britain and New Zealand, be passed to prohibit
the ‘treating’ of soldiers.

45

It was argued that drink was “the worst enemy” 46 to

discipline and fitness of the soldier 47 and that an anti-shouting law was a
“necessity” 48 because “the evil effects of drink” 49 was preventing “the people from
doing their best in the task before them.” 50 It was further contended that soldiers
fighting Australia’s battles “needed to be in the very pink of condition” 51 and that
alcohol had an adverse physical effect on outgoing and returned servicemen. 52
Furthermore, it was suggested that there was evidence that alcohol was the root of 90
per cent of all trouble amongst servicemen; ‘crime’ and absence without leave were
both attributed to this social ‘evil’. 53 Alcohol was not just a problem at home; 40 per
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cent of out-of-action soldiers who were returned to Australia as “undesirables” 54
were confirmed alcoholics even though authorities considered it to be an
“unpardonable sin in a soldier, whether officer or man”, 55 to be inebriated at the
Front. 56

7.2.3 “Shouting” is an undoubted abuse, but whether it could or should be put
down by an Act of Parliament is another question. 57
Finally, in January 1918, a Select Senate Committee was appointed 58 to inquire into
the extent that intoxicating liquor was adversely affecting outgoing and returned
soldiers, and to determine the best method of dealing with the sale of liquor during
the period of the war, demobilisation and repatriation. 59 In its interim report issued in
May 1918, the Committee announced that from the start of the war over £70 million
had been wasted in Australia on alcohol.

60

Senator Thomas, who was the Chairman

of the Committee, stated that from the outset, the Committee was faced with a
difficult problem:
[i]n the view of the fact that Australia had, on two occasions, decided to carry on the war
voluntarily, we felt that it would be unjust, and certainly somewhat unfair, to say to a man who
decided to volunteer to go to the Front and risk his health and, perhaps, his life, should be
denied some personal gratification, and, it be may be, some social pleasures, that were not
denied to those who remained behind.

The Committee made recommendations which had dual purposes: discipline
and surveillance. Whilst the Committee acknowledged that there some inequity in
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denying “some personal gratification” 61 to volunteer servicemen who risked their
health and even their lives for their country, it recommended that no liquor should be
supplied 62 to invalided soldiers 63 whilst under the care of the military. 64 They
deemed those men coming back from the war as sick and disabled, with “their nerves
out of order” 65 were not “normal” 66 and had no will power. 67 There was medical
evidence before the Committee that, for the returned invalid soldier, particularly if he
was suffering shell shock, drink was not to him a beverage “but practically an irritant
poison, which had a maddening effect.” 68 It was suggested that alcohol seriously
retarded recovery and it was even suggested that for these soldiers “only one drink
might possibly send them mad.” 69 The Committee also recommended all invalided
soldiers be identified by having to “wear a distinguishing badge on the arm” 70 during
the period that they were under medical care. 71
The Committee recommended that an “anti-shouting” law be passed.72
During its hearings, it accepted evidence that ‘shouting’ contributed to the ‘unduly’
and immoderate drinking habits of many of the soldiers. 73 It was suggested to the
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Committee that an ‘anti-shouting’ law would confer a “great benefit” 74 upon both
soldiers and the civilian population. 75 The restriction, which was analogous to the
English law, 76 meant that it would be illegal for an individual to be ‘shouted for’ or
to ‘shout’ for others. 77 In addition, it was proposed that licensees would assist with
the enforcement of this sumptuary regulation. 78 Any licensee who permitted the law
to be broken could risk the loss of their liquor licence. 79 It was argued that this form
or sumptuary regulation would not only benefit the invalided soldier but would
especially be an advantage for those very young recruits who had enlisted when the
enlistment age had been lowered. 80
Of course it was to be expected that the churches 81 and temperance societies,
particularly the abolitionist Rechabites 82 would be heavily involved in the antishouting campaign and that they would provide evidence before the Senate
Committee. 83 These organisations sought the total prohibition of liquor traffic in an
attempt to force uniformity of habits and tastes upon all members of the population
even though Australians exhibited variations in personal characteristics “to an
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infinite degree”. 84 As it was doubtful that they would convince the Government to
adopt a strict moralistic prohibition to protect men against the temptation of drink,
they accepted anti-shouting legislation as the next best measure. They considered
that it would do much to protect the returned soldier “who, in his weak, nervous, and
shell-shocked condition” 85 was so easily tempted. 86
Prime Minister Hughes was very cautious about supporting this type of
interventionist legislation, even though the Select Senate Committee on Intoxicating
Alcohol in their preliminary report had recommended that all invalided soldiers
should be prohibited from having any intoxicating alcohol whilst under the care of
the military. 87 Whilst Hughes insisted that his sympathies were with those who were
against shouting, he nonetheless argued that the State “should interfere with the
individual only when society would derive benefit from such interference.” 88 As we
see in Chapter 6, this stance is strangely incongruous with his desire to interfere in
the private lives of Australian when, in the same year, he pressed for the
establishment of the Luxuries Board and the prohibition of imported luxuries.

7.2.4 Sumptuary laws are frequently broken that they are apt to bring all law into
contempt. An “anti-shouting” law would be more honoured in the breach than in
the observance. 89

Anti-shouting campaigners who advocated for this type of ‘sumptuary
regulation’ were not without their critics. Their call for total national abstinence
caused them to be lambasted as being “cold-tea cranks” 90 and accused of ‘shrieking’
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moralistic rhetoric. 91 They were branded as “wowsers” 92 and were blamed

for

working up war-time hysteria in their attempts to further restrict “the liberty of the
subject” 93 in the name of national economy and wartime efficiency. 94 At best, the
proposal to prohibit ‘shouting’ altogether was considered by some commentators to
be well-meant, a “grandmotherly” 95 proposal that was easily evaded and “as
practicable as trying to hold water in a sieve.”

96

Supporters argued that ‘shouting’

was a civilised custom that, unless carried to the extreme, was neither detrimental to
private nor public good:
Shouting is a social custom of hoary antiquity, and like every other social custom it has some
human instinct or need underlying it. It is an act of goodwill and a sealing of friendship and
serves a legitimate purpose, and it is difficult to suggest a satisfactory substitute for it. 97

Many considered believed that if an anti-shouting law was passed, it would
be resisted, for most people would treat it as a joke 98 perpetrated to satisfy the
“whimsies of a few dyspeptic wowsers”. 99 In Britain, ‘innumerable ruses’ had been
used by the public “to defeat the new [anti-shouting] order”. 100 Customers evaded the
intention of the order by exchanging money when entering and leaving the bars. 101
Whilst ‘treating’ was permitted with meals, there was hopeless disagreement with the
owners of lunch bars as to what constituted a meal. 102 It was argued that no power on
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earth could prevent a man from being hospitable to his friends “if he wants to be
hospitable.” 103 The proposed anti-shouting law was clearly a ‘sumptuary law’ which,
like the sumptuary laws of the early modern period, would easily be invoked but it
would be difficult to enforce. 104 One critic suggested that whilst such sumptuary law
may be well-intentioned, it was probably doomed to fail:
Sumptuary laws may remain on the statute books of the country, but, unless they are broad
based on the people’s will, they will lamentably fail of effect. 105

The same critic suggested that there was a need for the education of public
opinion, without which, all remedial or restrictive laws “must be ineffectual.” 106
Further, it was argued that any attempt to threat returned Australian soldiers as third
class citizens, in regard to the liquor laws “would rightly be strongly resented”: 107
No man should be reduced to the status of an aboriginal as far as liquor is concerned by reason
simply of the fact that he has been a soldier. 108

In September 1918, the Liquor Trade Defence Union representatives gave
evidence before the Committee 109 about the effects of total prohibition of alcohol.110
They insisted that prohibition would seriously affect the loss of revenue for the
Commonwealth and that it would foster a black-market trade in liquor that would
then tend to create greater social “evils”. 111 Unionists argued that Australian soldiers
were on the whole “exceptionally temperate” 112 and that the sale of liquor did not
prejudice recruitment. 113 Furthermore, they contended that prohibition would
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interfere with the personal liberties and profits of “well-balanced citizens” 114 who
had entered the industry in good faith. 115
On 28 November 1918, almost three weeks after the war had ended, the
Select Senate Committee tabled its final report. 116 In the report, four 117 of the seven
Senators argued that prohibition was not necessary. 118 They claimed that any
problems with over-indulgence in drink could be remedied with anti-shouting
legislation. On the other hand, the minority 119 urged the adoption of total prohibition
during the wartime and repatriation period. 120 However, by this time, the
Committee’s recommendations to establish a wartime anti-shouting law had lost
much of their relevance and urgency. Eventually, the proposal to impose an
Australian ‘sumptuary law’ restricting the practice of ‘shouting’ or ‘standing treat’
became another in a long list of interesting wartime legal curiosities. However, the
anti-shouting issue was to raise its head again during the Second World War; but this
may be the subject for future scholarship.
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7.3

Sumptuary law at the movies: Entertainments Tax Act 1916 (Cth)

Picture shows are becoming a cancer which is eating into the very vitals of our national,
domestic, and religious life, and poisoning the whole. 121

In 1916, it cost an ordinary family of four as little as threepence (3d) 122 each
to be seated in the stalls to watch The Floorwalker, the latest Charlie Chaplin
movie. 123 In this movie, Chaplin adopting his traditional ‘Tramp’ persona, attempts
to leave a shopping establishment with half the lace counter in his pockets. When a
store detective (the eponymous floorwalker) attempts to apprehend him, chaos breaks
out and this results in the inevitable comedic chase on a “running staircase” 124 and a
hilarious ‘mirror scene’. This kind of light-hearted movie was the most popular and,
in most cases, the only form of amusement for working-class families during the war
years. 125 Although the national standard of living had improved slightly over the last
30 years, 126 this social class did not have much disposable income. 127 However,
many could afford to scrape together just enough pennies to attend the movies once a
week “to get a little relaxation from the humdrum course” 128 of their every-day lives
and enjoy a break away from war time anxieties. 129 The ‘well-to-do’ had a wider
choice of entertainment: they had the luxury of being able to afford to attend live
theatre, concerts, opera and “legitimate drama.” 130 Moreover, they could also pay an
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extra booking-fee to reserve their seats in theatres. 131 They could enjoy tax-free
entertainment in their homes; 132 “they [had] their balls and parties, with bands
playing; they have their pianos and pianolas”. 133 Unlike people of ‘small means’, the
upper classes generally did not patronise “picture entertainments” 134 and, if they did,
they would not purchase the 3d or 6d tickets for the stalls. 135 They could afford to
pay for the more expensive seats.
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, the American movie
industry flourished and there was a corresponding growth in the importation of
American movies into Australia. 136 This new form of entertainment was considered
to be mainly working man’s entertainment and to accommodate it, thousands of
picture theatres appeared in both urban and rural areas throughout Australia. 137 For
instance, in Sydney and in its surrounding suburbs there were 113 picture theatres,
with an average weekly attendance of 427 000. 138 Allowing for an average charge of
sixpence for admission, this attendance meant that approximately £11 000 was spent
each week on this form of entertainment. 139 These theatres provided evening sessions
on most nights and there were various sessions during the day for families with
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younger children. 140 However, despite attendance numbers rising dramatically after
the advent of ‘moving pictures’ in Australia, the high costs of movie importation,141
advertising and theatre hire, meant that many picture show proprietors only made a
bare living. 142 Proprietors feared their income would be further curtailed after the
State and Federal Governments decided to impose a tax on the price of admission. 143

7.3.1 War Games

This is not the time to play games, for we are engaged in a life and death struggle for the
existence of the Empire.144

During the war, Australian governments were anxious to find all possible
opportunities to raise revenue and in most circumstances they tended to follow the
austerity measures implemented by the British Government. An amusements or
entertainments tax was one such measure. 145
War conditions have brought about a change of circumstances in taxation, as in everything
else, and we are quite justified in adopting every available source of income. 146

In 1916, the British Government had imposed an inflexible147 entertainments
tax 148 on ‘amusements’ as part of its policy to raise revenue to fund the war effort. 149
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Surprisingly, it seemed to work well and “the people [in the Old Land] were
cheerfully putting up with it.” 150 Following Britain’s lead, and expecting the same
success, the Australian Government resolved to impose a similar sumptuary tax, and
at short notice the Entertainments Bill was brought before Parliament. 151 The
legislation did not have an easy passage. When the Bill failed to pass through both
Houses, Senate and House Committees were appointed to examine the viability of
this proposed tax. The Senate Committee originally proposed that it would be ‘just’
for the government to impose 1d tax on a 6d entertainment ticket and that the 3d
ticket, usually favoured by children and very profitable for theatre proprietors, should
be exempted from tax. 152 By December 1916, the government had dropped the
proposal to tax sixpenny tickets. 153 This was mainly as a result of the strong pressure
on government and on the Prime Minister, in particular, from picture show
proprietors who contended that there was “a well-defined and limited sum” 154 that
the public was prepared to spend on the price of admission. 155 The government had
characterised the entertainments tax as a “temporary tax” 156 that “would not have
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been heard of but for the war.” 157 It was anticipated that people would “rather
welcome [this] taxation” 158 or at least “not seriously oppose it.” 159 In the 1916
Federal Budget statement on 27 September 1916, the Government predicted that this
new tax could be expected to yield £1 000 000 in a half year. 160
It was proposed that the tax be paid on all payments for admission to
‘entertainment’, which included “any exhibition, performance, lecture, amusement,
game or sport”. 161 Some forms of entertainments were to be exempted from the
tax. 162 An exemption was also allowed where the Tax Commissioner was satisfied
that the takings would be devoted to philanthropic, religious or charitable purposes or
if the entertainment was of a wholly educational character. 163 There would also be no
tax on entertainment that was intended for children and where the charge was less
than sixpence per person. 164
The Federal Government decided not to tax the proprietors controlling the
entertainments, because it presumed that proprietors would, in all likelihood, just
pass the tax onto their clientele. 165 Instead, the tax was to be directly added to the
price of admission to picture shows, theatres and sporting fixtures. 166 A number of
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States had already passed this type of legislation, 167 with the result that many
consumers were facing double taxation on their entertainments. 168 Proprietors of the
various entertainments also expected to experience “manifest inconvenience” 169 as
well as additional responsibilities with the introduction of the tax. 170 Proprietors were
obliged to exhibit a notice at each entrance to the venue stating the amount of charge
for admission and the amount of Federal tax payable on the charge. 171 They were not
only to act as collection and enforcement agents for the Government, 172 but would
also incur heavy fines if they did not comply with these duties. 173 In March 1917,
Frank O’Dowd, the proprietor of Prahran “Pops”, was charged with failing to
forward, by 19 February 1917, all stamped tickets to the Deputy Commissioner of
Taxation. He was also charged with failing to cause all persons purchasing tickets
above 6d to pay the relevant stamp duty. On each charge, he was fined £5, with £1/1/
costs. Mendel Saider, the proprietor of the Armadale Picture Theatre, was charged
with two similar offences and on each charge was fined £10 with £2/2/ costs.
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An entertainments tax had the potential to be used by government to raise an
enormous revenue from social activities which had not been previously taxed. 174 As
seen in Chapter 6, some people had, to varying degrees, a little more surplus income
than before the war.

175

By 1917, a large amount of money was changing hands in

Australia “in connexion (sic) with outdoor and indoor entertainments.” 176 Some
attempted to justify the imposition of this tax by arguing that people were inclined to
forget that Australia was at war. 177 It was argued that those who had such “surplus
cash,” 178 after “the ordinary demands of life [had] been met,” 179 and used it to
patronize places of amusement, should be expected to “cheerfully acquiesce” 180 to a
tax that would meet the extra demands of the war. 181 It was suggested that whilst
some Australians were doing their patriotic duty by ‘going to the front’, others
should be equally patriotic by “finding the money for the prosecution of the war.” 182

7.3.2 A Class Tax

I am quite sure that people who patronize picture shows and sports of different kinds will be
quite prepared to pay their share of taxation for the conduct of the war. 183

An entertainments tax was ostensibly “one of the easiest methods possible”184
to raise revenue for the war effort. Those who supported the creed that the war
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should be won at ‘any cost’ thought that it was only fair that everyone should make
some form of sacrifice “to carry on the war”. 185 The Treasurer, Mr Poynton, argued
that this platitude alone justified the imposition of a form of consumption tax. 186 He
maintained that if people could not afford to pay the tax, they should go less
frequently to these places of entertainment. 187 This uncompromising policy was not
welcomed by some pro-tax politicians who believed that, as a consequence of the
combined operation of both the Federal and State amusement taxes, there might be a
danger that the anticipated revenue from this tax might ‘dry up altogether’. 188 This
position might be further exacerbated if the tax were to dislocate “that branch of
industry” 189 and close up many places of amusements. 190
This form of “justificatory discourse” 191 became a strong validation for a
sumptuary tax that, in most part, was considered a “special class tax” 192 that mainly
targeted the working classes. Whilst this consumption tax was to apply to many types
of entertainment, it would, according to some parliamentarians, mainly “clip” 193 the
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amusements of the very poor whilst “allowing those of the very rich to go free”. 194
The tax in effect, was considered by critics as a “levy upon a luxury”: 195 a simple
luxury enjoyed by the poorer classes.
This was not a concern to Mr Archibald MP, who held that the working
classes were in a much better position than they had been in previous years:
One has only to look at our working classes, and especially our women folk, and to note the
way that they dress, to satisfy oneself that this talk of poverty amongst the workers is all
claptrap… 196

Mr Higgs, a former Federal Treasurer, suggested that if people wanted
entertainment, they need not necessarily go to a picture show or a theatre:
Following the advice of Buskin (sic), they might sit on a hill and watch the clouds on a
beautiful afternoon, or spend the evening in watching the stars. If they prefer a theatre, what is
to prevent their coming to this House, admission to which is free. 197

However, he described the tax as indirect taxation “of the worst kind”198
because it was mainly targeted at one class. 199 Others described it as a ‘class tax’ on
one section of the community “which believed in having some form of social
enjoyment”. 200 Mr Fenton MP criticised the Federal government who he said
appeared to have no compunction about “continually heaping [tax] on the shoulders
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of those least able to bear it” 201 even when the State governments were doing the
same. 202
However, other State and Federal politicians disputed that the tax was a ‘class
tax’ because it would apply to all forms of amusements (including racing, cricket and
football). Yet, for many there was no doubt that the tax primarily targeted those who
patronised picture show movies: 203
[this is] an irritating class levy which has proved to be exceedingly unfair in its incidence, even
in London and other large cities, where places of amusement are attended by tens of thousands
of a floating population upon whom-as well as the resident population- the burden of the tax
falls. 204

It was thought by some to be a “miserable tax” 205 upon the ‘working man’. 206
Mr Mathews MP condemned those who advocated that there should be no enjoyment
during the war period and intimated that everyone should “be in sackcloth and
ashes”. 207 Mr Fenton maintained that ‘the picture show’ was “the working man’s
entertainment” 208 and that, before the ‘pictures’ came into existence, it was rare for
workers to enjoy any leisure activities. 209 He pointed out that movies were a new and
rare luxury for working families and that the relative low admission price to the
movies meant that “father, mother and children could go at least once per week.”210
It was argued that taxation of sixpenny (6d) tickets would mean a great deal of
hardship to a working man with a family 211 and that this type of an impost had the
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potential to “farther and farther remove” 212 any sort of luxury of life from the
masses. 213
Matthews pointed out that the working classes had already been savagely hit
by large increases in the cost of their furniture, food and rent, and the proposed tax
sought to squeeze them even more by increasing the cost of the only cheap form of
amusement they had been able to afford. 214 Matthews even went so far as to suggest
that the Entertainments Tax was only a subterfuge to compel the closing down of
places of entertainment, thus forcing male employees to enlist. 215
The proposal to tax amusements was met with an enormous amount of
hostility and criticism from both theatre proprietors and movie goers despite the
flood of nationalistic sentiment from Parliament and the press about the need to raise
wartime revenue whilst also protecting public morals from the salacious effects of
the movies. 216 There was concern that the imposition of this type of tax was shortsighted. It was argued that it would not only adversely affect patrons but it would
discourage those involved with the entertainment industry from continuing to
gratuitously provide their services and facilities in raising funds for the war effort. 217
It was also suggested that the tax would adversely affect “tens of thousands” of
people who were, directly and indirectly, engaged in the theatre, and show business
in Australia; the tax would “strike a blow” 218 and could mean the “absolute
ruination” 219 of this section of the entertainment industry. 220
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7.3.3 Movies and morals
We should tax a man, not for what he does, but for what he has. 221

There were others who considered that the tax could also be regulatory and
target extravagance, luxury and the erosion of morals in the Australia. 222 There were
pessimists who were fearful that the hegemonic order was increasingly being
challenged by new forms of popular culture and leisure activities, particularly those
enjoyed by the ‘profligate’ lower classes: “[a]s all people of a non-saving disposition,
having money in their pockets will do, they will naturally go out and try and get the
best they can out of life.” 223 Movies were particularly beleaguered as being an ‘evil’
or a ‘vice’ that caused a “dreadful effect” 224 on the young mind. 225 It was argued that
the quality of the subjects presented in popular movies was not conducive “to the
best results of the juvenile mind” 226 and that the increased popularity of movies was
threatening to become a kind of “national disease” that needed to be excised. 227
It was argued by some alarmists that picture shows pandered to lust by
depicting incidents that bordered on the indecent, or at least encouraged “an inane
mirth,” 228 which they considered was quite inconsistent with the gravity of the war
years. 229 They argued that only a class of movie, that was imbued with convincing
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moral lessons or those movies which were “clean, sweet and wholesome,” 230 should
be shown to the public. 231
When the entertainments tax was being proposed, much of the economic
discourse surrounding its introduction was coupled with moralising critique
analogous to that expressed by reformers of the early modern age who pressed for
sumptuary laws. 232 Both critiques invoked concerns about ‘present’ moral danger in
times of national crisis and appealed for urgent government intervention to help
alleviate these anxieties:
No sensible man would approve of this method of raising revenue in normal times, but it is
necessary to meet a special emergency. 233

As seen in Chapters 3, 5 and 6, the post-Federation Australian government
was already predisposed to intervene in widening spheres of social and economic
life. As anxieties intensified about wartime spending, so did the attacks on luxury
and extravagance, which were seen as the ‘enemy’ of all righteous Australians who
valorised both thrift and self-sacrifice as crucial patriotic virtues. 234 For such people,
an amusement was a luxury, and they demanded: “why should not people pay [tax
on] a luxury?” 235
Even though the government insisted that the tax was introduced as a war
measure to assist with ‘prosecuting’ the war, there was no doubt that the morals of
‘the masses’ were the main target of this tax. 236 Dr Maloney MP made it very clear
that he resented the actions of the ‘wowser’ element who he considered to be
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members of an “aristocracy of religion,” 237 who having no regard for the pleasures of
others, found their only pleasure within “the narrow limits of the churches.” 238 Mr
Hannan MP, argued that the tax was pressed by ‘wowsers’ who did not go to any
‘entertainments’ but sought, through their letters to the press, 239 to condemn and
penalise “tens of thousands of young Australians” 240 who went to the movies,
football matches and plays. 241 He contended that ‘wowsers’ who did not “believe”242
in theatricals or pictures shows would eventually seek the closure of such places of
entertainment. 243 Hannan suggested that these ‘wowsers’ were the same sort of
moralists who considered that a woman who took her children to a picture show was
not ‘respectable’ and the sort who wrote letters to the press about the ‘immoral’
practice of “mixed bathing.” 244
Movie aficionados such as Dr Maloney, argued that movie-making should be
celebrated because it had enormous potential as an uplifting educative tool for the
community. 245 He maintained that ‘movies’ could display to audiences the scenery
and “manufactures” 246 of many lands as well as demonstrate to them the devastating
effect of war on life and property: 247
Patrons…have…learnt more of history, geography and science, more of the arts and mysteries
of trade and manufacture, more of the manners and customs of other peoples, more of the
world in which they live, than they have learned from books and all other sources of
information. 248
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Senator Findley argued that in earlier years, the lower classes had had few
opportunities for ‘mental improvement’ or the ‘privilege’ of the sort of pleasures
“which fell to the lot of a certain favoured section of the community.” 249 One
journalist argued that the government should not deny “harmless pleasure” 250 to the
younger generation. He maintained that it was far better for them to attend pictures
than for them to “be walking the streets and hanging around hotels till all hours”.251
Mathews suggested that the Government should sponsor amusements in the country
“in order to give people in isolated portion of [the] continent an opportunity of seeing
some life instead of having their lives restricted.” 252 Similarly, Mr Page MP insisted
that the movies provided the opportunity for audiences to participate in palpable
forms of emotional release, particularly in times of personal disquiet:
When an amusing picture is shown on the screen, the theatre is filled with that sweetest sound
on earth…the rippling laughter of children. I never hear it without feeling myself a better man;
and those who think that the human heart cannot be touched by pictures have only to look
round when a sad play is being shown to see the handkerchiefs raised surreptitiously in the
darkened hall. 253

Whilst many movies were not always considered educational, some argued
that they were, nevertheless, very interesting and enjoyable. 254 Even if they were at
times ‘suggestive,’ they were according to some politicians, considered no more
‘suggestive’ than live stage shows and what was seen in every-day life. 255
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Eventually, on 21 December 1916 the Entertainments Tax Act 1916 (Cth)
gained assent and came into operation on 1 January 1917. 256 A flurry of deputations
from the entertainment industry and an huge backlash from the public concerning the
possible imposition of tax on 3d and 6d tickets,257 forced the Government to alter its
original proposal and to declare that the tax on admission tickets over 6d was to be as
follows:
•

Tickets costing more than sixpence, but not exceeding one

shilling would attract 1d tax
•

Tickets costing more than one shilling, the rate of tax was 1d

for the first shilling, and one half-penny for every sixpence or part of
sixpence by which the payment exceeded one shilling 258
This tax, although originally purported to be a war time measure, continued
to be a source of government revenue for the following 17 years until it was repealed
in 1933. 259 Over that period, the rates of tax were varied 260 and some further
exemptions and exceptions were provided. These included exemptions for
entertainments that funded the erection, maintenance or furnishing of halls for public
purposes or memorial halls for the use of returned servicemen. 261 It is interesting to
note that a similar form of tax was imposed on entertainments during Wold War II,
but again this is a topic for future research. 262
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7.4

Conclusion

Sumptuary regulation has never been limited to the regulation of appearance;
at various times it also extended to the regulation of other aspects of social life
including food, alcohol and entertainment. This chapter explores the proposed
wartime Anti-Shouting laws and the Entertainments Tax Act 1916 (Cth), both
legislative projects which, although not concerned with the regulation of appearance,
were nevertheless distinctively marked by sumptuary characteristics. Both projects
were advocated by the state in response to perceived threats of social disorder and
moral laxity, and were proposed as a particular ‘imagined social order’ during a
period of uncertainty and anxiety.
The discourse that surrounded the creation of these sumptuary projects was
discursively linked with wartime discourse concerning the notions of luxury,
morality and national duty. This chapter has illustrated that the Anti-Shouting laws
and the Entertainments Tax Act 1916 (Cth) were also disciplinary sumptuary projects
that targeted the choices made by individuals about their consumption practices.
Furthermore, the chapter also demonstrates the manner in which these projects were
intimately linked with wider concerns that government had for national well-being
during a period of social and economic crisis.
After our digression into other areas of war-time sumptuary regulation,
Chapter 8 takes us back into the realm of ‘appearential’ sumptuary regulation. In the
post-war period we begin to see, in discourses surrounding the importation of
inexpensive clothing, a discursive shift from a persistent emphasis on the
moralisation of luxury to an increasing focus on national economic well-being.
However, Chapter 8 demonstrates that this discursive shift was less apparent when
the ‘problem’ of women’s fashion was being discussed in Parliament or the press.
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8 WOMEN AND MORALISATION V MEN AND RATIONAL
PROTECTIONISM

The fickleness of that symbolical lady [Dame Fashion] has been blamed by the boot
manufacturers, milliners, clothing manufacturers and others for many of the trade
depressions that have taken place at various times.1

8.1

Purpose and structure of this chapter

As was shown in Chapter 4, 2 during the first decade following Federation
there was a preponderance of moralising rhetoric within Parliament and throughout
the press attacking women and their alleged extravagance in dress. 3 In that chapter it
was argued that this type of rhetoric took on a noticeable engagement with the
language of sumptuary regulation. Chapter 6 contends that during the war years this
type of gendered moralising rhetoric was zealously linked with a critique of luxury
and that there was a constant demand for government, already increasingly
concerned with economic waste and national ruin, to impose sumptuary regulation. 4
Whilst moralising invective was directed largely against general female extravagance
it seems that during this period the lower classes became the primary target of
government sumptuary interventionist policies.
By the early 1920s, the influx of low-priced imported apparel had increased
enormously. As a result, the sumptuary impulse became even more manifestly
apparent in the vigorous attempts by protectionists to suppress the importation of
such goods. However, by the mid-1920s, it appeared that the sumptuary focus was
beginning to shift from a moralising critique of luxury and extravagance to a

1

“The Cost of Fashion: The Brush Trade Suffers”, Gippsland Times, 3 August 1925, 6; “Dame
Fashion and Tariff Duties”, The Bathurst Times, 8 August 1925, 5.
2
See above Chapter 4.
3
See above Chapter 4.
4
See above Chapter 6.
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protectionist discourse that focused more on the well-being of the national economy.
However, this chapter and what follows will illustrate that whilst excessive
consumption of imported goods, including women’s felt hats, corsetry, hosiery and
men’s underwear, was increasingly linked with economic protectionism and national
interest, there still nevertheless remained during this time, strong threads of
sumptuary moralisation intertwined with protectionist discourse.
What becomes apparent from this chapter is that these threads of sumptuary
moralisation only remained evident in discourses associated with women and
‘fashionable apparel’. Women’s fashion persistently continued to excite general
moral condemnation and it was clear that it stimulated the sumptuary reflex to a
much greater extent than any matter concerning imported male apparel. This
disparity will become more apparent later in the chapter when we see that discourse
concerning imported men’s underwear was driven not by a desire for moral
regulation but by purely protectionist motives.
The Chapter is comprised of two parts. The first part explains how
‘fashionable’ women during the war years and in the 1920s were persistently blamed
for all manner of social and economic ills. Not only were ‘fashionable’ women
vilified for their alleged fickleness and profligacy but they were also accused of
being responsible for the destruction of many fledgling Australian industries and for
causing a dramatic increase in the cost of living. Critics linked women’s ‘obsession’
with fashion with national ruin and moral decay. During the war, concerns about
women’s fashion were indicative of broader national anxieties about the need to
protect the national economy during times of economic distress. The critique of
luxury, patriotic duty and protectionism thus became even more discursively
interwoven with moral regulation. This part will also reveal how the Tariff Board
was called upon to intervene by increasing tariffs on gendered items of apparel.
The chapter will also demonstrate that ‘fashionable women’ were not only
constantly under attack from masculinist institutions but also from prominent women
such as Ruth Beale who took it upon herself to guide women towards a parsimonious
ideal of gendered patriotism. This chapter will illustrate that, during the latter stages
of the war, the activist Ruth Beale labelled ‘fashionable women’ as unpatriotic
because they were squandering national resources on trivial and inappropriate
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fripperies. As a self-appointed female agent of protectionism and moral duty, she
sought government intervention to retard the economic effect of rapidly changing
women’s fashions. At the same time she sought to encourage Australian industries by
advocating the standardisation of female workers’ dress.
This chapter will also demonstrate that whilst post-Federation women had
been accorded new public freedoms and visibility as a waged workers and
consumers, they were excluded from public debate. They were denied the
opportunity to formally participate in masculinist decision-making processes that
were constantly denouncing women’s fashion and penalising female consumers by
initiating high prices on gendered ‘necessities’.
As a counterpoint to this form of hegemonic female marginalisation, this
chapter will describe an occasion when members of the Housewives Association
cleverly overcame their exclusion from the public domain by deploying collective
strategies to subversively challenge these same masculinist processes. These
rebellious women, who were denied the opportunity to sit on boards such as the
Tariff Board, effectively thwarted the Board’s objectionable tariff policies by
exercising the only power which a masculinist hegemonic society afforded them:
their ‘spending power’.
Although a collective of militant women may have successfully challenged
hegemonic practices on this one occasion they nevertheless continued to be mostly
excluded from the public tariff debate concerning female apparel. This chapter will
describe how the issue of female fashion was to continue to remain exclusively with
the male members of the Tariff Board.
The second part of the chapter deals with the prohibitive protectionist
measures associated with the importation of workingmen’s underwear into Australia
in the 1920s. The chapter will reveal that these measures were prompted by pure
‘unashamedly’ rational economic motives rather than those moral anxieties that
usually triggered sumptuary measures towards women’s fashion apparel and
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‘luxuries’. 5 This part begins with an examination of the prohibitive effect of those
tariff duties imposed on men’s underwear during the period from 1921 until 1926.
During this period, local underwear manufacturers persistently demanded that
government increase tariffs on imported men’s underwear. Some even demanded that
the male consumers be forced to relinquish their right to wear what they chose and be
compelled by government to support local industries by wearing only Australianmade underwear. Furthermore, it will describe the role the Tariff Board played, as
the ‘institutional voice of protectionism’, in restricting the choices of working class
consumers. This part also looks at the xenophobic anxieties that prompted Australian
manufacturers to demand that Australian workers be forced to eschew the more
practical and inexpensive imported cotton underwear in favour of the more costly
Australian-made woollen underwear. Finally, this part examines how the working
man was afforded no opportunity to voice his concerns about an impost that had such
a drastic impact on his consumer choices.

8.2

Women’s Fashion excites moral condemnation

8.2.1 Women attack fashion

She produced [a standard costume]. It was suitable for women of all ages, and could easily
conform to the passing fashions by slight alterations to cuffs and collars.6

Throughout the early decades after Federation, there a noticeable and
persistent 7 discursive emphasis within media reports and in Parliamentary debates

5

See above Chapters 4 and 6.
“Notes and Notices”, The Australasian, 13 July 1918, 33.
7
It interesting that some articles denigrating women and fashion were regularly recycled in the press,
sometimes with great gaps of time elapsing between repetitions of the article. For instance, in 1892, an
article was published in “Women who Over Dress”, Borderwatch, 5 October 1892. The exact same
article was reprinted in Burrowa News, 7 October 1910. The article suggests that, unlike women of
average means, “rich women” never over dress. Instead “the nice and refined women, the women of
6
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on the alleged social and economic ills created by the ‘problem’ of women’s
fashion. 8 During this period, the vagaries and the apparent extravagance of fashion
apparel appeared to have disturbed sensitive moralists and ‘patriotic’ protectionists
and activists such as Ruth Beale and Ivy Brookes, in the same manner as it disturbed
the governing classes in the early sumptuary epoch. 9
In July 1918, Miss Ruth Beale, the Secretary of the Women’s National
Economy Association, which had been inaugurated just after the outbreak of the war,
pressed for all Australians to demand home products and manufacturing. 10 During
this time, Beale had close links to Ivy Brookes, who was President 11 of the Empire
Trade Defence Association, a “sister” 12 organisation, with similar social objectives,
which was established in Melbourne. 13 Both women were heavily influenced by the
protectionist dogma espoused and enforced by the male members of their families. 14
When giving evidence before the Commonwealth Inter-State Prices
Commission, Beale, defined herself as a ‘patriotic’ agent of protectionism. She
forthrightly declared her ‘patriotic’ allegiance to protectionist ideology by
demanding that the Commission prohibit the importation of feminine luxury products
such as furs, fur skins, fancy goods, perfumery and trimmed millinery. 15
Furthermore, she positioned herself as a feminine ‘traitor’ by scorning the trappings
of a fashion industry that at the time seemed so dear to the hearts of her fashion-

taste, are not the purchasers of the showy fabrics and misfit hats…A refined woman never dresses
loudly”.
8
“The Cost of Fashion: The Brush Trade Suffers”, above n 1; “Women to Women: Problems of the
Day”, The Argus, 31 March 1920, 4-5.
9
Alan Hunt, Governance of the Consuming Passions: A History of Sumptuary Law (MacMillan Press,
1996) 273.
10
“Extravagance in Female Clothing’ Prohibition of Sumptuous Gowning: Over-Dressed women
Bleed the Wounded”, Border Morning Mail and Riverina Times, 11 July 1918, 2.
11
“Empire Trade Defence Urged”, Weekly Times, 16 March 1918, 9. Ivy was elected as President of
the Empire Trade Defence Association in March 1918.
12
“Home Products to the Fore”, Sunday Times, 13 October 1918, 13. Beale visited and addressed this
“sister body” in October 1918.
13
“Empire Trade Defence Urged”, above n 11.
14
Both Beale and Brookes had male family members who were staunch Protectionists.
15
“Extravagance in Female Clothing’ Prohibition of Sumptuous Gowning: Over-Dressed women
Bleed the Wounded”, above n 10.
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conscious sisters; the mannequin parades, special advertising and window dressing. 16
It is not surprising that Mr Piddington, the Chairman of the Commission, agreed with
Miss Beale. However, in his response he was not confident that this form of
gendered intervention would be successful: “[m]y own opinion is that this is an
abominable absurdity to operate in war times, but can you stop it?” 17
Beale, concerned about need for severe wartime rationing, used the
Commission hearing as a public forum to denounce fashionable women because of
their hedonistic attachment to consumerism, as being unpatriotic. In her call for
government intervention towards women’s extravagant spending habits, she
maligned over-dressed women for “bleeding the wounded”. 18 Whilst Piddington,
again concurred with her, but he appeared to be more realistic about the curtailment
of these activities: 19 “I am with you, but, to put it bluntly, are these matters which
could be stopped by government exacting penalties?” 20
Undaunted, she then proceeded to tread on “tenderer corns” 21 by advocating
the standardisation of women’s clothing. 22 Her recommendation that standard
uniforms be adopted in certain industries in which women were employed appeared
to be underpinned her preoccupations with protectionism, the moralisation of luxury
and by traces of sumptuary hieratic impulse. 23 In terms of sumptuary intervention, it
has been argued that uniforms were often used as instruments of social control
imposed on working class employees. 24 Whilst Beale’s uniforms might signify
uniformity, patriotism and frugality, they were also antithetical to women’s freedom
of self-expression and independence: “[t]o-day everybody is free to dress and live
16
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Chicago Press, 2001) 94.
17

267

according to personal taste so far as the purse permits.” 25 For working class women,
uniforms would act as a symbol of discipline, subjection and stereotypical
conservatism. It is notable that Beale’s proposed form of collective regulation of
identity exhibited similarities with the normative and codified regimen that we see in
Chapter 5 when Higgins J and other arbitration judges prescribed ‘appropriate dress’
for working class women.
By trying to enforce explicit dress codes for female factory and shop workers,
Beale sought to reaffirm an earlier social order that had been marked by clear class
distinctions. Before the war, many of these female factory workers would probably
have been employed as domestic servants. They would have been traditionally
clothed in ‘appropriate’ uniforms that submerged ‘the personal’ and identified them
as submissive and as part of a codified hierarchical order. Without a uniform, the
same women and their ‘status’ were no longer so easily identifiable and this caused
anxiety for some people. As one critic later suggested that: “[i]t is becoming more
and more difficult every day to tell to what station in life a woman belongs by the
clothes she wears or by the way she wears them.” 26
Beale also suggested to the Commission that wholesale and retail
standardisation should cover the nature of the fabric, colour and pattern of clothing. 27
Beale claimed that standard locally-made fabrics such as serge, worsted and tweed be
produced locally and sold with a government-fixed price. 28 She insisted that this
Australian-made fabric would be cheaper by reason of its increased output, and
claimed that its reduced cost would then enable women to clothe themselves and
their children more “suitably and economically”. 29
Beale declared that her motives for proposing this intrusive form of
prescriptive gendered intervention were based on her patriotic desire to “keep the
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industrial fires burning” 30 for returned soldiers. She insisted that she wanted to
eliminate the prejudice against local textiles, and keep prices down by compelling
Parliament to fix the price of the cloth at the mills. 31 She sought to legitimise this
proposed form of sumptuary intervention by contending that standardisation of dress
had been successfully adopted as a wartime measure in England, and also in
America, where Lady Duff-Gordon was supposedly responsible for the successful
introduction of a form of standardised female costume. 32 Beale was severely
censured by some critics for her proposal. 33 In endeavouring to fend off criticism
about the harshness of this form of state intervention, she argued that, whilst the
wearing of the standard costume would disclose that the wearer was practising
economy, the costume itself was in no sense a uniform. 34
It is noteworthy that Commissioner Piddington remained loath to endorse an
extreme form of social intervention that would require compulsory state action to
force women to adopt standard uniforms. 35 He contended that even under the War
Precautions Act, he could hardly see the Federal Government “laying down”
the State Governments compel their employees to wear certain uniforms.

30

36
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8.2.2 Women attack tariffs on ‘necessities’

These kinds of things, gloves, stockings, boots and shoes etc., the prices asked and paid are
enormous, but to a large number of the community they are almost prohibitive. Goodness
only knows how mothers of large families feed and clothe their offspring these times. 38

After the war, many women became increasingly concerned about the high
cost of living and the prohibitive tariffs on imported ‘necessary’ items such as food
and clothing. 39 Numerous women’s associations held meetings that specifically
addressed such issues. Their members were particularly concerned that women
continued to be omitted from tariff decision-making processes, 40 and they frequently
urged the government to appoint women to those boards that decided issues relating
to the family budget. 41
Whilst women were denied the right to formally participate in institutional
decision-making processes, they were, nevertheless able to exercise some level of
collective influence over government policy. In 1919-20, there transpired an
extraordinary instance of female collective revolt against a tariff regime that was
forcing them to endure increased prices on imported apparel occurred. 42 What was
even more notable was that this example of gendered insurgency specifically targeted
a masculininst taxing decision-making process from which they were persistently
excluded. 43
In 1919, the Melbourne branch of the Housewives’ Association met to
discuss possible solutions to current problems concerning “the prevailing high prices
for necessary commodities.” 44 Members argued that women should have to pay no
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more than “reasonable prices” 45 for mere ‘necessities’ such as gloves and stockings,
particularly at a time when the cost of living was so much higher than it had been six
years previously. 46 The Association freely acknowledged that luxuries were a
different matter, and that people should expect to pay much more for them. 47
The members resolved, as part their proposed campaign against profiteering
and the high cost of living, to do without articles of attire that were not “absolutely
indispensable” 48 to them. The Association, as a collective, had had some measure of
success with previous boycott campaigns in relation to the local price of potatoes 49
and price of shoes. 50 The boycott on high-priced shoes, for instance, was effectively
introduced when some parents in various districts in Melbourne sent their children to
school barefooted.

51

The aim of such a boycott was to force down prices on essential

food and clothing:
They simply boycott the article; the members leaving it severely alone and either do without it,
or in the cases of resourceful women (and what woman has not this quality who thinks at all?)
makes a substitute do for the time being. 52

In October 1919, the Association decided that the first line of attack was
against the wearing of gloves. 53 At the time, women’s gloves were invested with

45

“General Items”, above n 38.
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
48
“Influence of Fair Sex on Problems of the Day”, above n 44.
49
It seems that the Housewives Association had adopted a successful policy advocated by the
Housewives League in the Unites States of America. See “General Items”, above n 38. The boycott
against the price of potatoes was very effective. The members saw that “the word was passed round”
and they took off potatoes from the daily “bill of fare”. Pumpkins and Marrows were substituted. (See
“Producers, Consumers, and Prices”, Northern Star, 20 January 1920, 4.) Not only was there a big
drop from five pence per pound to twopence per pound for old potatoes and to threepence per pound
for new potatoes, but the change happened within a short space of time.
50
“Women to go Gloveless”, The Register, 6 December 1919, 8. In October, “an indignation meeting”
of the Housewives Association was held at the Sydney Town Hall in protest against the wholesale
exportation of eggs and other foodstuffs. The mover of the resolution called upon every women to
revolt by declaring not to bear children until “the men makes this country a safe place to live in by
seeing they were provided with sufficient supplies of nourishing food at a reasonable price”. See
“Here, There, and Everywhere”, Albury Banner and Wodonga Express, 15 October 1920, 19. At this
time, there were other feminine collective campaigns targeting the price of sugar and other essential
commodities.
51
“Women to go Gloveless”, above n 50.
52
“General Items”, above n 38.
46

271

cultural meaning. They were part of a socially approved form of femininity and
social custom. They were an ‘essential’ accoutrement for respectable and genteel
women, and were regarded as a cultural signifier that communicated with other
women as a part of an idealised form of fashion. An ‘un-gloved’ woman was
considered by other women to be ‘unladylike’ and in some cases, risqué.
The Association formally adopted a recommendation that all women should
wear gloves “as little as possible” 54 in an attempt to force down the high price of
imported gloves. 55 Its members were determined to challenge tariff policies that
targeted what was an ‘essential’ part of feminine dress. They were willing to forgo a
normative item of cultural feminine apparel to publicly contest the inequity of a tariff
regime that targeted women’s clothing. 56 Gloves, as a gendered item of dress thus
became invested with political significance and gestured towards women’s desire to
intrude into the male-dominated public arena. This form of protest was not only a
sign of defiance but it acted in symbolic opposition to what these women considered
to be oppressive forms of institutional power.
In pursuing their ‘fight’ against high prices, the members’ main concern was
whether they would find sufficient numbers to make their action effective. 57 To
forego the wearing of gloves was not an easy task for many middle class women,
especially as it was generally acknowledged that “all women loved good gloves and
boots.” 58 Yet, it was decided that if women would sacrifice these things for three
months, then the country would see the level of their sincerity that underpinned their
campaign to lower prices. 59
There was an enormous positive response to this new form of gendered direct
action and self-regulation. 60 It was so popular that the women’s section of the Public
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Service Association joined the movement. 61 The Sydney branch of the Association
also recommended to its members that they should refuse to wear gloves until “they
came to a reasonable price.” 62 It was reported that ten thousand Sydney women
resolved to discontinue wearing gloves until the prices came down from “sky-high
level”. 63 The boycott proved to be very successful, and was only lifted in January
1921 after the prices of gloves had dropped considerably. 64 As a result of their
actions, the Housewives’ Association was considered by some to be a guiding light
in the fight against profiteering and the high cost of living: 65 “[t]he Housewives’
Association had struck one of the most serious blows at the high cost of living yet
struck in Australia.” 66
However, this gendered boycott encountered criticism from some merchants
who were concerned that the boycott could adversely affect their own vested
interests. 67 For instance, one “leading Adelaide merchant” 68 suggested that only
“fanatics” 69 would support the boycott of gloves, which he contended were
“absolutely essential to the appearance of a well-dressed lady”. 70Another critic
suggested that to carry out this boycott successfully, women would need “backbone
and determination.” 71 He challenged their tenacity and authority by asking what form
of retribution could be applied against those “fair ladies” 72 who sought to ignore the
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directive or “scab” 73 on their sisters. 74 The Association had a ready response: those
women who were disloyal would be “shamed” 75 into doing their duty. 76
Following the Association’s successful boycott on the price of gloves, the
Chairwoman of the Housewives’ Association moved a motion in October 1920
seeking that the Association demand that women be appointed to all boards and
commissions that deal with questions affecting the interests of women and
children. 77 However, her demand was dismissed by authorities who considered
women as economically untrustworthy. 78 Moreover, they continued to accuse every
woman of profligacy and spending “every penny she [could] wring from her
unfortunate spouse” on dress. 79

8.2.3 The move to formal regulation: the Tariff Board and fashion

Crises, strikes, and riots may ruin their thousands, but Dame Fashion ruins her tens of
thousands! 80

In the post-war period, Australian manufacturers continually sought increased
protection against the barrage of imported fashion clothing, which was designed and
produced in Europe and America. 81 Manufacturers were anxious that they could not
compete with overseas manufacturers, either in price or in the variety of fabric and
design, unless they could be provided with a higher enough tariff that would
guarantee the security of the Australian market. 82
Australian manufacturers were also concerned about the apparent parochial
prejudice against locally manufactured goods. This prejudice was to some extent
73
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countered by the proliferation of jingoistic ‘buy Australian-made’ campaigns and
propaganda slogans established during and after the war. 83 Many of these campaigns
and associated propaganda, although often instigated by masculinist interests, were
steered by women’s associations and auxiliaries, and were often led by eminent
social advocates and civil luminaries such as Ruth Beale and Ivy Brookes. 84
It was a time when wages in Australia were reasonably high. 85 Some sections
of society were not only accused of spending “lavishly and ostentatiously” 86 but also
blamed for aggravating “the trouble of poorer people”. 87 It was often argued that
‘thoughtless’ people were making the hardships of those more hard pressed seem
“bitterer” 88 by contrast, by creating a demand for unnecessary and expensive
clothing. 89 Of course, throughout the 1920s, women continued to be the especial
target for this form of public disparagement and gendered moralising discourse: 90
“[t]here was a tendency to brand as luxuries, and place high duties on, things worn
by women and children.” 91 For instance, in an article in the Advocate in August
1924, the whole gambit of sumptuary ‘sins’ were laid against contemporary women
for their “fantastic extravagance …over dress.” 92 The author used the text as a
vehicle to disparage all female consumers; they were branded as shallow, weak, silly,
vain, capricious, fickle, spendthrift, insincere, flighty, pitiful, vulgar, contemptuous,
wasteful and reckless. 93 The subtext underpinning this gendered invective implied
that women’s consumption habits were a social disease that was weakening society
and was in need of intervention or cure: 94
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Fashion dictates; women follow, with no reason apparent to ordinary observers. It matters
nothing how hideous the apparel or head-dress may be, how unsuited to slim and stout, small
and large women - if that ‘deformed thief fashion’ dictated, his decrees will be obeyed. 95

In contrast, men in the article were prized for their ‘masculine’ virtues. They
were portrayed as conservative, rational, careful and measured in their choice of
clothing. 96 The author characterised men as being almost ‘without sin’, and thus
maintained the traditional paradigm of men being positioned as socially and
culturally superior to women: 97
Fashions still change in the garments of men, but with so mild an ebb and flow that male vanity
may be said to have ceased, except in that interesting freak the dude. This fact makes a striking
contrast to the development of feminine absorption in personal vanity. 98

During the 1920s, the fashion/luxury debate continued to excite moral
censure and to stimulate the sumptuary impulse especially amongst thrift
campaigners and those concerned with national waste and extravagance. Working
class female consumers were regularly targeted for sumptuary intervention. They
were condemned and ridiculed for over-dressing and for wasting both their
husbands’ and the nation’s resources by indulging in extravagant ‘fashion apparel’. 99
But woman has ears only for Fashion’s latest edict. With admirable courage, fat women make
themselves look fatter and thin women thinner. So long as it is new and fashionable they are
satisfied. Tomorrow it will be discarded as old and they will be eagerly awaiting the ephemeral
new. 100

These women were also derided for being ‘unpatriotic’ because they
eschewed the limited range of Australian-made ‘conservative’ woollen serges and
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tweeds promoted by Beale, in favour of fashionable imported weaves and fabrics that
included gabardines, marocain 101 and those with fancy checks and stripes. 102
In the 1925 and 1927 Tariff Board apparel hearings, the Board received
complaints about the capriciousness of Australian women and the manner they were
‘ruining’ Australian industries. 103 Women were blamed for the general depression
“throughout every branch” 104 of the women’s clothing trade, chiefly because they
were not in the habit of favouring Australian-made clothing. 105 It was alleged that the
future of industries, such as the Australian woollen apparel industry, was in a
precarious position because fickle fashion-conscious women were demanding
artificial silks and other ‘chic’ fabrics rather than choosing the less fashionable
woollen apparel that was currently being produced by Australian manufacturers: 106
At her will the clash of machines is stilled, kings of commerce bemoan a debit balance, new
factories rise in brick and concrete, tariff walls are capped with a few more bricks, fortunes are
made and lost on the Stock Exchange. And all because of a woman’s clothes. 107

Many of the applicants seeking increased protection insisted that the
depression in the industry was due to changes in women’s fashion.

108

They pleaded

that increased level of tariff protection was necessary to protect their industries from
the importation of cheap clothing. 109 They insisted that many Australian factories
had closed their doors, and workers were put off, because they could not compete
with the enormous influx of imported apparel from Japan, England and USA. 110
Often their complaints were couched in the same kind of xenophobic and alarmist
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rhetoric that sumptuary law proponents had adopted in proclaiming their grievances
about foreign imports in the early modern period:
So far as Japanese goods are concerned, we have nothing to fear from them in Australia. They
had their chance during the war, and I defy any honourable member to prove to my satisfaction
that anything good ever came from Japan. Their productions are the cheapest and the shoddiest
that have ever come into this country.

111

One witness explained to the Tariff Board in the 1925 Apparel Hearings that,
“owing to the trend of fashion,” 112 Australian women were currently wearing “25 per
cent less clothing” 113 than they had worn three or four years previously, due
principally to simplicity in fashions . 114 This meant that women were wearing
garments made from only three to four yards of material compared with the six or
seven yards used for women’s costumes in 1921. 115 This comment suggests that
current women’s fashions were not only affecting the profits of manufacturers but
were also to be considered to be rather scandalous and immoral. This witness
suggested that “[t]hat since Eve appeared in Eden never have civilised women been
more scantily dressed.” 116 The same witness predicted that this fashion trend would
continue to have an ongoing adverse effect on the profits of Australian
manufacturers. 117 Tariff Board member, Herbert Brookes, was concerned about this
situation and sought qualification from the witness: “[t]here must be limit to that of
course?” 118 he asked. The witness responded: “[o]ut of decency’s sake probably
there is”. 119 In this exchange, both men intimate that women were pushing the
boundaries of traditional morality towards future social and cultural degeneration.
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During the same period as the Apparel hearings were conducted, Mr Pratten,
the Minister of Trade and Customs, reprimanded “many thoughtless women” 120 for
the large importations of apparel, and reproached them for never inquiring into the
country of origin of their purchases. 121 Later, Mrs Eleanor Glencross, 122 in an
exchange with Pratten, again called for the government to appoint a woman to the
Tariff Board, claiming that “the mere man” 123 had given up in despair attempting to
estimate what it cost a woman to dress. 124 Pratten sniped that he thought that “the
persons most concerned [with the cost of women’s dress] are the husbands, who earn
the money for the women to spend.” 125
Mrs Glenross advised Pratten that, when the Board considered articles of
women’s apparel and domestic use, a women’s advice was imperative. 126 When
Pratten challenged her to name some articles that called for a women’s expert advice,
she immediately responded by saying “corsets.”

127

She reminded him that when the

Board had considered the tariff on imported corsets, it had to obtain its information
by “attending a display of mannequins wearing them”. 128
Pratten indicated that he was rather inclined to believe that if women wanted
to “do their share of work in connection with the tariff” 129 they might start by buying
Australian-made goods.

130

He even sought to pit woman against woman when he

counselled the Victorian Housewives’ Association to educate their “denser sisters”131
into buying Australian–made goods. 132 Similarly, he suggested that women could be
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as effective as any tariff, if they “thought in making their purchases to keep work in
Australia and encourage Australian goods.” 133

8.2.4 The continuing spectre of moral regulation

Some of the worst evils now confronting civilised nations may be laid at the door of the
feminine craze for indecent dress. 134

As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the spectre of moral regulation
continued during the 1920s to hover around discourse regarding women who
‘followed’

fashion

trends.

“Moralists

and

ecclesiastical

authorities”, 135

protectionists, the media and women’s organisations regularly called upon the state,
and women themselves to initiate some form of corrective action. 136 In the media,
there were frequent pleas for the return of “old-time propriety” 137 in women’s mode
of life and conduct. 138 Women were regularly counselled to stop “gadding” 139 about
and keeping late hours. 140 Women were instructed to consider the nation’s interests
and forego their fashionable attire, their artificial silk and cretonne costumes, in
favour of the plainer and more serviceable Australian woollen garment. 141
It was even suggested that the Parliament should completely prohibit the
wearing of all imported apparel, and to force Australians to wear only Australianmade goods. 142 However, this particular prohibitive sumptuary proposal was rejected
by Pratten on the basis that such a proposal would be too difficult to introduce
because it would need the acquiescence of all State Parliaments. 143 Women were
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constantly being reminded in newspaper articles and parliamentary debates of the
privations experienced in the war; the need for post war-restraint and for
‘consideration for others’: 144
The spenders must restrain their desire to spend, must resist the temptation offered by beautiful
things in the shops and over-full purses. No woman who has a sympathetic nature or an
understanding mind could appear extravagantly dressed or indulge in expensive amusements in
these times. 145

It was not just male-dominated institutions that called for women to be more
circumspect in their spending on imported fashion clothing. Women sought to
closely juxtapose women’s dress and morality. For instance, the women’s section of
the Victorian Farmer’s Union stirred the sumptuary instinct when it declared that
morality demanded “a stricter supervision over women’s dress”. 146 However, whilst
modern ‘fashionable’ women were condemned by the clergy, the media and others as
immoderate, immodest and immoral because of their short or slashed skirts, barearms, low necklines, makeup and silk stockings, 147 some changes in women’s
fashion actually had a positive effect on the economy by stimulating the creation and
growth of new industries. 148 For example, the wearing of shorter skirts was openly
accredited for the boom in Australian sales of domestically produced coloured and
‘better class’ hosiery: 149
The fashion of a short skirt has been a blessing to the stocking dealers who have turned out
such leg wrappings in all the tints of the rainbow, from sun-burst vermillion to moonshine opal
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… hosiers have run to riotous designs, such as clocks and lace insects, and have made some
select cobwebby stockings of a gun-metal chiffon that is a sartorial sonata. 150

Whilst many condemned women for causing society’s ills in the 1920s, they
overlooked the fact that the unexpected high level of revenue raised from indirect
taxation on imported fashion goods was not only welcomed by the Government but it
ensured that the Government did not have to rely on direct taxation to pay for the
costs of government. 151 Whilst customs revenues had increased “very materially”152
from £22 597 000 to nearly £31 832 000 in 1926-27, direct taxation, in comparison,
had shown only a slight increase during the same period. 153

8.2.5 Women and the cost of living

Women do not buy for quality: they buy for the sake of fashion, which means higher
prices. 154

Fashionable women were blamed for increased living costs. It was often
suggested by the media, various Boards of Trade and community organisations, that
there was an undesirable link between the change in women’s fashion and the
increasing cost of living. 155 For instance, in October 1926, Mr W N Gillies, the
Chairman of a Board of Trade Clothing Inquiry, maintained that the “rapid change in
fashion” 156 was one of the factors responsible for the high cost of living. 157 The
Board heard evidence from a number of witnesses about the phenomenon of rapidly
changing fashion. They generally made the observation that fashion seemed to be
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changing weekly and that ‘fashion apparel’ was becoming more extravagant every
year. 158 Furthermore, it was contended by some witnesses that the general public
could not be protected financially against these sudden changes or ‘the tyranny of
fashion’. 159
As usual, women were thought to be beguiled and blinded by fashion, and
were targeted for sumptuary intervention because of their purported profligacy and
folly: 160 “[t]he [female] consumer is becoming more extravagant every year. Some of
the expensive flimsy goods did not wear so well as some of the cheaper goods.” 161
Although women were considered to be largely responsible for the rise in the
importation of luxuries and the resultant high prices for female apparel, patriarchal
authorities nevertheless continued to deny them the right to participate in the public
debate about the level of duty which should be imposed upon their own clothing.162
Instead, women were counselled not to “rush so madly” 163 into fashion and to
manage and contrive their budgets as “cheerfully as possible”. 164 They were warned
that unless they were compliant in their own self-governance, the alternative might
be that they would be subjected to a strict sumptuary regime; they might even be
compelled to wear uniforms. 165
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8.2.6 An exemplar: Bobs and Hats

An industry is affected by a change in fashion-in fact not only one but several.166

When the fashionable ‘shingle’ and ‘bob’ were introduced into Australia in
early 1925, the effect on merchants “was immediate.” 167 As Australian women
quickly began to adopt new hair styles, importers and local manufacturers of hair
brushes, hairpins and hatpins became increasingly fearful that these radical new hair
fashions would adversely impact on their businesses. 168 By the end of 1925, sales of
split horn and whalebone brushes was “practically nil.” 169 Furthermore, there was no
indication that women were switching over to other types of brushes, 170 particularly
as these new hair styles took less time to maintain and required fewer, if any,
hairpins and hatpins: 171 “[s]hingled heads knocked out the hairpin industry, on which
millions of pounds had been spent for patents and plants.” 172
The level of anxiety amongst merchants was extraordinary, and it prompted a
hasty call for Government intervention. 173 By July 1925, the Tariff Board was
hearing evidence in an application for increased duty on imported hair brushes. 174 Mr
Levy, who opposed the application, denied that importers were responsible for any
slump which might have taken place in the Australian manufacture of brushes. 175
Instead, he blamed the latest fashion in ladies’ hair dressing. 176 Similarly, a
representative of one English firm of brush makers suggested that the sales of
hairbrushes had fallen off greatly “since shingled hair had become popular”. 177 In
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contrast, Mr Anderson, an Australian brush manufacturer, insisted that the “bobbedhair argument” 178 had no real significance because the demand for brushes was still
sufficient to keep Australian factories employed if there were not excessive
importation of brushes from overseas. 179
In 1927, Mr Edward Holland raised, as a justification for increased tariffs on
imported hair brushes, the issue of women’s health before the Tariff Board. 180 He
advised the Board that the new trends in hair fashion had rendered the use of the
hairbrush almost obsolete. 181 Furthermore, he argued, that women’s heads were
much less healthy because they did not brush their short hair “anything like the
extent that was necessary when it was long”. 182 He claimed that women were instead
wasting an average of 2/- on a ‘shingle’ at hairdressing salons every three weeks. 183
His evidence gave the impression that the state of women’s health was being ruined
because of their ‘sin of pride’ and intimated that this sin was in need of a cure.
The Chairman of the Board, Mr Hall, had similar concerns about the effect on
women’s health and paternalistically reminded women that their hair ‘required
brushing’. His comments invoked the metaphor of disease when he suggested that
the decline in the use of hairbrushes could be the harbinger of ruin and decline. Hall
warned women that if this national ‘contagious’ ‘malady’ continued, they would
become “bald like men”. 184 Others suggested that the shingle was partly responsible
for the formation in women of “solar ray blemishes” 185 and “actual pre-cancerous
conditions”. 186 It is obvious in the 1920s, just as in other eras, that the sumptuary
impulse was quickly stimulated whenever the ‘problem’ of women’s fashion was
debated.

178

“The Cost of Fashion: The Brush Trade Suffers”, above n 1.
Ibid.
180
“Bobbed Hair Evils: Heads Much Less Healthy”, above n 167.
181
Ibid.
182
Ibid.
183
Ibid.
184
Ibid.
185
“Untitled”, Sunday Times, 23 June 1929, 6.
186
Ibid.
179

285

Whilst women’s hair fashions had an enormous negative impact on the brush
industry, it had an even bigger sway on the sale of imported women’s hats, artificial
flowers and millinery ornaments. 187 In 1920/21, the Greene Tariff had increased
protection for Australian manufacturers of hats, millinery hat ornaments, flowers and
hairnets. 188 However, it proved ineffective in stemming the volume of imported
millinery that continued to pour into Australia during the 1920s. 189 During the 1927
Tariff Board inquiry into the importation of felt hats, it was contended that the
increased volume of trade of imported women’s felt hats was directly “susceptible to
changes in fashions,” 190 and particularly to the ‘hair-shingling’ fashion that
Australian women had adopted in the mid-1920s: 191
The ladies of Australia, for some reason, probably because of the fashion of shingled hair, went
into in for close fitting felt hats in conformity with the straight lines of their costumes. 192
Her cloche hat sits neatly on a cool, tidy, and hairpin-less shingled head. 193

Between 1922 and 1927, the rise of imported felt hats was phenomenal and
was, according to Frederick Millin of the Retail Traders Association of New South
Wales, directly related to the ‘dictates of fashion’.

194

In 1922, 1950 dozen wool felt

hats were imported, with a value of £6 166. By 1927, 74 002 dozen hats, valued at
£164 635 arrived in Australia. 195 At the time, Australian hat manufacturers were
unable to supply the type of hats that were demanded by Australian women. 196
Women were looking for variety, quality and a greater selection of colours. 197 Most
of the hats popular with Australian women were designed and manufactured in Italy
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and France. 198 From 1925, Italy’s hat trade with Australia had increased by 17 per
cent and the trade with France had increased by 92 per cent. 199 Australian hats were
regarded by women and merchants as inferior to the imported brands. 200 It was said
that the reason Australian manufacturers were unable to compete with the overseas
market, was because Australian manufacturers were “most unenterprising” 201 and
“lacked designing ability”. 202
In the early 1920s, there was growing alarm about the increased importation
of winter and summer headwear from Europe, South America and Asia, as well as
the ostensible prejudice against the locally made article. 203 In 1925, it was predicted
that the importation of felt hats for winter wear and Javanese and imitation Bankok
(sic) “hoods” 204 for summer wear, would cause a “great deal of unemployment”205 in
the Australian hat and millinery trades. 206 Not only was the extent of importations
criticised, but the processes, materials and producers were also derided. 207 For
instance, it was reported that the “hoods” were made from Bankok (sic) straw, tree
shavings, plaited grass and flax and were woven “by mere children” 208 in a
“mysterious water-weaving process”. 209 These cheap hoods arrived in bales, “soft
and shapeless,” 210 from Northern Italy, South America, Java and Japan. 211 The only
work remaining for Australian machinists and milliners was to block and trim the
hats. 212
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In 1925, the Tariff Board heard evidence about the languishing state of the
Australian women’s hat industry. 213 Those in favour of increased protection for the
Australian hat trade argued that Australian manufacturers could not compete with
overseas industries, where wages and conditions were far below those in Australia. 214
It was alleged that employees of foreign competitors did not work under an award,
and that overseas factories used cheap female labour to a greater extent than in
Australia. 215 Furthermore, applicants seeking increased duty claimed that Australian
manufacturers had invested £1 000 000 in the industry and this investment was at
dire risk because of the large extent of imported women’s hats. 216 Mr G A Carter,
secretary of the Amalgamated Clothing and Allied Trades Union, censured the Tariff
Board for its lack of intervention and suggested that it was “probably asleep” 217
when allowing such importations. 218 He argued that it was the Board’s duty to make
a public statement on the matter before “hundreds of hands were put off”.

219

Unfortunately for the Victorian and New South Wales felt hat
manufacturers’, their application for increased duties on wool and fur and felt hats
failed. 220 The Board’s disinclination to provide further industry assistance was due to
a large extent to the fact that it had become increasingly critical of, and less
compelled to strictly adhere to the ‘settled policy of protectionism’. Manufacturers
could no longer expect the Board to routinely rubber stamp their applications for
increased protection. 221 The Board began to appear more objective in its stance and
more critical of those industries seeking protection:
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It meant that applicants for tariff assistance have had to do more than merely ask for
protection. They have had to present some sort of reasonable case and to bring definite
evidence before the Board.222

The Board even began to call for balance sheets and other evidence of
efficient manufacturing processes. 223 Moreover, as the Board’s hearings were now
open to the public, and closely scrutinised by the press and critics of protectionism, it
seemed that the members were more clearly concerned with the appearance of
transparency and objectivity in its processes and determinations: 224
The public ventilation of the proceeding was highly educational to the taxpayers, and
has been largely influential in fomenting the present deep and wide popular
resentment and distrust with our ‘Settled Policy’. 225

By 1925-26, the Board appeared to be more reluctant to participate in
protectionist intervention, particularly in cases where it considered that an increase in
tariff was unwarranted or undeserved. 226 The Board became increasingly focused on
the efficacy of a protectionist policy that seemed to foster unproductivity and
inefficiencies. For instance, in the felt hat hearings, the Board decided that it could
not recommend an increase in duty because the current duty was “sufficiently
high,” 227 and that the trade in both States was in need of reorganisation to cure the
“excessive” 228 internal competition or infighting, which the Board considered was
“responsible for so many of the factories being unable to get sufficient trade to keep
them busy”. 229 The Board was of the opinion that the locally made hats had not
reached the standard of the best imported hats. 230 The Board also recommended that
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the quality and price of locally-made hats could be brought “before the notice of
Australian users” more prominently, 231 if the industry adopted “better selling
methods”, 232 regulated output, increased efficiency and promoted their products
through an “intensive advertising campaign”.

233

The government was displeased

with the Board’s refusal to increase protection for hat manufacturers, and its apparent
‘loss of faith’ in its ‘settled policy’ of protectionism. 234 However, after some short
delay, the Minister of Trade and Customs eventually tabled the Board’s Report and
its recommendations were adopted by Parliament. 235
During the 1927 felt hat inquiry, the Board was provided with further
evidence concerning the Australian felt hat industry’s struggle to compete with the
“hurtful” 236 competition from British and Italian Borsalino hats. 237 The Board was
warned that the industry seemed incapable of functioning efficiently, as it was unable
to coordinate the various opposing interests of nine mills that were, at the time, being
merged into 2 combines. 238 Moreover, each factory, “pitted against one another”, 239
was displeased with the mergers. 240 The Board declined to provide any further
assistance to the industry as it considered that an extra duty on imported hats would
not be in the interests of the public. 241 Furthermore, the Board declared that
manufacturers’ claims regarding the severe overseas competition had not been
substantiated, and that Australian manufacturers had not made “the best efforts” 242 to
cater for, and capture, the trade from foreign made articles. 243 The Board decided that
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Australian manufacturers were generally unable to meet the demand, “either in
variety or quality,” 244 of Australian consumers. 245 The Board received some support
from the press: “[w]e do not need an increased tariff: we are spoon-fed enough at
present. We need more brains and enterprise.” 246 The Board, in its 1929 report, again
refused the request to increase duties on imported hats. The Minister, became even
more displeased with the Board’s, and declined to table its recommendations for a
number of months after they had been submitted to him. 247
Other industries associated with the hat trade were also severely affected by
changes in millinery fashions. 248 For instance, the “very peculiar” 249 artificial flower
trade was a fashion trade that was dependent entirely upon the frequent and
capricious edicts emanating from the fashion centres of Paris, London and New
York. 250 After the sober war years, Australian women had become more interested
in wearing fashion hats and had no qualm in “follow[ing] the dictates of the creators
of fashions in those centres”. 251 Those Australian importers who supplied milliners
with flowers, ornaments and trimmings for women’s hats, were especially devastated
by changes in hair fashions and promptly supported the application for an increased
tariff on imported felt hats. 252 Others considered that there was no future in this
industry and advised those importers, left with surplus and redundant stock, to
‘scrap’ their stock and move into a “more profitable occupation”. 253
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In the next part we see that the rhetoric surrounding the regulation of
imported men’s apparel in Australia during the 1920s was increasingly linked with
economic rationalism and national interest. The anxieties that triggered the
sumptuary response were not moral ones but were instead those associated with the
establishment of internal markets and the fear of ‘cheap’ overseas competition.
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8.3

Men’s Underwear: a sumptuary impulse sparked by rational
protectionism

My company is confident that if the proposed duties are granted there will be no shortage of
underwear, and the price to the consumer will not be increased.254

8.3.1 A Poor Man’s Tariff

The public should be able to buy Underwear (sic) at a low price since many working people
and their families will otherwise be forced to go without it.255

Whilst almost every other form of taxation had been reduced in Australia
after the end of the war, customs duty had steadily increased. 256 In the 1919-20
financial year, customs revenue was £21 576 559 and by the 1925-26 year it was
estimated to be about £40 000 000. 257 One journalist suggested that the prohibitive
customs duty on the “necessities of life in the humblest homes” 258 was like taking
“the shirt off a man’s back without his knowing who has taken it”. 259 He maintained
that, not only were the duties on textiles prohibitive, but they kept prices high, and
made “living difficult” 260 for the lower classes. 261
Before the war, most Australian workingmen generally wore imported
underwear made of fabric called “merino,” 262 which was also the trade name for a
poorer class of article. Traditionally known as “a working man’s article”, 263 it was an
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English-manufactured underwear line either made of pure cotton or containing up to
ten per cent wool. It attracted no duty and retailed at 2s 11d per garment.

264

These

garments were serviceable and practical for working men and for others who
favoured cotton garments. In 1925, one importer told the Tariff Board that these
‘merino’ garments were “decently smooth” 265 garments and similar to those which
he wore himself, as he was unable to wear wool next to his skin. 266 He considered
them to be “a very nice class of cheap stuff,” 267 but lamented that such garments
were no longer available because of the high tariff on their importation. “These days
are gone forever” he told the Board. 268
During the war, Australian clothing manufacturers were ‘blessed’ with little
overseas competition, and they “practically had the whole of the home market to
themselves” 269 for the higher grade lines of underwear. They also enjoyed
“exceedingly high artificial aid” 270 in the form of costly shipping overheads. 271 After
the war, the growth of tariff-assisted Australian manufacturing continued to be
“phenomenal.” 272 The cheap imported underwear then attracted a 25 per cent duty. 273
Despite the growth in locally-made garments, in 1921 Pratten maintained that it was
essential for Australia to be more economically pragmatic in the face of changing
global conditions: 274
Now the world is shaking down again … it seems to me that the time has arrived when we
should consider what out permanent policy with regard to local industries is going to be.
Notwithstanding the artificial protection during the war, the home industries of Australia are
not even yet satisfying the requirements of Australian people in many directions. Plenty of
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room exists for further development, not only in the establishment of new industries, but in the
multiplication of old ones. 275

Pratten became enthusiastically involved in activities to educate Australian
purchasers “to the merits of the goods made in their own country.” 276 As President of
the Chamber of Manufacturers of New South Wales, he inaugurated the movement
“All Australian Manufacturers Week” 277 that sought to advertise the expansion in
Australian industries “of all sorts and descriptions,” 278 and to promote the adage that
Australian made goods were the “best”. 279 His vision was for all Australian shop
windows to be full of Australian goods in the not distant future. 280
In 1921, the Minister for Trade and Customs, Mr Massy-Greene, also
attempted to control the flood of imported underwear by creating a new sub-item in
the Tariff Schedule that included woven undershirts, combinations and underpants of
wool, or those that contained wool, or consisted wholly of cotton. 281 Greene justified
this new formal classification on the basis that traders said they found it difficult to
discriminate between goods made of cotton and those made wholly of wool. 282 Mr
Lazzarini MP dismissed this pretext as “absurd”. 283 He pointed out that it was
inequitable to protect cotton goods in favour of Australian manufacturers to the same
high level as was afforded to the woollen industry. He argued that protection should
not be provided until such time that cotton underwear manufacturers were able to
obtain their raw material in Australia. 284 He insisted that there were many parts of
Australia where garments made wholly of cotton were far more comfortable than
woollens during the summer months. Furthermore, he argued that in many inland
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districts, “artisans and labourers” 285 found it absolutely necessary to wear cotton
garments. 286 Mr Gregory MP, agreed and suggested that the cotton underwear
industry should not be built up by spoon-feeding, but instead should be established
upon “a sound and solid basis.” 287
The underwear debate was so contentious that it even triggered internal
discord amongst protectionists themselves. Senator Payne, although a protectionist,
positioned himself as a champion for the working class consumer. He maintained in
1921, that the working man had no choice and was compelled to wear imported
cotton underwear because it was much lower in price than locally manufactured
‘ordinary natural wool undergarments.’ 288 He reminded his colleagues that if the
working man had no alternative but to choose clothing made in other countries other
than Great Britain, he would be severely penalised because this clothing would
attract the higher duty of 55%. 289 Payne also insisted that such duties were unfair
because they were ‘class based’, 290 and that it was “almost impossible” 291 for the
bulk of the people to clothe themselves with suitable underwear, considering the
“very high prices” 292 that were presently being charged. 293 He cited the example of
the average working man, earning £4 to £4 5s per week, who had a wife and family
to support, and who had difficulty clothing himself and his family comfortably,
especially during the winter months. 294 Payne suggested that even if the working
man wanted an all-woollen garment he would expect to pay 50 per cent more than he
would have normally paid before the war. 295 Payne recommended that much lower
tariff duties be levied upon those lines of imported cotton and light-weight woollen
285
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underwear that were currently being manufactured in Australia. 296 Whilst he
acknowledged that such ‘lower’ duties might still represent a “fairly high Tariff”,297
he considered Greene’s proposal to increase duty on imported underwear from 25%
to 40%, as more than “he could swallow”. 298
Whilst politicians such as Payne, Gregory and Lazzarini were troubled about
the impact that a prohibitive tariff would have on the working man, others appeared
more concerned about Australia’s fiscal position. For instance, the Treasurer, Sir
Joseph Cook, acutely aware that Treasury would receive “an enormous revenue”
(sic) 299 from Customs duties in 1921 on goods such as men’s underwear, contended
that Commonwealth revenue would suffer if Australia reduced its Customs duties,.300
Gregory took issue with Cook, and argued that if the duties were too high, then
consumers would not be able to buy imported goods, and Cook would then not “get
any revenue at all from that source”. 301 Gregory claimed that whilst he would do
nothing to injure Australian industries, but wanted to see “fair conditions for the
people of this country”, 302 as well as some assistance for the Motherland, who was
experiencing severe post-war economic distress. 303
Further tariff increases were demanded in 1925 and 26 by Australian
manufacturers who insisted that they were unable to compete in the face of the boost
in imported apparel. 304 Protectionists kept asking: “[h]ow are we to build [the
underwear industry] up if we do not spoon-feed or shovel feed it?” 305 Some critics
maintained that the new 1925/26 tariff was a “rich man’s tariff” 306 that victimised the
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working class even more than the 1921 tariff had done. 307 By 1926, the average
working man, who had been able to previously purchase an undershirt or a pair of
under-trousers for about 5s or 5s 6d, was “compelled,” 308 after the application of new
tariff rates on imported underwear, to pay anything from 7s 6d to 8s for each item.309
It was argued that the subsequent increased financial burden would be largely borne
by working men and their families 310 because it focused on “indispensable articles of
daily and general use.” 311 In some cases, the tariff acted as a complete prohibition on
many of the imported clothing lines purchased by working men, including cotton
underwear and cotton tweeds. 312 Parliament was told that Sydney traders had
suggested that cheap underwear was “absolutely necessary” 313 in the interests of the
health of the community. They insisted that the public should be able to buy sound
underwear at a low price 314 or otherwise, many working people and their families
would be forced to “go without these garments”. 315
Some importers suggested that if Australian workers were unable to afford
the British “commoner grades of stuffs” 316 then they would be forced to buy an even
lower grade article. 317 For instance, Sydney Neilson Rice, a representative of the
Australasian Association of British Manufacturers, warned the Tariff Board that the
workingman, unable to afford to purchase the cheaper grade of garment made in
Great Britain or the locally manufactured “better class of underwear,” 318 would be
“forced to purchase the inferior Japanese article.” 319 Rice endeavoured to convince
the Board that if the tariff were increased, it would not act as “a protective duty but a
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prohibitive duty”. 320 Whilst the threat of the Japanese market seemed to be of some
concern to the Board, it was not a sufficient ground for it to deny the application for
increased duty. 321

8.3.2 Fear about national security and sustainability

I want to see a self-sustained country with manufacturing industries which will furnish us
with a large variety of occupations capable of keeping men fit, so that they will always be in
a position to defend our country. 322

When endorsing this national protectionist project in Parliamentary debates,
Pratten and Fenton and other committed protectionists, regularly used language that
was imbued with traditional sumptuary notions of national independence and
economic caution. 323 Not only did they insist that Australia should be “self-contained
and self–supporting”, 324 by exporting heavily and importing lightly, 325 but they
frequently applied sumptuary tropes when voicing their fears about national security
and economic ruination. 326 There was also periodic anxiety about the need to build
up Australian secondary industries in order that Australians would be in a position to
“populate”, 327 “defend” 328 and “protect” 329 their country. By 1921, this anxiety about
national security and the need to encourage home industry was so palpable that it
prompted Gregory to declare that Pratten and his cohorts sought to “build a tariff
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wall around Australia akin to the Great Wall of China.” 330 He argued that whilst they
might preach peace, they in fact desired “a trade war against other countries.” 331 Mr
Killen suggested that this form of “extreme protectionism” 332 would not only be
detrimental to the Australian economy but would diminish Australia’s trade
reputation: 333
The doggedness of the barrage of ‘buy only Australian-made goods’
propaganda which was being promulgated by protectionists during the 1920s even
overburdened the common man.

334

For instance, Barney O’Mick, in a letter to the

Editor of The Argus in September 1925, vented his irritation about the dissemination
of such propaganda by manufacturers and their agents. 335 Whilst acknowledging that
everyone had the desire to be patriotic, he railed at the relentless message that one of
the “greatest evidences of patriotism” 336 was to buy in ‘a dear market’. 337 He argued
that this message was so firmly implanted in Australians that manufacturers, as
“custodians of patriotism” 338 forever sought to make the market dearer in order to
“improve the quality of our patriotism”. 339 For critics such as O’Mick, patriotism did
pay: it paid the manufacturer. 340
Others suggested that some members of the opposition, including Senator
Payne, were actively engaged in a campaign of vilification against Australian-made
goods. 341 Senator Guthrie became affronted when Senator Payne suggested that the
knitting mills which produced knitted goods, including underwear, were not properly
equipped and that they turned out goods which wore badly and had a tendency to
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shrink. 342 Guthrie attacked Payne for his loss of faith in the ‘settled’ canon of
protectionism, and for trying to “wreck” 343 the Australian woollen industry. 344
Guthrie insisted that it was “pure humbug” 345 to say that these mills were not turning
out satisfactory articles. 346 As a demonstration of his confidence in Australian-made
apparel, he assured the Chamber that he had worn Australian-made underwear for the
past four or five years and it had not shrunk. 347

8.3.3 The 1925 Tariff Board Apparel Hearings: men’s underwear becomes ‘a
hot issue’

Articles of underwear and overwear are brought before the tribunal, and subjected to a
searching inspection, with the object of ascertaining whether something inferior is not good
enough for the working class. 348

Throughout the 1925 Tariff Board Apparel Hearings, the tariff on men’s
imported underwear proved to be a significant issue. During these hearings the Board
heard an application by an Australian underwear manufacturer for an increase in duty
upon particular brands of imported workingmen’s cotton underwear. 349 The Board
was advised by various witnesses that the cheaper brands of underwear, including
“Brown Cotton”, 350 “Natural Merino” 351 and “Balbriggan,” 352 were not only popular
with workingmen because they suited their occupations, but also because they were
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“within the buying limit of working men’s income.” 353 What seems absurd about this
application was that Australian manufacturers, at the time, were neither producing,
nor had any desire to produce this lower grade and less profitable class of
underwear. 354 Payne had earlier in 1921 pointed out the injustice of such an
application. He told Parliament: “[i]t is a wrong attitude to impose a heavy Tariff on
articles which people need, and must have, and which are not produced in
Australia.” 355
If this application had proved successful then the Tariff Board would
effectively be sanctioning an increase in tariff duty, to ostensibly ‘protect’ phantom
or non-existent Australian manufacturers from overseas competition. 356 In reality, the
tariff on cheap imported men’s underwear was nothing but a purely prohibitive tariff
and it exhibited all the marks of a sumptuary impost. Whilst it would significantly
increase revenue, it would also severely affect workingmen because they would be
no longer able to afford to purchase the cheaper British lower grades of
underwear. 357
Although the Board heard ample evidence that workingmen had always
traditionally purchased cheap lines of ‘brown cotton underwear’, its members, as
‘committed Protectionists’, were determined to explore the issue of whether the
working classes should be compelled to wear Australian made woollen underwear. 358
During the hearing, Herbert Brookes asked Robert Howard Morgan, a representative
of the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce, “how essential” 359 the cheaper garments
were to the workers and whether any “loading up” 360 of duty on them would “put
such garments quite out of the range of working men’s pockets?”361 Brookes was
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also keen to ascertain if extra duties would “force the working population of
Australia” 362 to use a better class of underwear. 363
However, the evidence presented did not support Brookes’ expectation that
working men could be compelled to support the Australian underwear industry.
Rather, it confirmed that working men would not be able to afford the better
article. 364 The extra charges sought by manufacturers would heavily penalise the
workingman because he would have to “pay a higher price for the … same stuff he
uses …, or he [would] have to take cheaper articles-[and] getting a poorer quality for
the same outlay”. 365 Nevertheless, Brookes and his fellow Board members ignored
the evidence and recommended that there should be a significant increase in the tariff
on imported British cotton underwear, even though Australian underwear
manufacturers were not producing the cheaper line of underwear favoured by the
working classes. 366

8.3.4 Protection as xenophobia

The cheapest and nastiest labour one could imagine would be producing those goods, and
we would be using them whilst our own people were turned into hewers of wood and
drawers of water. 367

As already been noted in Chapter 3, the Board, by 1925, was hearing
complaints from protectionists and manufacturers who were increasingly anxious
about the increased incursion of foreign goods onto the Australian market. The 1921
Greene Tariff schedule had proved to be ineffective in allaying this anxiety. 368
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During this period, Protectionism was becoming even more aligned with the
expression of national duty and pride 369 and there was also a corresponding surge in
sumptuary protectionist rhetoric being uttered in Parliament and in the press. 370 One
protectionist politician declared:
I am a protectionist because I am Australian, and love my country, because I believe that it is
infinitely better to have one Australian working for good wages and under decent conditions
than to have ten Japanese, Chinese, Germans, Frenchmen, Americans, or Britishers (sic)
working on our behalf in their country. I believe that this is our job, and that no other country
can do it half so well as we can. 371

As noted earlier, nationalistic sentiment continued to be voiced by those who
feared that a low tariff would bring Australian workers “down to the level of cheap
labour countries”. 372 Whilst fervent protectionists abhorred the influx of all imported
goods from all sources, there were others who desired to maintain a good trade
relationship with Great Britain. 373

Whereas some strict protectionists and

manufacturers considered that trade with Great Britain was “dangerous
competition,” 374 there were, on the other hand, some merchants who insisted that
nothing but good could come from “fair and healthy” 375 competition with British
manufacturers. 376 More particularly, these merchants claimed that trade with Britain
would ensure that the standard of Australian secondary industry would maintain a
high standard of efficiency and “grade of production”. 377
Imperialists were particularly apprehensive about “cute Japanese”378
manufacturers who had undercut their Australian counterparts 379 because they were
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“shrewd” 380 enough to discover a way to “get around” 381 the prohibitive effect of the
1926 tariff on imported cotton underwear. 382 It seems that Japanese manufacturers
had found a loophole “through which they bought in piece goods knitted in tubular
form, which only had to be cut into lengths, a few stitches inserted and the finished
garment was produced.”

383

This fabric attracted much lower duty compared to the

duty on the finished imported finished article, 384 and with the expenditure of a little
labour, it could be made into underwear in Australia. 385 This novel method of
underwear

production

caused

a

drastic

effect

on

Australian

underwear

manufacturers: 386
While the textile Rome was burning, the Government fiddled away in recess … [w]e did not do
it deliberately but we allowed a loophole which permitted the makers of garments from
imported material practically to throttle the Australian industry. 387

It was even suggested that this tariff loophole 388 was the main reason why
George Bond and Co. Limited, of Sydney, the biggest hosiery and underwear
spinners and weavers in Australia, went into voluntary liquidation in 1927. 389
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These alarmists contended that, whilst some Australian underwear
manufacturers might be perturbed about competing with British imports, these
manufacturers should be even more uneasy about competing with underwear
manufactured in less ‘desirable’ low-wage countries: 390
Textiles can be produced in Japan and sold on the Australian market at a price with which
Australians cannot possibly compete. The same remark applies to articles manufactured in
China, Germany, France, Czecho-Slovakia (sic), and other European countries. We cannot
compete against those low-wage countries, nor do we desire to do so if it means that our wages
are to be reduced and our working hours increased. 391

8.3.5 No voice for the consumer

Little has been heard of one matter from which much was expected in 1921, namely the
protection of the consumer where a manufacturer was shown to be taking ‘undue advantage’
of the tariff. 392

Whilst the Board provided a forum for tariff discussions and determinations,
there was a noticeable absence in this forum of the person most affected by such
discussions and determinations: the consumer. This omission was at odds with
Hughes’ 1919 election promise, when he undertook that the Board would be
established to provide a protective tariff, “coupled with security for the
consumer”. 393 Hughes insisted that the Board would be “charged with the duty of
protecting the consumer” 394 against manufacturers who might make use of the tariff
to exact unduly high prices. 395 Yet, in its early determinations, there was no evidence
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that the Board, took the interests of the consumer into consideration when it decided
to increase the tariff on many imported items of apparel.
Mr Duncan-Hughes MP argued that “very few people ever appear to think of
the consumer.” 396 He told the House that he was surprised that some members had
not risen to “say a word for [the consumer]”. 397 “Surely he has rights as well as the
manufacturer and the primary producer”, he asked. 398 Furthermore, he argued that he
saw no compensating advantage in the future for the additional prices that the
majority of the people would have to pay for cotton goods. 399 Robert Howard
Morgan made a similar comment when giving evidence before the Tariff Board on 1
June 1925. 400 Morgan noted that no evidence had been given “on behalf of the
consumers” 401 who, he said, were the people who were principally affected by any
tariff increase. 402 He told the Board that he was disappointed that there was no
representation by retail distributors, who he believed were “nearer to the public”403
than anyone else. 404 He maintained that if evidence from distributors had been
available, it “should undoubtedly be very helpful to the Board” 405 about the effect
that such an increase would have on consumers. 406 Morgan nonchalantly explained
to the Board, that the whole of his evidence was being given solely “to help the
Board in coming to a decision over a very big question which is under inquiry”. 407
He contended that distributors, whether wholesale or retail, had “nothing to lose or
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gain” 408 by any increase in tariff duties on imported underwear, for the duties were
passed on to the consumers “at a profit”: 409
We wholesale people really do not care twopence what the duty is. It does not make any
difference to us because we merely pass it on. That is recognised in respect of both wholesale
and retail distribution. 410

Morgan contended that the only people who would be affected by the
increase in duty were those poorer consumers:
whose circumstances will not permit [them] to buy the higher quality pure wool article, and
who purchased merino-that is a garment containing less than ten per cent of wool. 411

Pratten sternly warned manufacturers during a discussion about the new tariff
schedule in the early part of 1926, that “no shrift” 412 would be given by the
Government to those industries which unnecessarily raised their prices to consumers.
However, for critics such as R C Mills, this warning was a hollow one for he
maintained that the issue of consumer protection would, as far as he was concerned,
continue to remain a “dead letter”. 413
In the 1926 Debates, the issue about the inappropriateness of woollen
underwear in tropical climates was again raised. 414 Senator Guthrie, advocated that
the Commonwealth government should force all Australians to support the
Australian woollen industry by compelling them to wear only woollen overwear and
underwear garments, regardless of the climatic conditions which they experienced. 415
Senator Payne dismissed this demand, and declared that anyone favouring this
attitude was likely to be regarded as a “real autocrat”. 416 He argued that people must
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have “light material” 417 during certain periods of the year and, in some parts of
Australia, throughout the whole year. 418
Payne, a Tasmanian, tried to impress upon his Victorian colleagues that the
climate in Queensland was very different from that of Victoria. 419 He maintained that
a man in Queensland “would not attempt to wear the heavy garments that are
required in the southern part of Australia.” 420 Furthermore, he contended that the
imposition of additional duty on underwear which was especially made for hotter
climates, would not protect any industry, and would be purely a revenue
duty. 421During the debates there was much discussion about the extra duty imposed
upon cotton singlets, which were especially made to suit residents in tropical and
subtropical regions of Australia. 422 It seems that the only reason these singlets
attracted increased duty was because they were bound round the neck with a binding
of ‘special material’ containing a little silk.423 Silk was, of course, traditionally
considered to be a luxury fabric and constantly attracted sumptuary attention.424
Payne claimed that this extra duty was an “unjust imposition” 425 as it meant that
workers were called upon to pay an additional 3s to 4s for this class of undervest. 426
Payne suggested that the addition of the silk binding gave a “nicer appearance” 427 to
the singlets, than if they had been made of cotton. 428 Moreover, he argued that it was
not the intention of Parliament to “penalize” 429 the wearers of cotton garments by
making them pay the heavier duty imposed on silk or woollen garments, “simply
because the tape on the neck of a garment contain[ed] a little silk”. 430 He maintained
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that the imposition of this additional duty did not protect any Australian industry but
was, in fact, only a revenue raiser. 431

Why therefore any increased protection is a mystery, except that some of the Victorian
companies have pleaded to the Tariff Board for more baksheesh. 432

8.4

Conclusion

By the 1920s, the quantity of various types of imported apparel had increased
enormously and the presence of sumptuary impulse was still manifestly apparent in
the vigorous attempts by protectionists to suppress the importation of such goods. At
the same time, it appeared that the sumptuary focus was shifting from a moralising
critique of luxury and extravagance to a protectionist discourse that focused on the
well-being of the national economy. However, this chapter demonstrates that whilst
excessive consumption of imported goods, including men’s underwear and women’s
felt hats, was increasingly linked with economic protectionism and national interest,
there still remained some threads of sumptuary moralisation intertwined with tariff
discourse. What is apparent in this chapter is that this form of sumptuary
moralisation was more markedly evident in discourses associated with women and
‘fashionable apparel’.
Chapter 9 considers the rise of two iconic Australian industries in the 1920s
and continues to follow the shift in the sumptuary focus from a moralising critique of
luxury to one that had an increasing emphasis on economic interests and national
well-being.
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9 A STRONG SHIFT TO A RATIONAL FORM OF PROTECTIONISM

Much money was spent by Protectionist organizations in propaganda and continual
repetition of catch cries in appeal to the public to protect local industries-whether efficient
or not-on presumably patriotic grounds. 1

9.1

Purpose and structure of this chapter

This chapter will examine the manner in which sumptuary regulation
manifested itself through prohibitive tariffs on imported hosiery and corsetry during
the war period and early 1920s. This chapter will explore how economic concerns
and national interest lay behind a more rational economic form of sumptuary
regulation that developed during this period into a conscious promotion of local
industries and an active discouragement of foreign imported goods. This new
“eruption” 2 of sumptuary regulation was one where the sumptuary ethic was focused
more on economic regulation than on moral regulation. The moralising tones that
accompanied discourse on luxury and women’s fashion were in these instance were
subsiding and were being replaced with discourses of nationalism mixed with
mercantilist preoccupations.
The chapter specifically explores the establishment of two iconic industries:
the hosiery and corsetry industries that were managed by George Bond and Frank
Burley, two ‘new-age’ businessmen, who had keenly embraced the unexpected
opportunities opened up by the war. This chapter will also demonstrate how the
government and the Tariff Board, as the “institutional voice of protectionism”, 3 were
both committed to protectionism, often to the detriment of the consumer. They
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considered that a high Tariff on imported apparel was essential to encourage and
support emerging secondary industries and maintained that strong domestic industry
underpinned the government’s plan to make Australia more independent and
prosperous. They recognised that Australian manufacturers were working under
difficult trading conditions that were peculiar to Australia, and that these conditions
placed Australian manufacturers at a disadvantage so far as competition with
imported goods was concerned.
This chapter will also expose the presumptuous demands of many prospective
manufacturers such as Burley and Bond who insisted that the government
‘guarantee’ sumptuary protection for their industries even before they commenced
production and before they had proved that they were ‘capable’ of satisfying the ever
increasing Australian demand for corsetry and hosiery respectively. It was not
surprising that an ‘avowedly protectionist’ government and a compliant Tariff Board
both readily acceded to these manufacturers’ demands for such pre-emptive
protection. They eagerly accepted submissions from these ‘heroic and courageous’
manufacturers that the newly-established hosiery and corsetry industries were
‘entitled’ to absolute protection because they were industries necessary for the
economic growth of the country. It was readily acknowledged that each venture had
the potential to be “one of the greatest of Australia’s secondary industries.” 4

4
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9.2

Early Australian Hosiery Manufacturers: demand protection

Some Australian manufacturers at present are having a ‘rough spin’ both in hosiery and in
other woollen manufactured goods because material is being dumped in at prices which … is
below what we know it has cost to manufacture in England. 5

As seen in Chapter 4, before the war, imported socks were considered a
luxury because of the prohibitive tariffs imposed upon them. 6 Whilst importations of
hosiery continued throughout the war, they fell off quite dramatically by 1917-18
because of the Trading with the Enemy Acts 1914-16 (Cth) and with problems with
transport and increasingly high tariffs. 7 During the war years, tariffs on hosiery had
become even more exorbitant than before, despite Australian hosiery factories
fulfilling only a small portion of the country’s demands for these goods. 8 Whilst
manufacturers were extending their factories and substantially benefiting “by the
abnormal conditions arising out of the war”, 9 there were still only a small number of
hosiery factories in Australia. Most of these were small concerns employing only
about five to ten persons. 10 In New South Wales, there were nine “establishments”11
manufacturing knitted goods and hosiery, and these employed only a total of 371
workers. 12 Even though consumers in New South Wales was buying up to £301 166
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worth of imported socks and stockings, its hosiery and knitted goods industry was
only paying out £16 226 in wages and £2 202 in salaries. 13

9.2.1 A new war industry

The manufacture of hosiery in Australia might well be classed as a war industry. Previously
to that it was infinitesimal. 14

Most socks and stockings worn by Australians in the pre-war period were
ready-made and came from the United Kingdom and Germany. 15 Before 1914,
Germany had developed a profitable hosiery market within Australia. 16 In 1912,
Australia imported £549 446 worth of silk, woollen and cotton socks and stockings
from the United Kingdom and £193 390 worth of similar hosiery from Germany. 17 In
particular, German hosiery manufacturers supplied £158 029 of the cotton socks that
were so popular with working-class Australians. 18 It was anticipated that, ‘but for the
outbreak of the war’, German manufacturers would have eventually established and
expanded hosiery factories within Australia to purposely avoid the incidence of the
high Australian tariff on hosiery items. 19
The press was quick to counsel Australian manufacturers that the wartime
prohibition of the trade in ‘enemy’ imported goods could be turned to an advantage:
they could enlarge their factories 20 and thus corner the market in hosiery sales. 21
Besides, it was predicted that the industry could provide “clean, healthy employment
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for female labour.” 22 Both the press and manufacturers were confident that Australia
would ‘eventually’ be in a far better position than Germany had been in to
manufacture cotton goods such as stockings. 23 At the same time, they were actively
coveting German “ocean possessions” 24 such as Samoa, which Australia might “hope
to keep after [her] conquest of them.” 25 It was proposed that if there were such an
acquisition, that the whole cotton sock industry, “from the cotton field to the
salesman,” 26 could then exist independently within Australian territories. 27
This scheme appeared expedient at the time, as the leading hosiery
manufacturers in Leicester and Nottingham were unable to fulfil orders for shipment
to Australia because of the pressure of an enormous local demand. 28 Moreover, it
was suggested in 1920, that there was no reason why the Australian cotton industry,
with proper cultivation and management, “should not be in a flourishing position in
Australia in the near future.” 29 To achieve these goals a propaganda campaign was
recommended to promote the growing of cotton in Australia: 30
What is needed is a propaganda (sic), not a mere Gazette notice of the offer of the Government.
The people of Australia, particularly those living in localities suitable for growing cotton,
should be told that the Government are ready to stand behind them in any effort to grow
cotton. 31
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Of course, securing labour was a problem.

32

Whilst some politicians were

not deterred by the “old idea that cotton growing is a black labour industry,” 33 others
realised that it was not the growing of cotton that was the trouble, but, rather the
gathering of it.34 However, despite insistent rhetoric from the press that there were
‘potential’ opportunities to establish a ‘holistic’ cotton industry in rural areas
favoured with good soils and a good cotton-growing climate, Parliament was advised
by the Inter-State Commission in 1915 that no amount of assistance, whether by
bounties or by import duties could possibly lead to “any reasonable development of
this industry in Australia.” 35 The Commission stressed that a cotton industry was not
viable in Australia until the invention of a “successful picking machine” 36 could
overcome the cost and difficulties with hand picking. 37
Hosiery manufacturers were also keen to increase the production of woollen
hosiery, especially as Australia was so well endowed with the ‘raw materials’, and
because, in some cases, they already had the necessary machinery to cater for aspects
of its production and distribution. 38 But this was not enough for some manufacturers:
“we want more [protection]” 39 was the persistent catch cry that continually echoed
through the corridors of Parliament 40 and in evidence presented to the Commission. 41
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9.2.2 Increased importation of hosiery

Notwithstanding the impetus given to this industry during the war, and by the protection
under this Tariff, we have imported into Australia during the past nine months no less than
£2 368 000 worth of hosiery. 42

Despite these ambitious wartime plans to enlarge the Australian cotton
hosiery industry in Australia, little advancement occurred for many years 43 because
of the difficulty with obtaining the necessary machinery to produce such hosiery. In
the meantime, the tariff duty on imported cotton socks and stockings became “almost
prohibitive”. 44 Mr Tudor MP, a former Minister of Trade and Customs 45 who had
had experience in the cotton industry, 46 advised Parliament in 1920 that it was
impossible to get machinery for the manufacture of hosiery 47 because overseas
engineering firms were attempting to fulfil orders to replace machinery that had been
destroyed in the war. 48 Although Tudor supported protectionism, he objected to the
proposed duty on cotton hosiery lines that were not even being manufactured in
Australia. 49
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Whilst some hosiery manufacturers, especially Bonds 50 may have been
actively proclaiming their message to some Parliamentarians that they were capable
of producing a large amount of cotton hosiery, they were at the time only producing
a small number of samples that they touted around to interested politicians. 51 Senator
Payne was so aghast at the colour of one sample that he exclaimed to the Chamber:
“[t]he colour is execrable”. 52 Despite the manufacture and circulation of these
samples, it seems that local manufacturers had not yet “got into the wholesale
market:” 53
They claim they can now produce a certain output of cotton hosiery, that is socks and
stockings, but where are the visible signs of its attempted completion in the local markets, in
view of their statement that they can turn out 42 000 pairs weekly? Their advertisements do not
mention cotton socks or stockings. Why do they not utilise the yarn they state they have on
hand and begin operations at once, instead of contenting themselves with an assertion that
‘they can produce’ not ‘they do produce’? 54

Even though it was obvious to many, including Tudor and Gregory, that the
cotton hosiery manufacturing industry had “not got much beyond the sample
stage”, 55 George Bond would not going abandon his demand for full protection
without a fight. He publicly berated Tudor for providing an ‘incorrect inference’ to
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Parliament that cotton hose could not be made in Australia. 56 He even delivered a
sample pair of cotton hose, made at his mills in Redfern, to sympathetic
parliamentarians, as “practical proof” 57 that such Tudor’s inference was “absolutely
and unreservedly untrue”. 58 Furthermore, he vowed that his machinery was suitable
to economically and efficiently produce cotton hose. He explained that he had only
desisted from commencing production because of the “huge quantities of cotton
(imported from Japan and The United States of America)” 59 that were in bond and in
warehouses at the time. 60 He complained that the market for this class of goods was
being “greatly over supplied.” 61
Bond claimed that his company had, ‘in good faith’, invested over £3 000 000
in hosiery production within Australia with an expectation that the proposed new
Tariff would give his business protection. 62 He sought to sway parliamentarians by
proclaiming that his new factory in Redfern employed 300 hands and that additional
buildings were currently being erected. 63 He warned Parliament that if the protective
tariff was removed, then Australia would become the dumping ground for “foreignmade hosiery.” 64 Moreover, he maintained that this would not only have an adverse
impact on his expansion of operations and cause the loss of employment to “some
hundreds of Australian men and women,” 65 but it would also seriously jeopardise
national security. 66
Bond had many supporters in Parliament and they were all clearly impressed
with his vision to establish a cotton hosiery industry in Australia. 67 Some even
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accepted his invitation to visit his new factory at Redfern. 68 Later, they
enthusiastically praised Bond for his commercial acumen and insisted that Bond and
other Australian hosiery manufacturers could produce cotton hosiery “much cheaper
than the imported article.” 69 Furthermore, they suggested that “if sufficient
inducement” 70 were provided to Bond and other hosiery manufacturers, they would
be in a better position grow their own cotton to manufacture hosiery. 71 In contrast,
Senator Payne, after visiting hosiery factories, concluded that Australian hosiery
manufacturers had not reached the stage at which “it pays to make cotton hosiery”. 72

9.2.3 Resisting the sumptuary directive

Payne and Tudor were part of a small group of parliamentarians who were
concerned about the right of the consumer to choose apparel that was affordable or
suitable to his/her needs. Payne explained to protectionist Senators that there was a
fairly large quantity of cotton hosiery in bond because “a great many people find it
necessary to wear it” 73 for economical and health reasons. 74 He pointed out that the
foot “is perhaps the most sensitive portion of a man’s anatomy” 75 and many men
could not wear worsted or woollen socks. 76 Others, he said, could not wear cotton
socks. 77 Moreover, he suggested that the proposed prohibitive tariffs on imported
cotton hosiery would force everyone in Australia to wear woollen or Australian-
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made silk (artificial or real) hosiery. 78 In Chapter 8, we see that Payne expresses
similar concerns about the prescriptive nature of prohibitive tariffs on workingmen’s
underwear.
Tudor contended that, in certain parts of northern Australia woollen hosiery
could not be worn. 79 Whilst he saw no problem imposing an extra duty on silk
stockings, which were considered by most to be a luxury, he couldn’t accept that
women would wear “merino hosiery.” 80

9.2.4 A new Greene Tariff expecting to ‘dam’ the flood of imported hosiery
If we are protectionists let us give protection.81

By July 1920, there had been a marked increase in the value of imported
hosiery in comparison for the same month in 1919. Socks and stockings had
advanced from £185 978 in July 1919 to £235 557 for July 1920. 82 The new Greene
Tariff proposed to target socks and stockings in an extremely prohibitive manner
even though only 5% of the supply of socks and stockings was made in Australia and
that “practically the whole of the remainder [came] from the British mills.”83
Formerly, these cotton items had been duty-free under the British preferential tariff,
but imported English cotton hosiery was to become dutiable at 30%, whilst 45% was
to be imposed against other foreign imports. 84 Greene continued to maintain that the
cotton hosiery industry was “peculiarly adapted to establishments in country
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districts” 85 and that there was no reason why 90% of the country towns should not
have their own mills supplying the requirements of the districts. 86 He repeatedly
vowed that plant was not costly and the manufacture was simple. 87
It was not just cotton hosiery that was problematic for politicians and the
population. There been an “enormous rise” 88 in the price of Australian-made hosiery
and the Australian woollen hosiery factories were unable to keep up with demand. 89
Moreover, much of the woollen hosiery produced in Australia was often considered
to be below standard. 90 For instance, Mrs Glencross, the Chairwoman of the
Housewives Association, claimed that frequently “purchasers found that a pair of
stockings would come in two at the first time of wearing”. 91 Nevertheless, it was
proposed that the duty on English woollen socks and stocking be raised from 25% to
35% and that the duty on ‘foreign’ woollen hosiery be raised from 30% to 50%. 92
Despite these proposed increases, the demand for British-made socks and stockings
continued to be so great that the leading manufacturers in Leicester and Nottingham
were unable to fulfil orders for shipment to Australia. 93 The situation was so dire for
the ordinary housewife, that Mrs Glencross suggested at a National Housewives
Association Conference that the duty on woollen stockings should be suspended
“until the [Australian] manufacturing plants were improved”. 94
After the war, there was an enormous dissatisfaction amongst politicians
about the fact that Australia was exporting 95% of its wool crop overseas and
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“bringing it back again in the shape of underwear, hosiery, jerseys, and cloth. 95 They
argued that Australia “should see that all the wool that can be used in Australia is
made up here”. 96 Tudor considered that this type of ‘tariff tussle’ was detrimental to
the Australian working class: 97
It is no wonder that there is so much industrial unrest when people realize that articles
manufactured from raw material which we produce are constantly increasing in price. Instead
of the position improving it is becoming worse. 98

Nevertheless, many protectionists including Sir Robert Best continued to
demand that high tariffs be imposed upon imported cotton hosiery. 99 Best argued that
he wished to give his fullest support in encouraging “our own industries” 100 and to
encourage, “so far as we may,” 101 the wearing of woollen hosiery in Australia. 102
Tudor disagreed, and reasoned that it was useless to place a duty on cotton hosiery
“in order to compel people to wear woollen hosiery.” 103
During 1921 tariff schedule debates, Greene announced that he was
‘staggered’ to see the “enormous” 104 current level of imported hosiery. 105 Despite the
provision of earlier protection for the Australian hosiery industry, 106 in the nine
months up to May 1921, £2 358 000 worth of mostly cotton hosiery was imported
and there was £500 000 worth of cotton socks in bond. 107 Furthermore, Greene was
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perturbed that the charges for the importation and distribution of such imported
hosiery had reached a level “that was entirely unwarranted,” 108 especially
considering that he believed that the industry was one that could easily be adapted to
Australia. 109 Nevertheless, Greene remained hopeful that Australian manufacturers
“would soon be able to produce all [the hosiery] that was required in Australia.”110
At the time, the government was making extraordinary efforts to encourage and
protect this budding Australian industry.

111

For example, Stirling Taylor, the

Director of the Bureau of Trade and Industry, was sent on a ‘whistle-stop’ trip
throughout rural Australia to promote the establishment of country mills: 112
He went up and down the country making people believe that, even in relatively small towns,
they could run mills successfully. The craze extended to this Parliament. 113

As a direct consequence of these promotional campaigns, many small country
mills were established. 114 However, after a short period, many failed to prosper.
The problem was that the government’s “new-born zeal”

116

115

to transfer people from

the cities to work in the country mills failed to produce results. 117 This meant that
many small newly established mills lacked the manpower, organisation and
machinery already available in the bigger and more efficiently-equipped concerns. 118
However, it is notable that mills such as The Australian Knitting Mills and the
Onkaparinga Mill, which did not require “the artificial aid of even the existing
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duties,” 119 proved to be successful and were praised nationally for their efficiency
and productivity. 120

9.2.5 The problem of ‘dumping’

Unfortunately … British manufacturers are dumping hosiery into Australia at such a price
that the Australian manufacturers are unable to sell their product at a profit, and many of
the factories are practically at a stand-still, and will at an early date be dismissing a number
of employees. 121

Sawer says that after Federation, manufacturers were constantly lobbying Parliament
about the practice of ‘dumping’ goods on the Australian market to the detriment of
Australian-produced goods. 122 Mr Jowett MP was so concerned in 1921 about the
problem of ‘dumping’, that he proposed a further 5% increase on items on top of the
already Greene prohibitive Tariff. 123 As an active member and representative of the
Australian sheep-breeders Association, 124 it was not surprising that Jowett argued
that “the cheap imported cotton article” 125 from Britain and the America was the
most serious competitor of Australian-made woollen socks and stockings. 126 He
contended that whilst the manufacture of hosiery in Australia might be claimed as a

119

Ibid.
Ibid.
121
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 3 October 1922, 60 (Senator Reid).
122
Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law 1901-1921 (Melbourne University Press,
1956) 42. Often the ‘dumped’ goods were poorly made clothing lines (sometimes called shoddy)
which were being produced in other countries, particularly Britain and Japan, at a cost that was far
less than Australian manufacturers could achieve. The Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906
(Cth) was enacted to penalise those who engaged in this practice.
123
“Federal Parliament: The Tariff”, above n 85.
124
“Half Cotton ‘Pure Wool’ Socks”, Camperdown Chronicle, 3 March 1936, 1.
125
“Jowett’s Jerky Judgment”, Construction and Local Government Journal, 7 June 1921, 6.
126
Ibid. It was frequently suggested that British hosiery was being landed in Australia at less than the
cost of production. See Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 3 October 1922, 60 (Senator
Reid).
120

325

“war industry,” 127 current competition with imported hosiery meant that 90% of the
machines in Australian woollen factories were idle. 128 Others suggested that the
Japanese were the greatest threat to the Australian hosiery industry. 129 Mr Foley MP,
however, was not troubled with the Japanese goods, for he considered the Japanese
manufacturers had “missed the boat” 130 and “had not delivered the goods”: 131
So far as Japanese goods are concerned, we have nothing to fear from them in Australia. They
had their chance during the war, and I defy any honourable member to prove to my satisfaction
that anything good ever came from Japan. Their productions are the cheapest and the shoddiest
that have ever come into this country.

132

Jowett reasoned that cotton socks and stockings were not really ‘cheap’ to the
consumer because woollen socks lasted ten times longer than cotton socks. 133 One
commentator pointed out that whilst Jowett resided in Victoria and had no problem
wearing woollen socks, this would not be the situation if he was expected to wear
woollen socks in Queensland during the summer months: 134 “[m]embers of
Parliament are inclined to get parochial and inconsiderate of the wants of others in
their enthusiasm to establish factories and pile on duties.” 135
Foley maintained that the duties proposed by Greene were “a direct impost on
the working classes.” 136 He stressed that cotton stockings and socks were not made
in Australia 137 and that “there is no industry to encourage”. 138 Likewise, Mr Gregory
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MP protested against the imposition of high duties purchased by the poorer sections
of the community. 139 One critic argued that members of Government, by piling
tariffs high on imported hosiery, was receiving enormous amounts of revenue whilst
at the same time taking “their people down” 140 in a shocking fashion, 141 especially
when “the local factories [had] contributed very little to the supply.” 142 It was not
only the government that was condemned for its misuse of the tariff. 143 Textile
manufacturers were often accused of profiteering 144 and it was suggested that rather
than using the Tariff to build up Australian industry they were using it as means of
rapidly increasing their own wealth. 145
The issue remained contentious in parliamentary debates. For instance, Foley
insisted that the poorer paid workers in his division were obliged to wear cotton
stockings and demanded that duties on cotton hose to be made cheaper. 146 He argued
that the lower-paid men had no choice but to clothe their wives and families in cotton
hose, as the price of woollen goods was “almost prohibitive”. 147 On the other hand,
Mr Considine MP objected to Foley’s proposal on the basis that he wanted the
standard of living raised so that the workers would not need to wear cotton socks:148
He told Parliament: “I would prefer that they should wear the woollen article. I want
to see every worker in this country in a position to wear the very best material that is
obtainable.” 149
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As some Australian manufacturers were having a “rough spin”, 150 there were
calls for the newly established Tariff Board to make “further inquiries” 151 as to
whether Australian hosiery industries should be provided with more protection
especially as British imported hosiery was being sold for less than the cost of the raw
material. 152 Protectionists such as Senator Guthrie was confident that the tariff would
be increased and saw no difficulty for Australian manufacturers to “submit a good
case” 153 to the Tariff Board. 154 However, when the question of hosiery came before
the Tariff Board in 1922, ardent protectionists submitted that existing prohibitive
tariffs on hosiery were not sufficiently high to protect the hosiery industry. 155 The
Board heard complaints about Australian manufacturers who were constantly faced
with “unfair competition” 156 from countries that were suffering depreciated
currencies. This meant that German and French makers were able to undersell British
and Dominion markets with both finished and unfinished goods. 157 There were also
numerous allegations of hosiery and knitted goods being manufactured in Great
Britain from yarn ‘dumped’ from Continental countries, and then sent to Australia.
Manufacturers were constantly looking to the Board to enforce penalties,
pursuant to the Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906 (Cth), against those who
were engaging in these alleged practices. 158 It was also alleged that when goods were
being imported wholesale to England in cartons from Germany, they were
‘disguised’ and falsely marked “English Make” 159 before being sent directly to the
Australian markets. 160 This form of “malpractice” 161 was condemned by the unions
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who were anxious to “dam up” 162 the flood of German textiles. 163 Australian
manufacturers were, on occasion, encouraged to pool their resources to wage a
publicity campaign in favour of Australian textiles. 164

9.2.6 The Board takes flack for the failure of the Australian hosiery industry

If something is not done speedily to check the importations of hosiery and knitted goods
there will soon not be a mill in the county.165

In its 1925 Annual Report, the Board clearly acknowledged that Australian
secondary industries were “more or less in a developmental stage” 166 where the
conditions and needs of the various industries were constantly changing. 167 However,
the Board advised Parliament that it was not possible to provide a Tariff that would
make provision “for all the needs that might arise.” 168 It acknowledged that the
industry was “suffering severely” 169 from overseas competition from Great Britain,
Europe, the United States and Japan 170 and was also very mindful that some
Australian hosiery manufacturers, who had invested

£4 000 000 in capital 171 in

establishing and maintaining the industry, were ‘anxiously’ awaiting its
determination about an increase in tariff on imported hosiery. 172 Furthermore,
manufacturers had warned the Board that there were 6 000 employees who would
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not be assured of their employment if higher duties were not imposed on imported
duties. 173 However, the Board was to receive an enormous amount of criticism from
hosiery manufacturers and the press when its members “reluctantly” 174 declined
manufacturers’ request to take action pursuant to the Act. 175
The Board heard evidence from many interested parties. For instance, Mr
Rupert Neil McLean, a director of George A Bond Limited gave evidence that his
company had sold thousands of dozens pairs of hose without profit in its endeavour
to develop mass production. 176 He sought to convince the Board that his company
aimed to protect consumers by “[stopping] the importation of shoddy goods”. 177 The
manager of Bond’s hosiery department also submitted samples to the Board of
imported stockings that were introduced at prices lower than it cost to produce them
in Australia. 178 For example, one sample submitted was an imported line that sold at
12/6, but could not be produced by Bond’s for less than 28/6. 179
However, the Board “reluctantly” 180 determined that this evidence was not
sufficient to justify a recommendation from it to the Minister for the imposition of
dumping duties. 181 The Board advised the Minister that it would continue “to watch
the situation closely” 182 with a view to recommending more immediate relief than
could be given by a revision of the tariff, should further evidence be obtained that
would justify such a recommendation. 183 The use of the word “reluctantly” 184 points
to the Board pro-Protectionist bias. This prompted one critic to suggest that the
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Board, in its determinations, was always thinking of the manufacturer and that it had
no concern for the consumer. 185 In spite of its bias, it was suggested that the
“determining factor” 186 that moved the Board to decline the request to impose
dumping duties was that it had apparently ‘discovered’ that “some makers” 187 in
Australia were able to earn substantial profits under the exiting duties. 188 It was
conceded that the Board’s disinclination to impose dumping duties in this case
produced a practical and an ‘enlightened effect’ upon other manufacturers: 189
It is understood that a good deal of reorganisation is going on in several mills in order to
increase efficiency. Advance in this direction may enable further reference by some of them to
the Tariff Board to be avoided. 190

The Board was blamed for the ‘depressing’ state of affairs existing in the
Australian hosiery industry, and in particular for the closure of a number of mills.191
It was suggested that between 32 to 34 smaller hosiery mills had been “obliged” 192 to
close their doors because they had had difficulty with securing trade. 193 In October
1924, Gold’s Hosiery Mills Ltd., with mills at Redfern, Alexandria, Erskineville and
Homebush, ceased operations, 194 even though the company had made “excellent
profits” 195 during, and for a few years following the war. 196 However, in 1922 and
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1923 the business had been conducted at a loss 197 even though considerable
reconstruction work had been carried out at the mills.198 The company’s directors
blamed both the high price of wool and the “inaction of the Tariff Board” 199 for not
providing the relief that it had expected when faced with a high level of imported
hosiery. 200
The unions criticised the Government’s ‘apathetic’ failure to apply the
provisions of the Australian Industries Preservation Act 1916 (Cth) to help the
hosiery industry, which they insisted had been “badly hit” 201 by wholesale
dumping. 202 They also declared that thousands of workers had been thrown out of
their jobs and warned that unless dumping was prevented, “a valuable industry” 203
would inevitably perish. The Australian Worker accused the Board of being
disinclined “to give effect to Australia’s fiscal policy” 204 because of the “sinister
influence” 205 exercised on it by the “wealthy importers of Flinders-lane” (sic). 206 The
newspaper claimed that the Board’s “glaring dereliction of duty” 207 was the cause of
this textile industry being in a “very critical condition”: 208 “[i]t would be a disaster,
very far reaching in its evils effects, if the business which has been built up were to
be broken down.” 209 In contrast, the Register suggested that the Board was not at
fault in declining to “recommend action” 210 pursuant to the Australian Industries
Preservation Act 1906 (Cth). 211 It was alleged that the Board was directed to do so
by the Minister of Trade and Customs: “[b]odies like the Tariff Board are usually wise to

197

“Hosiery Mills Fail: 500 Employees Thrown Idle”, above n 194.
The loss for the year ended June 1924 was £21 159. The total loss was £74 876.
198
“Gold’s Hosiery Mills Ltd”, above n 195.
199
Ibid.
200
“Hosiery Mills Fail: 500 Employees Thrown Idle”, above n 194.
201
“Textile Industry Menaced”, The Australian Worker, 2 January 1924, 11.
202
Ibid.
203
Ibid.
204
Ibid.
205
Ibid.
206
Ibid.
207
Ibid.
208
Ibid.
209
“Protecting the Knitting Industry”, News, 3 January 1924, 6.
210
“Federal Politics: Notes of the Week”, The Register, 7 January 1924, 8.
211
Ibid.

332

the desires of a Minister, and it is not impossible that the weakening of Mr Chapman is at the
back of this decision.” 212

The Board was also criticised for not being more transparent in its evidencegathering processes and for holding its hearings “behind closed doors”. 213 There
were calls that these hearings should, “in the interests of the consuming public”, 214
be opened to the public and that notice of the Board’s intention to hear applications
ought to be given through the press. 215 The Minister of Trade and Commerce
endeavoured to justify the Board’s closed hearings by arguing that most of the
evidence presented before it was contained in correspondence and departmental
reports. He argued that to take oral evidence was not practicable and would result in
long delays and “that would make the Act a dead letter”. 216 The Adelaide Chamber
of Commerce rejected the Minister’s explanation. 217 The Chamber’s representative
stated that there was no means of knowing when the Board was conducting an
enquiry on any particular class of goods. Further, he claimed that importers had no
opportunity of placing evidence before the Board, even though the Minister had
assured the Chamber that the Tariff Board was “quite ready at all times to consider
representations made in regard to any case.” 218
Even the notion of ‘scientific protection’, which was advanced as an intrinsic
part of the Federation process, came in for intense criticism. 219 Whilst it was
conceded that the ‘scientific tariff’ had worked fairly well before the war when there
was some stability in wages, hours worked and social conditions in competing
overseas countries, 220 this form of economic stability disappeared with the onset of
the war. It was also alleged that the Greene Tariff, with its “small scientific
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protection,” 221 proved to be useless in the face of the constantly changing conditions
in competing countries. 222 It was claimed that disturbed industrial conditions and
depreciated rates of exchange in these countries were at odds with the upward trend
of wages and standard of living in Australia. 223 And it was suggested that all these
circumstances had had a disastrous effect on local industries: 224
Many of our industries that in 1920-21 were considered to be prosperous, or promised to be so,
are now placed in a very precarious position by the flooding of our markets with goods from
cheap labour counties. 225

9.2.7 Anti-Australian sentiment
Many honourable senators … have no use for Australian made goods. 226

Whilst some politicians, such as Mr Stirling Taylor, 227 preached that
Parliament should “ordain” 228 that Australians should only wear clothes made in
Australian factories, others contended that there was a “distinct prejudice against
Australian goods”. 229 As an illustration, James G Hare, the managing director of
Dominion Knitting Mills advised the Tariff Board that the firm had frequently been
requested by Flinders Lane firms to leave off the brand ‘Made in Australia’. 230
Senator Payne suggested that Australian manufacturers would find a “ready sale”231
for their goods if Australian hose was consistently of a better quality and free of
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imperfections. 232 Payne, who himself had had a bad experience with some lines of
Australian-made hosiery, insisted that he and other consumers in the same position,
would make every effort in the future to “carefully avoid purchasing certain brands
of Australian made clothing.” 233 It was argued by many protectionists that ‘effective
protection’ should be full and unconditional protection and should be provided for all
Australian industries. 234 As noted in previous chapters, 235 this type of protectionism
was considered by many to be inextricably linked with nationalism and patriotism.
9.2.8 The Gospel of National Self-Reliance…Government Affirms Principle of
Protecting Local Industry 236

We have emerged from the tradition that imported goods are better than those made here…
The surest way to keep secondary industries inefficient is to inadequately protect them. 237

In August 1924, the Prime Minister, Mr Stanley Bruce, promised that the
government would give many secondary industries further assistance to relieve the
“ever-increasing” 238 strain of the “excessive importations” 239 of manufactured
goods. 240 Many manufacturers were still facing difficulty keeping their hands fully
employed, and often new “large up to-date plants” 241 were working far below their
full capacity. 242 The owners complained that they had been “buoyed up” 243 with the
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hope that the Government would fulfil its promise to “give them protection against
the manufacturers of cheap labour and low currency countries”. 244
On 2 September 1925, the Minister of Trade and Customs, Mr Pratten,
introduced a new a tariff Schedule that he said represented a “thoroughly Business
proposal” 245

and

which

would

assist

in

encouraging

Australia’s

“own

productions,” 246 and thus make it more self-reliant. 247 To this extent, Pratten was
encouraged by the many “most estimable leagues” 248 that were educating the people
“in the direction of a sound national sentiment.” 249 Protectionism had become the
settled policy of the country and a religion in which the government placed its trust
and belief: 250 “[t]here can be seen sermons in windows. The Government is in full
accord with the gospel of self-reliance and national sentiment.” 251
The government also used various strategies and ‘propaganda’ to encourage
Australians to purchase only Australian–made goods. 252 In addition, various
‘protection’ leagues and associations, including the Australian Industries Protection
League and the Australian Natives Association, began to actively disseminate fresh
“public propaganda” 253 concerning the need for increased protection for Australian
industries, and about the “folly” 254 of sending overseas for articles which could be
made quite efficiently “at home”. 255 This ‘buy-Australian’ rhetoric become rampant
and powerful. During the parliamentary tariff debates in March 1926, the call to
protect local industries was couched in explicit terms using religious nomenclature
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and ‘patriotic” propaganda. 256 This protectionist dogma was elucidated in a
moralising epistle called the “Ten Commandments for Good Australians.” 257 Every
‘patriotic’ Australian was expected, for their own good, to comply closely with this
edict in the same manner that was expected in traditional sumptuary laws. For
instance, the 9th Commandment declared that the manufacturer was to be given
special treatment by the Australian consumer:
The manufacturer has a special claim to support. He is to a great extent a pioneer. He is a man
of courage. He has faith in his country and his people, and every Australian should try to prove
to him that his faith is justified. 258

Any Australian who was found to be reluctant to wear Australian boots, or an
Australian hat, or an Australian suit of clothes made of Australian cloth was to be
branded as “really ashamed of Australia”. 259

9.2.9 Protectionist dogma

Most of the applications for increased duties had been presented by manufacturers whose
works were inefficient, whilst those working on efficient methods did not need protection.260

It was argued that if Australians were loyal to Australian industries then it
would not be necessary to impose many customs duties. 261 One parliamentarian even
claimed that the main purpose of duties was “to protect Australians against
themselves”. 262 However, by 1926 some protectionists, such as Senator Hayes,
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advised Parliament that they were losing their ‘faith’ in very high protection. 263 They
maintained that the Australian hosiery industry was struggling because
manufacturers were inefficient, 264 inexperienced and because they were using
outdated machinery and processes. Mr Seabrook MP argued that if the Australian
hosiery industry could not ‘carry on’ with a protective duty of 35 per cent and was
asking for 55 percent, then the only conclusion he could make was that either the
industry was “inefficiently managed” 265 or because the workers engaged in it were
inefficient. 266 Others argued that inefficient management was causing factories to
produce an ‘unsatisfactory’ hosiery article. 267 Complaints often were directed at
workers because they lacked industry experience and training causing customers to
be unhappy with socks and stockings that shrunk considerably after a couple of
washes. 268 It also had marked impact on customer satisfaction and sales: 269
Owing to inexperience in the manufacturing of hosiery some Australian factories at their outset
of their operations produced socks and stockings which, when washed, shrunk considerably,
and that was responsible for a reduction in sales. 270

It was suggested that the large increase in revenue that accompanied the high
rate of imported goods was a financial boon that the Government could not ignore. 271
For instance, the revenue collected from July 1923 until the end of January 1924 was
£21 150 529 which was £3 855 529 larger than expected for the period. 272 Others, on
the other hand, suggested that the higher the tariff, the higher the cost of living. 273
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Unionists declared that it was unfair for Australian manufacturers of hosiery
to compete against importations from foreign countries where workers worked
longer hours and were paid much lower wages than Australian workers. 274 Yet, the
Board acknowledged, in its Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 1925, that
Australian manufacturers faced many conditions that put them at a disadvantage “so
far as competition with imported goods is concerned”.

275

The Board listed higher

wages, shorter hours, payments for holidays, high cost of material, limited markets
for products and “consequent restricted production” 276 as conditions that were
problematic for Australian manufactures. 277

9.2.10 Hosiery Mills Fail

The relief anticipated from possible action by the Tariff Board did not eventuate. The
position of the company, therefore, has gradually become worse.278

In February 1925, Mr Henry York, managing director of Lustre Hosiery Mills
gave evidence to the Board that the largest woollen hosiery mills in New South
Wales were struggling to compete with cheap foreign importations. 279 Yet, it seems
that those mills producing silk and artificial silk hosiery were busy supplying the
popular coloured hosiery that was in “heavy demand”, 280 even though importers
could bring in similar goods from overseas and land them in Sydney at a lesser
price. 281 In this case, transport time and the fickleness of fashion were in their favour.
Wholesale customers were happy to purchase from local mills and pay a higher price
because they would “not risk their judgement in regard to colours” four months from
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the date of purchase. 282 However, it was suggested that hosiery manufacturers could
not be complacent, because “the moment fashion decided” 283 to embrace the
ordinary standard shades, such as black, white, “nigger”, 284 and tan, the bulk of the
business they were enjoying would again be “placed overseas”. 285
The Board suggested to Parliament in September 1925, that as it had already
recommended an increase in the duty on wool yarn by 10%, that a corresponding
increase should be made on the duty on socks and stockings of all other material
other than cotton. 286 However, it endorsed a smaller increase in duty on silk socks
and stockings because Australian manufacturers of these articles were already
competing well against imported goods. 287 In fact, the “better classes” practically
held that business. 288 Eventually the new tariff changes were lauded by the press as
“an honest effort” 289 to protect Australia’s “Infant factories” 290 against foreign
competition. 291 Not all parties were so pleased with the new tariff. When the Board
recommended a new tariff on hosiery in 1925, Leicester hosiery manufacturers
decided to cable the Australian Prime Minister, Mr Bruce, protesting against its
application on their ‘on-route’ shipments of hosiery to Australia. 292 They also sought
a concession on goods in transit which were ‘on order’. 293
However, by 1926, the Board began to take a more conciliatory attitude
towards the consumer. At the same time, it began to question the “declared policy” 294
of the Commonwealth to routinely and absolutely protect local industries against
overseas competition. 295 In its 1926 Annual Report, it attempted to reassure
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consumers that when making it determinations, it constantly sought to ascertain what
the effect of any proposed increase in duties would have upon prices to the public.296
Furthermore, it became critical about abuse of protection, particularly when it
appeared to have an adverse impact on the consumer: 297
There are times when the local manufacturer desires the superior article he is making at a far
greater cost to be protected as to force the cheaper one off the market, and there are on the
other hand instances known to the Board where he is making an inferior article and asks that it
be protected against a superior one. 298

It had become very obvious that the Board was no longer the stalwart face of
protectionism in Australia and that it was at times ‘at odds’ with Mr Pratten, the
Minister of Trade and Customs. As a result, the Board’s comments and reluctance to
recommend increase in tariff protection for mismanaged and inefficient industries
were neither embraced nor appreciated by the Minister. 299 By 1926, the Minister
began to purposely fail to table the Board’s reports even though they should have
been laid before the House within seven days of their presentation. 300 Previously, it
had been the practice of the Minister to always table the Board’s reports forthwith on
their receipt. The Board began to retaliate, and in its 1928 Annual Report openly
criticised Minister for his failure to table its reports. 301 Without the benefit of
‘absolute’ protection, some companies began to struggle to meet their overextended
financial obligations. For instance, in November 1927, the directors of George A
Bond and Company Limited, considered entering into voluntary liquidation. 302 Not
only had the Company’s bank overdraft limit been exceeded but it was predicted that
it was unlikely that its “heavy stocks” 303 could be realised. 304 Its annual report listed
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the increase in the importation of hosiery as a factor contributing to the company’s
difficulties. 305
In the next part we see another example of a post-Federation fledgling
industry, led by the iconic Frank Burley, which expected an ‘avowedly’ protectionist
government to provide unlimited protection even though such protection tended to
increase the prices of both imported and locally-produced goods, particularly for
female consumers.
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9.3

Cossetting Australian Corset-Makers

Before the war, the Australian corsetry industry was mostly comprised of
small enterprises that employed only a handful of staff that only made hand fitted
corsets. 306 By 1921, the industry had grown to include twenty four small
manufactures in various capital cities, as well as four major “wholesale houses”: 307
Berlei Limited, the Australia Corsets Limited, Messrs Robert Paxton, all of Sydney,
and the Elasco Corsets and Tie Company of Melbourne. 308 The bulk of their output
was children’s corsets and brassieres, which Mr Lister MP told his colleagues that a
brassiere was a “form of bust bodice”. 309 Even though corsets “continued to
dominate notions of female beautification”, 310 less than five per cent of the corsets
worn by Australian women in 1920 could be manufactured locally. 311
The wearing of female corsetry had not been abandoned in the 1920s with the
onset of the ‘new era’ of “modish” 312 slim form flapper silhouette. 313 However, many
of the traditional “stiff-boned” 314 or rigid corsets purchased up to and during the war
went out of fashion and were replaced with shorter and slender corsets that sat
“barely above the waist”. 315 These new types of corsets were more comfortable to
wear and were generally “supple garments marked by dainty trifles of silk and satin
that few women could resist.” 316 All forms of corsets, including medical and surgical
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corsets, continued to remain in high demand during this period: in 1921 there were
“some 2 000 000 women in the Commonwealth requiring these articles of
apparel.” 317

9.3.1 Small beginnings for the Australian corset industry

Until 1920 the industry was not very successful in Australia, although there have always
been a few persons making corsets to order. 318

In 1914, £262 000 worth of corsets were imported and Australian
manufactures only supplied 10% of the market. 319 Although all the raw materials for
corset-making had to be imported, none of these materials, except for lace and
embroidery, attracted customs duty. 320 England supplied the cheapest lines, being the
bulk of trade, and America supplied the higher class of corsets. 321
Whilst the issue of tariffs on imported corsetry was dealt with in the 1908
Tariff Schedule, it was not until 1914 that tariff protection was more fully explored
for Australian corset-makers. 322 The question of protection for a nascent and
struggling Australian corsetry industry was first investigated by the Inter-State
Commission in 1914, when an application was made by W. Zander and Co., of King
Street Sydney, for an increase of the duty on corsets from 10% (British preference)
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and 15 % (general) to 20% and 25% respectively. 323 Mr Wilhelm Zander argued that
whilst his business of selling corsets and corset accessories had increased since 1913,
and was profitable, he was concerned that he was not receiving a “satisfactory
profit.” 324 He told the Commission that he was alarmed with the increase in the
number of imported corsets from Britain, 325 Germany 326 and America. 327 He
claimed that he continually struggled with high labour costs and with a prejudice
against locally-made corsets. 328 He pleaded that if the duty were increased
sufficiently, he would be able to compete with the imported articles in other
grades. 329
Others in the corset industry, such as Frank Burley of Unique Corsets asked
for even higher tariffs than Zander on imported corsetry. 330 Burley, who employed
30 to 40 hands, pointed out that American corsets sold well in Australia because they
were “so well advertised”. 331 He explained that the only reason why local corset
industry existed at all was because of the early tariff imposed on imported
corsetry. 332 This view was later verified in 1921 when Senator Payne advised the
Senate that the Australian corset-making industry had made good progress during the
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war even though it had been initially developed under a 10 per cent preference tariff
and 15 per cent foreign tariff. 333
In July 1915, the Commission recommended that the duty on corsets should
be not less than on general apparel, and that corsetry should be included under the
classification of apparel and attire, 334 which at the time attracted 35 % preferential
and 40% general tariff. 335 The Commission advised Parliament 336 that it considered
that the corset industry was an industry that, “with fair encouragement”, 337 should
succeed in Australia. 338 It was extolled as an industry with “great variety of design,
shape and size,” 339 which could provide a wide avenue of employment. Whilst the
proposed increase in duty was to ostensibly assist Australian corsetry manufacturers,
it would also potentially have a significant economic impact on female consumers.
Women were already facing significant increases for these ‘essential’ items of
feminine attire because of higher freights on “the most sought after corset” 340 from
America and the cost of extra bone in the modern style of corset. 341

9.3.2 The War opens up opportunities for Australian corset makers

The idea … is to make Australia not only one of the greatest producing countries of the
world, but self-supporting so far as the manufactures are concerned. 342
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The war began not long after the Commission took evidence from Zander and
Burley. This event, of course, had an enormous impact on the importation of all
corsetry, especially with regards to German lines. 343 The prohibition of German
imported corsetry was considered to be a boon for a small Australian manufacturing
industry that had previously struggled to compete with inexpensive German
products. 344 During the war, Australians were cautioned that German manufacturers
were in the process of secretly planning a post-war trade campaign that would
‘dazzle’ Australian consumers with bargains they could not refuse. 345 During this
xenophobic campaign, the “minds of thoughtful people” 346 were also actively
engaged in developing strategies and campaigns to foster the development of
Australian industry and overseas trade. 347 Australian manufacturers were urged to
seize the commercial opportunities that the war, with its associated problems with
trade, freight and isolation, had opened up. 348 They were especially encouraged to fill
the gaps left in the supply of German commodities that before the war had been so
vital to the Australian importer, and so popular with the consumer. 349
Yet, despite all of this patriotic rhetoric, the corsetry industry failed to
advance during the war because it lacked the necessary skilled workers and imported
materials for manufacturing corsets. 350 Furthermore, just as it was impossible during
this time to obtain machinery for the hosiery industry, it was “absolutely
impossible” 351

to

obtain

machinery

to

manufacture

corsets

within

the

Commonwealth. 352 Yet, this obstacle did not hinder Australian manufacturers
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lobbying for additional tariff protection to protect an industry that was still in its
embryonic stage and as yet remained untested.
By 1921, the issue of increased protective tariffs on imported corsets had
become a significant, and a strangely incongruous topic of passionate debate within
the Australian Parliament. 353 Senator Payne, who had been engaged in the corset
trade, 354 called the issue one of the “most important items in the Tariff from the point
of view of the general community.” 355 The topic was so hotly and emotively debated
that it even warranted all-night sittings. 356 The hostility in the debates was palpable,
with some senators being accused of being unpatriotic, and for having “no use for
Australian-made goods”. 357
An avowedly Protectionist Government proposed to raise the tariff
appreciably on corsets to 40 per cent (preferential), 50 per cent (intermediate) and 55
per cent (general). 358 This meant that a particular line of corset that retailed before
the war for 5s 11d, and then sold during the war at 9s 6d, would be sold under the
new increased rates for 12s 6d; this was an increase in price of over 100 per cent. 359
Opponents were concerned that the imposition of this proposed tariff increase was a
purely revenue raising-exercise and that the revenue “thus raised … [would come]
out of homes which can ill-afford to pay it.” 360 Others 361 pointed out that the corset
industry was asking more than most other clothing industries and it was
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“anomalous” 362 for it to receive different treatment from that extended to ordinary
apparel. 363
Payne insisted that a tariff increase would be an incentive for Australian
manufactures to substantially increase the price of their corsetry. 364 He told the
Chamber that after the previous tariff increase, the price of corsets of Australian
manufacture was put up by “several shillings”. 365 Gregory agreed and insisted that an
increase in tariffs on corsets would be the “same old story as during the war” 366 when
the local manufacturer, once safely secure “behind protection,” 367 would put up his
prices as near as he could to the cost of the imported article. 368 Importers of corsetry,
including Sir Horace Bayer, were indignant about the increase of tariff on corsetry,
particularly as the new tariff would adversely affected thousands of corsets that were
currently on route to Australia and those held in bond. 369 Bayer labelled the new
tariff as “Bolshevik laws” 370 and characterised himself as a “victim of legalised
robbery.” 371 He threatened to retaliate against what he considered to be a “gross
dishonesty” 372 of Custom procedures by using his connections in Ireland and
Scotland to “prevent anyone of the farm immigrant types from coming to
Australia.” 373
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In August 1921, the Senate was advised that D & A Co of America 374 and
Warmer Bros of America were intending to establish factories in Australia. 375 This
expansionist plan caused alarm with protectionists such as Senator Pratten who
recommended that the only way that American capital could be kept out of the
country was if there was a rapid development of the Australian industry. 376 Some
politicians actively encouraged the nascent industry. 377 They suggested that
Australian-made corsetry would not only be equal in quality to corsetry made in
America but they could be made and sold more cheaply 378 because of the added
packing and freight costs of imported corsets. 379 Senator Elliott even glibly
recommended that the industry could be started without “great expenditure of
capital” 380 and in a “small room containing a few sewing machines”. 381 He was naïve
when he suggested that by extending this ‘simple’ enterprise to a dozen country
centres that it would “soon bring down the price of the article to the Australian
buyer”. 382
Others such as Gregory, Lazzarini and Payne were more pragmatic and were
clearly cognisant of the impact that prohibitive tariffs would have on the ordinary
consumer. Gregory stressed that the Australian corsetry industry was still in its
embryonic stage. 383 He advised the House that the statistics for 1919 showed that
imported corsets, principally from America and Great Britain, were worth £876 000,
as opposed to Australian-made corsets that were worth only £36 000. 384 He argued
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that until Parliament had “concrete evidence” 385 that the corset industry was large
enough to be profitably conducted ‘in the Commonwealth’, then Parliament should
avoid imposing ‘heavy duties’ on the imported article. 386 Gregory maintained that
women should be able to buy the corset of her choice and not be forced to buy the
potentially second-rate Australia item: 387
Every lady wishes to buy the style of corset that suits her best, and undoubtedly the American
manufacturers, having paid more attention to hygiene than their British rivals, have won
popularity for their goods which insures them a more ready sale. 388

Although Payne would not denigrate the Australian product, he took the
trouble to remind his fellow Senators that the corset-making industry was “a
specialized industry.” 389 He claimed that skilled corset-makers in Europe and
America were, with their superior knowledge of the industry, 390 at a “stage of
perfection” 391 that could not be achieved by the Australian industry for many
years: 392 “no matter what facilities are given in Australia, it [would] be many years
before we can possibly hope to supply the whole of the needs of Australian users of
corsets.” 393
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9.3.3 The Tariff targets women

How women of slender means are going to provide themselves with good corsets of good
quality and design I do not know. 394

It was obvious to politicians such as Gregory that the increased tariff would
have an enormous impact on the female consumer. Yet, Mathews strongly denied
that the increased tariff on imported corsets was a “sex tax”. 395 He claimed that the
tariff was clearly a protective duty which, unlike the “old Tariff,” 396 was merely a
revenue duty. 397 He was an avowed protectionist who went so far as to declare that
he would place a duty of “1,000 per cent” on every corset that could be manufactured
in Australia. 398 Richard Foster, who like Payne, had been in the “trade,” 399
considered that protection on corsets was a “heavy tax upon the womenfolk in … the
community”. 400
Some members of Parliament were more informed and pragmatic than others
when articulating the corsetry needs of women. For instance, Gregory emphasised to
the members of the House that “[a]lmost every woman in civilised communities
[wore] corsets, and [had] done so for generations” 401 and that there was evidently
“some natural and physical reason for their universal adoption.” 402 Senator Payne
instructed his ‘brother’ Senators, that “proper shaping” 403 was needed for each
individual corset in order to make them comfortable for women to wear. 404
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Furthermore, he recommended that a large amount of care and attention would have
to be applied by Australian manufacturers in order to supply appropriate corsets that
had to be “moulded to a great variety of forms”. 405 At the same time, Payne warned
his colleagues that it was important to remember a gendered truism, for it could
seriously impact on their own personal happiness: “every man knows how essential it
is to a woman’s comfort that her corsets should fit well.” 406
Payne suggested that many women preferred the French or American corsets
because of their “peculiar shape,” 407 and claimed that the British manufactures had
gone “leeward” 408 because of their inflexibility in providing ‘lines’ that met “the real
needs of the people:” 409
We are not all built alike. Fortunately there are varieties of feature, and in the same way there
are varieties of form. Every woman cannot wear the same kind of corset. It is essential for each
woman to wear whatever corset suits her form, no matter where it may be made. 410

Payne claimed that women before the war could purchase a good British,
American or French corset for 7s 6d or 8s. However, after the 1921 Tarff increase,
the cost was 10s a pair. 411 On the other hand, Foster pointed out that it was not
possible to compare the pre-war and post-Greene Tariff prices on corsets. 412 He
suggested that corsetry fashions had changed over this period and that there was “a
marked change in the character” 413 of corsets that had much to do with “hygiene.”414
He suggested that women in 1921 were generally asking for “a very much superior
article” 415 to the “old style” 416 of corsets of pre-war days. 417 Furthermore, Foster
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maintained that the Australian corset industry was only producing about 3% of
Australian demand and that the more expensive locally-made corsets were lower
grade articles that were not popular with Australian women who were only able
afford a reasonable quality imported article. 418 Payne insisted that the only options
for consumers were to do without or to continue to purchase the imported items, even
though they attracted prohibitive duties. 419
It was clear to many that the increased tariff on corsetry was not only a ‘sex
tax’ but was also a “class tax”,420 as the woman who possessed a “large purse”421
could continue to have her corsets made to order in the “expensive salon.”422
Lazzarini suggested that there were some women who would be willing to pay 42s
for a pair of corsets and who would not care if there was “a duty of 200 per cent
imposed”. 423 It was suggested that the majority of women with little money were,
however, forced to wear Australian corsets, even if they were unsuitable “on account
of the prohibitive price.” 424 McWilliams contended that the small manufacturers
were being “coddled in the big cities of Sydney and Melbourne,” 425 and as a result,
women were being compelled to pay “an enhanced price” 426 to protect manufacturers
against overseas competition. 427 He branded the new Tariff as “a monstrosity from
start to finish” 428 and cautioned the House that the burden of the tariff on corsets was
one which was squarely on the shoulders of the lower classes: “[r]ich people do not
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care what they have to pay. The working people are the real sufferers. It is not a fair
deal.” 429
During the war and early post-war period, some parliamentarians sought to
invoke the sumptuary critique of luxury to justify their protectionist position. They
insisted that corsets were luxury items and should ‘naturally’ attract high tariffs.
Some were aghast at the notion that when Australia was in the “grip of a titanic war
struggle - a struggle for national existence,” 430 that luxuries such as corsets and
feathers still poured into Australia at “an alarming amount”. 431 It was pointed out
that during the year ended 30 June 1916, £259 479 worth of corsets “to encircle the
graceful [female] forms” 432 were imported into Australia. 433
In the 1920s, the critique of corsets as luxury items was often given short
shrift by others who vehemently argued that corsets were a necessity to women.
They maintained that it was unfair to impose excessively high duties and “thus
penalize the womenfolk of Australia”. 434 Mr Jowett MP was so confused about the
issue that he sought guidance from Mr Greene, the Minister for Trade and Customs,
as to whether corsets were luxuries or necessities. 435 Receiving no response, Jowett
“turned, as a last resource, to the information supplied in the daily press”. 436 It turned
out that this polemic, which tested men’s “intelligence and judgement”, 437 could only
be answered by a woman. Mrs Glenross, President of the Housewives Association
sought to confirm men’s ignorance about women’s personal clothing when she wrote
to Greene and asked whether he knew the difference between “corsets and
brassieres”. 438 Needless to say, she also received no reply. 439 She was reported to
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have told a meeting dealing that: “[m]en do not seem to see the necessity of corsets.
They do not seem to care a button whether we wear them or not.” 440

9.3.4 Women in Parliament: who better to advise what corset a woman ‘needed’

Mrs Glenross admitted that not every woman was fitted for Parliamentary duties, but not by
the wildest flight of imagination could it be assumed that every man who was there was fitted
for the position. 441

As seen in Chapter 8, there was an increasing demand in the media and
elsewhere for institutions such as the Arbitration Courts and Board of Trade during
the post war period to allow women a voice about their clothing needs: a subject
which they alone had intimate knowledge and experience. This demand for female
participation was amplified in 1921 because of comments made by Federal
Parliamentarians and the press during the tariff debates about imported corsetry. This
was particularly the case when it was reported that male parliamentarians were prone
to much entertainment when viewing and handling samples of corsetry, of which
they knew so very little: 442
A pair of Australian-made corsets was produced, much to the amusement of many members of
the House. There was a great deal of joking of the self-conscious kind. A member had only to
handle the article to raise a laugh, and the older the member the greater the mirth. 443\
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Mr Lister MP, a progressive politician, suggested that there should be
“representatives of the opposite sex”444 in the Parliament to assist men in the
discussion of “matters of this kind.” 445 Dr Maloney made an “impassioned
declaration” 446 for female representation. He argued that it would be a very good
thing for the House if there women members who could instruct “the mere males”447
on matters affecting “the corset-wearing sex”. 448 He maintained that women were
quite capable of making important decisions and that it was time that there were
some women in Parliament, particularly to speak on gendered issues such as the
importation of corsets: 449
If there were women here to speak for their sex, there would not be so much foolishness
spoken on their behalf as we hear now. Thirty years ago I moved in this Chamber to separate
women from the criminals and lunatics with whom they were classed in being deprived of the
right to vote. Woman has since obtained some of her rights, but she is not yet the political
equal of man. This Parliament is not at civilised as that of Finland, which has twenty-two
women in a House of 200 members. On one occasion, when there was some labour trouble, the
care of the principal city was intrusted to a committee elected from these twenty-two
women. 450

It was pointed out that women knew what type of corset they wanted and that,
over time, they had been “well educated on the subjects of corsets,” 451 and would
never by choice wear one which was “ill-fitting or badly cut”. 452 Yet, women
continued to be denied a voice in those Parliamentary debates that deliberated on
their most personal and feminine forms of apparel.
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9.3.5 Frank Burley’s Castle of Dreams

This is a story of dream and its fulfilment: the story of one who dreamed big dreams and
then worked, night and day, with heart and brain and hand, to make his dreams come
true. 453

Just as cotton hosiery was considered by many to be a great opportunistic
wartime industry and very suitable for Australian conditions, the establishment of an
Australian corsetry industry was similarly endorsed by Parliament and the press. 454
Greene argued that an Australian corset industry could provide employment for
many hands, 455 and he predicted that the industry could quickly satisfy Australia’s
demand for corsetry. 456 Furthermore, just as George Bond and other hosiery
manufacturers were championed by the press and some parliamentarians as
entrepreneurial visionaries leading the development of a new cotton hosiery industry
in Australia, there was a parallel anointment of Frank Burley457 as a heroic visionary
who led the Australian corsetry industry. 458
Like George Bond, Burley was the consummate salesman and political
lobbyist. He vigorously bragged to politicians and the press that his business was
‘capable’ of “turning out over 600 000 pairs of corsets per annum”. 459 Prompted by
his own self-interests, when describing his products he continually spruiked the
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fashionable axioms about female health, beauty and comfort. 460 He doggedly
criticized the low tariff on corsets and proclaimed that the industry was “scarcely
protected at all.” 461 He also advocated that it was the duty of the Tariff Board to
protect “a certain class of persons…against themselves” 462 by the imposition of a
protective tariff that would remove the temptation from women to buy imported
corsets: 463 “[t]he Australian corset should be insisted upon, and that can only be
brought about by the operations of the Customs House, or better still, by drastic
legislation.” 464
Furthermore, Burley insisted that the Australian woman “should be taken in
hand”

465

by her menfolk, who he said were expected to pressure her to buy only

Australian-made corsetry. 466 He declared that a protected corset-industry, which
concerned itself with “the health, beauty and physique”

467

of Australian women, was

at the core of the future development of “the Australian race”. 468 Burley maintained
that Australian women “must be educated” 469 and forced to visit his factory, so they
could appreciate that only Australian corset makers knew how to make corsets for
Australian women. He insisted that a woman who wore the French or American
corset 470 was either guilty of “thoughtlessness or ignorance:” 471
The danger and absurdity of the Australian women wearing in the month of February in
Australia a corset made for a woman in the north of England in December must be apparent to
anybody. 472
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By 1926, it became obvious that some protectionist parliamentarians were
becoming increasingly sceptical about the type of artificial protection that many
Australian manufacturers continually expected from government. 473 They began to
oppose proposals to increase tariffs on imported clothing because they were
conscious of the adverse effect such duties were having on consumers. 474 Even those
members of the Tariff Board who were committed protectionists, were becoming
concerned about the level of protection being accorded to those emerging industries
that made every attempt to “shelter plant, machinery and methods which have
passed, or are passing out of date under stress of modern development.”

475

These

Board members maintained that such practices should not be encouraged and urged
Parliament to ensure that opportunities for the abuse of the protectionist system be
eliminated. 476
By 1930, the Board, despite considerable criticism from the authors of the
Brigden Report and other quarters, was more realistic about the reasons for
stagnating industries and government debt. The Board was “inspired by “a kind of
gloomy wisdom” 477 and began to regularly reject unwarranted manufactures’ claims
for increased protection and dismiss exhortations that every national misfortune and
economic difficulty should be blamed on “greedy trade unionists and cunning
foreigners.” 478

9.4

Conclusion

Chapter 9 examines two fledgling Australian clothing industries that sought,
with the assistance of government, to expand their control over the Australian
domestic market. During the early post-war period private business interests were
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enthusiastically encouraged by governments that insisted Australia’s future
development was dependent upon a robust manufacturing sector. This meant that
during this period the tariff continued to remain the major instrument of economic
policy. For protectionists, the tariff was a populist regulatory technique that
government was obliged to use to achieve its ideals of national wealth and
prosperity. It helped create employment, protected the cost of living and encouraged
‘appropriate’ immigration.
In Chapters 4, 6 and 8 we see that during the first two decades following
Federation the sumptuary impulse was stimulated by both protectionist aims and
concerns about morality. In Chapters 8 and 9 we see that by the early 1920s,
sumptuary discourse had shifted its discursive emphasis from this mixed
protectionist/morality focus to one that was increasingly preoccupied with national
economy. In chapter 9, there is little evidence of the anti-luxury, moral regulation
discourses of the earlier period even in those industries that were concerned with
basic women’s apparel. 479 Instead, sumptuary discourse is increasingly underpinned
by ‘nationalistic’ demands that Australians should be forced to support local
industries by wearing only Australian-made apparel. This chapter also demonstrates
that whilst government was giving manufacturers their unreserved support, the Tariff
Board was beginning to doubt the efficacy of providing unlimited support to
industries that were clearly inefficient and mismanaged.
Chapter 10 will present the final conclusion for this thesis, initially
summarising the key findings from each chapter, and then providing some examples
of how the sumptuary ethic has today had lingered in different forms.
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10 CONCLUSION

10.1 The purpose of this chapter

This thesis had provided an interdisciplinary analysis concerning the
‘eruption’ of sumptuary regulation in Australia in the early decades following
Federation. It demonstrates that sumptuary law did not disappear with the passing of
time as generally believed. Rather, it surprisingly resurfaced in new guises in
Australia after Federation.
This chapter draws together the threads of sumptuary regulation that surfaced
during this period: the moralisation of luxury and extravagance, the hierarchical
ordering of appearance and the protection of domestic industry. The interlacement of
these threads reveals a fresh sumptuary narrative shaped by those atypical social,
economic and political conditions that prevailed in Australia during its early years as
a fledgling nation.
Whilst Australians are not currently subject to specific sumptuary hierarchical
laws that control the type and quality of clothing that is worn by Australian people,
this chapter briefly demonstrates that, nonetheless, traces of the sumptuary ethic
persistently underlie some contemporary legislation and government policy.

10.2 Structure of this chapter
The chapter begins by discussing the themes and observations in each chapter
of this thesis. The chapter then moves to remark on the presence of the sumptuary
ethic in modern day legislation and policy.
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10.3 Drawing together the threads
At the outset, this thesis proposed to demonstrate manifestations of
sumptuary regulation in Australia during the first three decades following Federation.
This period was one that was marked by momentous social, technological and
political anxieties and vicissitudes. Australia was in the process of trying to define its
new subjectivity as a fledgling Federated Commonwealth, whilst at the same time, it
sought to position itself economically and culturally as an essential but isolated
member of the British Empire. The war brought forth further unparalleled political,
economic and social difficulties that challenged the freedoms and choices of ordinary
Australians.
To cope with these challenges, authorities sought to implement a wide range
of social and economic policies. In many instances, these policies sought to strictly
regulate the private and public behaviour of certain sections of the Australian
population to more closely reflect traditional hegemonic values and expectations.
This thesis argued that in many instances these interventionist policies, many of
which were exercised as wartime measures, closely reflected the interventionist
nature of the sumptuary laws of the early modern period.
This thesis had a particular focus on the regulation of dress. Whilst postFederation Australian interventionist tariff policies may not have aimed to regulate
dress, it was in their effects that we saw clear evidence of the sumptuary ethic.
Whilst most of the research focuses on the regulation of dress, Chapter 7 highlighted
the presence of other targets of sumptuary regulation during these first decades after
Federation.
Chapter 2 drew on the research of Hunt and Baldwin and provided an
opportunity to deconstruct the sumptuary laws of the early modern period. This
deconstruction revealed those warp threads that underpinned the sumptuary ethic: its
moralising tendencies, its hierarchical paradigms, its implicit nationalism and its
desire to protect local industries. During the deconstruction process, supplementary
weft threads of class and gender were also exposed.
This chapter explained that the sumptuary laws of this period sought to
control the type and cost of clothing that was worn by various ranks in society. These
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laws were often complicated edicts that provided meticulous hierarchical dress codes
that were based on rank, income, position and wealth. Furthermore, the chapter
revealed how the moralisation of luxury was at the core of discourses surrounding
the demand for sumptuary laws. 1 However, at times, the sumptuary reflex was also
stimulated by economic motives, especially when authorities sought to protect local
industries from overseas imports. Often, authorities employed sumptuary regulation
as a ‘paternal’ interventionist regimen that aimed, with mixed motives, to ‘guide’ and
protect both the moral and economic lives of their people.
Chapter 3 provided a contextual cache that can be drawn upon in
understanding the motivations and influence of Australian individuals and
institutions that figured prominently in later chapters played in the revival of
sumptuary regulation in the early 20th century.
A large part of this thesis dealt with the sumptuary effect of prohibitive
taxation (in the form of tariffs) on clothing in the first few years following
Federation. Chapter 4 was a foundational chapter that served to illustrate the shift in
taxing policies on goods from 1788 until 1914. By 1914, government no longer
relied upon taxation just for the provision of revenue. The chapter argued that
government began to use taxation as an interventionist tool to modify the
consumption practices of its people to reflect its favoured economic policy of
protectionism.
Chapter 4 demonstrated that, by the end of the first decade, a strong
symbiotic relationship had developed between this type of taxation and
protectionism. Whilst the express purpose and primary effect of tariff policy was the
protection of local industries, at the same time, the effects of protectionist policies
began to bear a striking resemblance to the aims and effects of sumptuary laws of the
early modern period. This chapter exposed the sumptuary threads that began to
resurface in protectionist discourse. It also illustrated that prohibitive tariffs on
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imported goods, such as clothing, were beginning to have a clear sumptuary
influence on the consumption practices of many Australians, especially those of the
lower classes. In particular, prohibitive tariffs on imported clothing could effectively
regulate the type and quality of clothing that certain people could wear.
The research in Chapter 4 also demonstrated how the figure of Luxury
excited moral condemnation and stimulated the regulatory reflex in post-Federation
Australia. Chapter 4 showed that Parliament and the press were anxious about the
‘evil’ effect of imported luxuries and women’s extravagance in dress. Lower class
women were particularly targeted for regulation. There were even calls for the
revival of ‘the old sumptuary laws’ as a way to control extravagance and women’s
desire for ever-changing fashion apparel. The chapter revealed that Australia’s
particular brand of protectionism was revitalising the sumptuary ethic long after the
disappearance of the English sumptuary legislation of the early modern period.
Having established the sumptuary effect of early post-Federation protectionist
policies affecting imported clothing, the thesis shifted to Chapter 5 to demonstrate
that the imposition of prohibitive tariffs on imported clothing was not the only form
of sumptuary regulation that surfaced in the post-Federation period. This chapter
examined the sumptuary effect of female ‘living wage’ determinations made by
Australian arbitrations courts before and after the First World War.
In cases such as Fruitpickers 2 and Archer, 3 arbitration judges posited
themselves as both official arbiters of taste and as adjudicators of ‘normative’ dress
for working class women. This chapter explained how these judges, when assessing
the minimum wage for female workers, placed a skewed emphasis on the cost and
‘appropriateness’ of their apparel. Judges sought to curtail the alleged fickleness and
extravagance of female workers by denying them a sufficient wage that would allow
them to afford to purchase the clothing of their choice. Furthermore, they arbitrarily
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set prescriptive standards of dress for these female workers whilst at the same time
taking the opportunity to chastise them for their profligacy and to encourage them to
better equip themselves for marriage by adopting thrifty practices.
During the war, governing classes became even more anxious about the
increased demand for imported clothing and the problem of squandering national
wealth. They were concerned that many Australians, particularly the lower classes,
were wasting their money on luxuries and fashionable apparel, at a time when they
should be saving their money for future exigencies or ‘patriotically’ investing their
surplus funds in war bonds. Chapter 6 demonstrated that it was during this period
that the demand for sumptuary regulation to control extravagant spending on
‘inappropriate’ luxuries reached its apogee in Australia.
This chapter revealed the extent to which luxury became a focus of moral
critique and a target for regulation for Australian governments during the war years.
After appeals for self-regulation had been ignored, Prime Minister Hughes, in May
1917, introduced a modern manifestation of sumptuary regulation when he
established the Luxuries Board to determine the categories of luxury goods that were
be denied to Australian consumers until the end of war. Chapter 6 suggested that the
establishment of the Board could be characterised as a unique interventionist
sumptuary scheme that sought to quell wartime anxieties about economic waste,
extravagance and mimesis; the same kind of anxieties that prompted the sumptuary
laws of the early modern period.
It was revealed in Chapter 2 that sumptuary laws of the early modern period
were not limited to the regulation of dress and that at times sumptuary laws targeted
the consumption of food, alcohol, social ceremonies, entertainment and wealth.
Chapter 7 demonstrated the pervasiveness and malleability of sumptuary regulation
in Australia during the post-Federation period. In particular, this chapter argued that
the sumptuary impulse that surfaced in Australia during the early decades following
Federation was similarly not limited to the regulation of dress. In fact, this chapter
argued that the sumptuary impulse became evident in all manner of guises of
interventionist policy. This was especially the case during the war when
governments, beset by issues concerning national security and morality, made use of
the War Precautions Act 1914 (Cth) to constrain personal freedoms. The chapter
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foregrounded two such wartime ‘non-appearential’ projects: Anti-Shouting laws and
the Entertainments Tax Act 1916 (Cth).
As shown in chapter 2, luxury and extravagance in dress in the early modern
period persistently excited moral censure and stimulated the regulatory reflex.
Chapter 8 demonstrated the robustness of the perennial treatment of luxury and
female dress in an Australian context. The chapter showed how ‘fashionable’
Australian women in the early decades after Federation were labelled as ‘unpatriotic’
and viciously chastised by masculinist institutions, individuals and women’s groups
for squandering national resources on trivial and inappropriate imported fripperies.
The chapter revealed that war-time exigencies and governments’ ‘fervent’ devotion
to protectionism further exacerbated these gendered attacks. The chapter
demonstrated that these women were vilified for their alleged fickleness and
profligacy and were also held responsible for the failure of various Australian
industries and for increasing the cost of living. Manufacturers, protectionists and
‘patriots’, such as Ivy Brookes and Ruth Beale, called for women to curtail their
obsession with rapidly changing imported fashion apparel and to support local
industries. They went so far as to demand that government force women to eschew
imported fashion apparel in favour of Australian made clothing.
Chapter 8 set up a contrast between the treatment by government and the
press concerning women’s fashion and men’s underwear. It was argued that whilst
moralisation persistently continued to underpin discourse concerning women’s
fashion apparel into the 1920s, the regulation of men’s clothing via the imposition of
prohibitive tariffs was sparked more by purely economic objectives than with a
concern with moral regulation. It is in only the effects of these tariffs on working
men and the self-serving demands of manufacturers that we see evidence of the
sumptuary impulse.
Chapter 9 illustrated the shift in the discursive context surrounding the
incidence of sumptuary regulation in Australia during the 1920s. By the end of the
First World War, protectionism had become Australia’s ‘settled’ economic policy. In
1921, legislation was enacted for establishment of as the ‘institutional voice’ of
protectionism and its role was to encourage and support emerging domestic
industries that were facing enormous overseas competition. Sumptuary regulation
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became more about economic intervention than about moral regulation. However,
sumptuary regulation was not completely subsumed by protectionism during this
period. The two case studies within Chapter 9 demonstrated that, at least in the case
of the hosiery and corsetry industries, the sumptuary ethic remained unmistakably
intact. In seeking to control the domestic market, hosiery and corsetry manufactures
sought to increase the level of demand for their products by insisting that
governments force certain sections of society to wear only Australian-made hose and
corsets. Chapter 9 revealed how those involved with the establishment of two iconic
industries took full advantage of opportunities opened up by the war as well as the
generous protection offered by government and the Tariff Board.

10.4 Remnants of the Sumptuary Impulse in present day consumer
culture
Hunt suggests, the sumptuary laws did not die but were transfigured into
more modern regulatory projects. 4 Despite this transformation, the sumptuary ethic
has remained resilient and pervasive since the early modern period. It has been
suggested that sumptuary regulation has been in the habit of making “many final
curtain calls”. 5 For instance, this thesis argues that the threads of sumptuary
regulation were clearly visible in Australia in the interventionist projects in the early
decades following Federation. These sumptuary threads were also evident in the US
prohibitionist policies of the 1920s and 1930s. 6 They again resurfaced in Germany
before the Second World War when certain fashion clothing was forbidden by the
Nazi regime in favour of Aryan national costumes and uniforms. 7 In Australia,
sumptuary regulation resurfaced during this war under the guise of rationing and
austerity measures. 8 During this period, economy was “arbitrarily forced upon
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[Australians]”. 9 It was accompanying by the same moralising discourse that sought
to chastise Australians about their extravagance and self-indulgence during the early
years following Federation. 10 The sumptuary ethic has continued to resurface
occasionally in Australia in the press and in Parliament in discussions about the
propriety of dress and the need for dress codes in certain social and business
situations. 11
Whilst modern legal commentators may be hesitant to characterise or label
current regulatory dress codes or consumption-based laws as sumptuary law, it is
evident that many of the modern codes and laws concerning dress, luxuries and
consumables are “built upon the foundations of early sumptuary laws.” 12
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the modern dress standards for some
industries and occupations provide in some instances, a “platform for interventionist”
and such standards are often linked with the moralisation of gendered appearance. 13
Hunt suggests that the critique of extravagance has not entirely disappeared.
He argues that it still lives on “with considerable vitality” 14 in the moralisation that
underpins the regulation of gambling. 15 Furthermore, moralisation is also still present
in legislation and government policies that seek to regulate the use and promotion of
drugs, alcohol and tobacco. 16 Hunt argues that this form of moral regulation has
increasingly become associated with discursive medicalisation discourse. 17 He
contends that the state continues to play a decisive role in the sponsorship and
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coordination of what he calls these “medico-moral projects.” 18 Hunt argues that it is
only in the field of the governance of sexuality where “pure forms of moral
regulation” 19 still exist. He cites the continuing contestation over pornography as
“the classic case”. 20
It is evident that the sumptuary ethic still lingers under various guises. In the
last few years there had been a trend by some US academics to link current
regulation “of attire or grooming” 21 with traditional sumptuary law. 22 For instance,
Lucille M Ponte argues that there are clear linkages between the foundational tenets
of traditional sumptuary laws and the proposed Design Piracy Prohibition Act
(US). 23 She suggests that whilst the Act, which was to be introduced in a time of
“great transition and flux”, 24 ostensibly aimed at protecting the creative efforts of
fashion designers from manufacturers who copy and sell replicas of designers’
creation to retailers, it is nonetheless underpinned by sumptuary imperatives. 25 Ponte
contends that the drafters of the proposed Act sought to shield the US fashion
industry by promoting government control over social identity and by enforcing
notions of public morality. 26 She insists that the Act would not only assist the
wealthy to use fashion to differentiate themselves from the general public but it
would deny lower-status people from accessing cheap ‘knock-offs’ from overseas.

27

A similar issue has arisen in Australia when local manufacturers and business
retailers demanded that government protect their interests by the imposition of GST
on overseas internet purchases. 28
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Ibid 398.
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Ruthann Robson, ‘Beyond Sumptuary: Constitutionalism, Clothes, and Bodies in Anglo-American
Law’ (2013) 2 British Journal of American Legal Studies 478.
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Ponte, above n 12, 51.
24
Ibid 75.
25
Ibid 51.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid 82-84.
28
Crikey, Netflix Tax Well and Good, but it’s time to add GST to Overseas Purchases (12 May 2015)
<http://www.crikey.com.au/2015/05/12/netflix-tax-well-and-good-but-its-time-to-add-gst-to-overseaspurchases/?>.
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Barton Beebe suggests that certain areas of intellectual property law have
adopted a sumptuary role by seeking to provide a means to preserve “our
conventional system of consumption-based social distinction”. 29 Whilst he
acknowledges that the express purpose of intellectual property law remains the
“misappropriation and the promotion of technological and cultural progress” 30 he
argues that legislators have increasingly invested this law with sumptuary purposes. 31
Beebe argues that legislators have turned to intellectual property laws to protect
forms of distinction from imitation and overproduction. 32
In conclusion, whilst the sumptuary laws on dress of the early modern age
have been dismissed by many legal commentators as “dusty relics of pre-industrial
societies”, 33 this thesis has demonstrated that the sumptuary imperative is resilient
and has continued to resurface unexpectedly in various transfigurations since these
laws themselves have waned.

29

Barton Beebe, “Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code” (2010) 123 Harvard Law
Review 2, 5.
30
Ibid 5.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
33
Ponte, above n 12, 48.
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